Letts and Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission (Veterans' entitlements) [2025] ARTA 1032 (16 July 2025)
Applicant:John Letts
Respondent: Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission
Tribunal Number: 2024/1908, 2024/1909
Tribunal:Senior Member D Thomae
Place:Brisbane
Date:16 July 2025
Decision:The Tribunal affirms the decision under review.
................................[SGD]...........................
Statement made on 14 July 2025 at 4:40pm
CATCHWORDS
VETERANS’ AFFAIRS – claim for ischemic heart disease and essential tremor – veteran conscripted for national service within Australia – are medical conditions connected to service in the Australian Army – medical evidence of clinical onset and causation – decision under review affirmed.
Legislation
Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (Cth)
Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation (Defence-related Claims) Act 1988 (Cth)
Cases
Beezley v Repatriation Commission [2015] FCAFC 165
Comcare v Mooi [1996] FCA 1587
Comcare v Power [2015] FCA 1502
Comcare v Sahu-Khan [2007] FCA 15
Dekker and Australian Postal Corporation [2018] AATA 682
De Tarle v Comcare [2022] FCA 175
Kattenberg v Repatriation Commission [2002] FCA 412
Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission v May (2016) 257 CLR 468
Rodriguez v Telstra Corporation [2002] FCA 30Smith and Comcare [2013] FCAFC 65
Vivian and Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission [2005] AATA 875
Secondary Materials
Statement of Principles concerning Ischaemic Heart Disease (Balance of Probabilities) No. 28 of 2025
Statement of Reasons
INTRODUCTION
On 22 March 2024, the applicant, Mr Letts, made an application for review[1] to the General Division of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the AAT)[2] of the decision by the Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission (the Commission) to affirm the determination denying liability under s 14 of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation (Defence-related Claims) Act 1988 (DRCA) for ‘essential tremor and ischaemic heart disease’.
[1] Exhibit R1.
[2] On 14 October 2024, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal became the Administrative Review Tribunal (the Tribunal). Under the transitional provisions in the Administrative Review Tribunal (Consequential and Transitional Provisions No. 1) Act 2024 (the Transitional Act), proceedings in the AAT that were not finalised before 14 October 2024 are to be continued and finalised by the Tribunal. Anything done in relation to the proceeding before 14 October 2024 is taken to have been done by the Tribunal.
Mr Letts gave evidence at the hearing. Mr Letts was self-represented. Ms Audsley,of the Australian Government Solicitor, represented the Commission.
The Tribunal admitted into evidence the exhibits which are listed in the annexure to these reasons.
BACKGROUND
Mr Letts was born in 1947 and is now aged 78 years old.
Mr Letts served in the Australian Army (Army) as a national serviceman for 2 years between July 1967 and July 1969 as a private, air despatcher, in the Royal Australian Army Corps of Transport.
On 10 July 2021, Mr Letts made separate claims for ‘essential tremor’ and ‘coronary artery disease’ (the Claim).[3]
[3] Exhibit R3 & R4.
By a determination dated 29 August 2022, the Commission denied liability for the Claim (the Primary Determination
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- Letts and Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission (Veterans' entitlements) [2025] ARTA 1032
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether Mr Letts' service in the Army materially or significantly contributed to his ischemic heart disease and essential tremor, as defined under the Defence Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 2004 (Cth). The court needed to determine if the Commission's decision to deny the claim was justified based on the medical evidence provided.
The court reviewed the medical evidence provided by various specialists, including Dr Herman, a cardiologist, who diagnosed Mr Letts with coronary heart disease and found that his condition was significantly contributed to by non-service-related factors such as hypertension, hyperlipaemia, and age. Dr Krishnan, a neurologist, diagnosed Mr Letts with essential tremor, a genetic condition that would have developed irrespective of his Army service. Dr Garrity, a psychiatrist, noted Mr Letts' history of chronic depression and PTSD, which he believed was related to his service. The court found that the medical evidence did not support the claim that Mr Letts' conditions were significantly contributed to by his Army service. The court concluded that the Commission's decision to deny the claim was correct.
The court affirmed the decision of the Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission, denying Mr Letts' claim for compensation.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Commission contends:[14][14] Respondent’s SOFIC at [50]- [59].(a)That there is no medical evidence to support that Mr Letts Claimed Medical Conditions were contributed to by his service to the requisite degree required or at all.(b)That the likely date of clinical onset of Mr Letts Claimed Medical Conditions is:(i)On or around December 2020 for ‘essential tremor’ based on when Mr Letts first sought treatment from a Dr Puhl.(ii)In March 2019 for ‘ischemic heart disease’ based on the opinion of Dr Herman and Dr Saunders, Mr Letts general practitioner.(c)That Mr Letts essential tremor is unrelated to his Army service and is in fact, a genetic condition, supported by the opinion of Professor Krishnan.(d)The Tribunal must first need to be satisfied that liability exists under s14 of the DRCA before turning to the deeming provision under s7(4) to determine the date of injury, citing Smith and Comcare [2013] FCAFC 65.CONSIDERATIONDiagnosis The High Court in Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission v May (2016) 257 CLR 468 at [49] explained that the first task the Tribunal must undertake under the SRC Act (the DRCA is relevantly in the same terms) is to consider the facts to determine if the employee is suffering a ‘disease’ or an ‘injury’. There is no controversy in the medical evidence before the Tribunal. The Tribunal is reasonably satisfied that the correct diagnosis of the Claimed Medical Conditions is ‘essential tremor’ and ‘ischemic heart disease’.Was Mr Letts’s ‘essential tremor’ and ‘ischemic heart disease’ contributed to, to a ‘material’ or ‘significant’ degree, by his employment so as to constitute a ‘disease’? The definition of ‘injury’ under ss 5A(1) of the DRCA includes ‘a disease suffered by an employee’. Subsection 5B(1) of the DRCA defines ‘disease’ to mean either ‘an ailment suffered by an employee’ or ‘an aggravation of such an ailment’, that was ‘contributed to, to a significant degree, by the employee’s employment by the Commonwealth’. The Tribunal is reasonably satisfied based on the uncontroversial medical evidence that Mr Letts medical conditions of ‘ischemic heart disease’ and ‘essential tremor’ are each a disease and s 5B of the DRCA applies in determining whether the Commission is liable under s 14 of the DRCA. The application of the term ‘contributed to a significant degree by the employee’s employment by the Commonwealth or a licensee’ in s 5B of the SRC Act, in the same terms as s 5B of the DRCA, was considered in Comcare v Power [2015] FCA 1502 by Katzmann J at [93]-[94]:[15]There is no room for doubt that the purpose of the 2007 amendments was to strengthen the connection necessary between the employment and the contraction or aggravation of a disease. Including a definition of “significant” as “substantially more than material” makes this abundantly clear. In other words, it is insufficient that the contribution of the employment be “more than trivial”; it had to be substantially more than trivial. The Tribunal did not recognise this, despite its reference to the definition. The error the Tribunal made is similar to the one made by the Tribunal in Sahu-Khan. In a valiant attempt to save the decision Ms Robinson drew attention to the fact that Dr Lewin had said “certainly more than trivial”, but this was no more than an emphatic way of saying “more than trivial”. It did not satisfy the statutory test and the Tribunal was mistaken in thinking otherwise.Moreover, the current test of contribution also requires an evaluative exercise to be undertaken. That is apparent both from the words used in subs (1) of s 5B and also the matters to which subs (2) draws attention. The Tribunal did not engage with any of them. Indeed, it did not mention subs (2) at all. While the chapeau to the subsection states that those matters “may” (not “shall”) be taken into account, a word which is generally permissive, properly construed it is at least arguable that in this context it is directory; in other words that “may” means “shall”: see Julius v Lord Bishop of Oxford (1880) 5 App Cas 214 at 222–223 (Earl Cairns LC); NorthAustralian Aboriginal Justice Agency Ltd v Northern Territory [2015] HCA 41 at [209] (Nettle and Gordon JJ). In the absence of argument on this question I refrain from expressing a concluded view. Nevertheless, there is nothing in the Tribunal’s reasons to indicate that it carried out the kind of evaluative exercise required by the statute.[15] [2015] FCA 1502 at [93]-[94].