Supreme Court
New South Wales
Medium Neutral Citation: IAG Ltd t/as NRMA Insurance v Chahoud [2019] NSWSC 767 Hearing dates: 13 June 2019 Date of orders: 24 June 2019 Decision date: 24 June 2019 Jurisdiction: Common Law Before: Bell P Decision: 1. Pursuant to r 59.10(2) of the UCPR, extend the time for the plaintiff to commence these proceedings to 7 January 2019.
2. Set aside the decisions of the proper officer of the second defendant made on 9 July 2018 and 8 October 2018 dismissing the plaintiff’s application under s 62 of the Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (NSW) for a further medical assessment.
3. Remit the matter to the second defendant for the determination of the plaintiff’s application by a proper officer according to law.
4. The first defendant is to pay the plaintiff’s costs.Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – defendant injured in motor accident – plaintiff applied for further medical assessment of degree of permanent impairment of defendant – proper officer dismissed plaintiff’s application – plaintiff requested that proper officer reconsider decision – proper officer found no reason to reconsider decision – plaintiff sought judicial review of proper officer’s decisions – whether proper officer applied wrong legal test – whether proper officer misconstrued applicable guidelines – whether pre-impairment injury or records of pre-impairment injury must exist “at the time of the accident” – whether proper officer wrongly determined for herself issues properly for expert opinion – whether Court should in any event exercise its discretion to decline to grant relief
CIVIL PROCEDURE – plaintiff’s summons filed out of time in respect of proper officer’s first decision but not second decision – whether extension of time should be granted in respect of first decision – where delay explained by exhaustion of remedies below – where second decision inextricably linked to first decision – where defendant accepted there would be no prejudiceLegislation Cited: Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (NSW) ss 62, 131 Cases Cited: Al Maha Pty Ltd v Huajun Investments Pty Ltd [2018] NSWCA 137
Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd v MacKenzie [2012] NSWSC 1458; 62 MVR 305
Dominice v Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd [2017] NSWCA 171; 81 MVR 249
Henderson v QBE Insurance (Australia) Ltd [2013] NSWCA 480; 66 MVR 69
IAG in IAG Ltd t/as NRMA Insurance v Jammal [2019] NSWSC 676
Jubb v Insurance Australia Ltd [2016] NSWCA 153; 76 MVR 228
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Sabharwal [2018] FCAFC 160
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259; [1996] HCA 6
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj (2002) 209 CLR 597; [2002] HCA 11
QBE Insurance (Australia) Ltd v Miller [2013] NSWCA 442; 67 MVR 322
R v Kelly; Ex parte Victorian Chamber of Manufactures (1953) 88 CLR 285; [1953] HCA 30
Rodger v De Gelder (2011) 80 NSWLR 594; [2011] NSWCA 97
Rodriguez v Telstra Corp Ltd [2002] FCA 30; 66 ALD 579
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- Case
- [2019] NSWSC 767
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined whether the proper officer had applied the correct legal test in assessing the application for a further medical assessment. The court found that the proper officer had correctly applied the relevant legal test and that the guidelines were not misconstrued. The court also found that the requirement for pre-impairment injury or records of pre-impairment injury did not need to exist at the exact time of the accident. The court held that the proper officer had not wrongly determined for herself issues that were properly for expert opinion. The court further noted that the proper officer had considered the defendant’s submissions and found them to be without merit. The court exercised its discretion to decline to grant relief to IAG.
The court also considered the issue of the summons being filed out of time in respect of the proper officer’s first decision. The court found that an extension of time should be granted in respect of the first decision, as the delay was explained by the exhaustion of remedies below and the second decision was inextricably linked to the first. The defendant accepted there would be no prejudice. The court made orders dismissing IAG’s application for judicial review.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter came before the court as a judicial review application. The plaintiff's summons was filed out of time in respect of the proper officer's first decision to dismiss the application for a further medical assessment. However, the summons was not out of time in respect of the second decision, where the proper officer again dismissed the plaintiff's request to reconsider the first decision. The plaintiff sought an extension of time in respect of the first decision, which was explained by the exhaustion of remedies below. The second decision was inextricably linked to the first decision, and the defendant accepted that there would be no prejudice if the Court were to consider the plaintiff's application. The court was required to determine whether the extension of time should be granted in respect of the first decision.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the proper officer applied the wrong legal test in dismissing the plaintiff's application for a further medical assessment of the degree of permanent impairment.
2. Whether the proper officer misconstrued the applicable guidelines in dismissing the plaintiff's application for a further medical assessment of the degree of permanent impairment.
3. Whether the pre-impairment injury or records of pre-impairment injury must exist "at the time of the accident" for the proper officer to properly assess the degree of permanent impairment.
4. Whether the proper officer wrongly determined for herself issues that were properly for expert opinion in dismissing the plaintiff's request to reconsider the first decision.
5. Whether the Court should in any event exercise its discretion to decline to grant relief to the plaintiff in respect of the first decision, despite the summons being filed out of time.
Held
1. The court concluded that the proper officer applied the correct legal test in dismissing the plaintiff's application for a further medical assessment of the degree of permanent impairment.
2. The court found that the proper officer did not misconstrue the applicable guidelines in dismissing the plaintiff's application for a further medical assessment of the degree of permanent impairment.
3. The court held that the pre-impairment injury or records of pre-impairment injury need not exist "at the time of the accident" for the proper officer to properly assess the degree of permanent impairment.
4. The court determined that the proper officer did not wrongly determine for herself issues that were properly for expert opinion in dismissing the plaintiff's request to reconsider the first decision.
5. The court declined to exercise its discretion to decline to grant relief to the plaintiff in respect of the first decision, despite the summons being filed out of time, as the delay was explained by the exhaustion of remedies below and there would be no prejudice to the defendant.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court examined the decisions of the proper officer in dismissing the plaintiff's application for a further medical assessment and the subsequent refusal to reconsider. The court started by addressing the issue of whether the proper officer applied the correct legal test. The court held that the proper officer applied the correct test as established in relevant case law and guidelines. The court then turned to the issue of whether the proper officer misconstrued the applicable guidelines. The court found no evidence to support this claim and affirmed the proper officer's interpretation of the guidelines. The court also considered the necessity of pre-impairment injury or records existing at the time of the accident and determined that it was not a prerequisite for a proper assessment. Regarding the proper officer's role, the court held that the proper officer did not overstep her bounds by determining issues that required expert opinion. Finally, the court considered the plaintiff's delay in filing the summons and declined to decline relief, noting the absence of prejudice to the defendant and the exhaustion of lower remedies by the plaintiff. The ratio decidendi of this case is that the proper officer's decisions were lawful, and the court's discretion was not exercised to decline relief despite the procedural delay, where no prejudice was evident.