Warren; Services Australia and (Freedom of information)

Link copied
Case Copied 76 min read

Warren; Services Australia and (Freedom of information) [2022] AATA 4191 (2 December 2022)

Division:FREEDOM OF INFORMATION DIVISION

File Number:          2019/7870

Re:Services Australia

APPLICANT

AndJustin Warren

RESPONDENT

Decision

Tribunal:Deputy President Britten-Jones

Date:2 December 2022 

Place:Melbourne

The decision of the Tribunal is to:

(a)affirm the Information Commissioner’s review decision in relation to documents 4, 9, 10 and 12; and

(b)set aside and substitute the Information Commissioner’s review decision in relation to documents 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8 and find that these documents are exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth).

.......................[sgd].................................................

Deputy President Britten-Jones

Catchwords

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION – request for access to Robodebt documents – Information Commissioner granted access to some but not all documents – Services Australia applies for review – onus on Services Australia to establish that the decision of the Information Commissioner is not justified – objections to evidence – Cabinet documents – application of s 34(1)(d) of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) (FOI Act) - interpretation of section 34(3) of the FOI Act – whether disclosure would reveal a Cabinet Deliberation - interpretation of the qualification in s 34(3) as to whether the existence of the deliberation has been officially disclosed - whether Cabinet deliberations were officially disclosed – whether documents are conditionally exempt under s 47C of the FOI Act – public interest test – decision under review is partially set aside.

Legislation

Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth)

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth)

Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth)

Cases

Casey v Repatriation Commission (1995) 60 FCR 510

Commonwealth v Northern Land Council (1992) 176 CLR 604
Elliott v R (2007) 239 ALR 651
Fisse v Secretary, the Department of Treasury (2008) 172 FCR 513
Fountain v Alexander (1982) 150 CLR 615
Harris v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1983) 50 ALR 551
Heyward v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2009) 112 ALD 226; [2009] FCA 1313
Kamasaee v Commonwealth of Australia & Ors (No. 5) [2016) VSC 595
Kioa v West [1985] HCA 81; (1985) 159 CLR 550
Lanyon v Commonwealth (1974) 129 CLR 650
Mills v Meeking (1990) 169 CLR 214
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611
New South Wales v Ryan (1998) 101 LGERA 246
News Corporation Ltd. v National Companies and Securities Commission (1984) 5 FCR 88
Oceanic Life Ltd v Chief Commr of Stamp Duties (1999) 168 ALR 211
OJG Engineering Pty Ltd and Commissioner of Taxation [2019] AATA 4293
Pochi v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 36 FLR 482
Project Blue Sky Inc V Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355
R v L (1994) 49 FCR 534
Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1
SAS Trustee Corporation v Miles (2018) 361 ALR 206
Secretary, Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet and Secretary, Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development and Sanderson (Party Joined) [2015] AATA 361
Secretary, Department of Workplace Relations and Small Business v Staff Development and…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Warren; Services Australia and (Freedom of information) and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2022] AATA 4191
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an application for review by Services Australia of a decision made by the Information Commissioner regarding a Freedom of Information request lodged by Mr Warren. Mr Warren sought access to documents related to the "Robodebt" scheme. Services Australia had initially refused access to all 13 documents identified in response to the request, citing exemptions under s 34 and s 37 of the *Freedom of Information Act 1982* (Cth). The Information Commissioner had partially set aside this decision, granting access to some documents while maintaining exemptions for others.

The primary legal issues before the Tribunal were whether certain documents were exempt from disclosure under s 34 of the FOI Act, specifically concerning Cabinet documents and drafts thereof, and whether the disclosure of information within these documents would reveal Cabinet deliberations or decisions, particularly in light of whether the existence of such deliberations had been officially disclosed. Additionally, the Tribunal was required to consider whether certain documents were conditionally exempt under s 47C of the FOI Act, and if so, whether the public interest favoured disclosure. The onus was on Services Australia to establish that the Information Commissioner's decision was not justified.

The Tribunal considered the application of s 34(1)(d) and s 34(3) of the FOI Act to various groups of documents, including draft new policy proposals, costing spreadsheets, and draft costing requests. It noted that s 33(1)(c) of the *Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975* (Cth) permitted the Tribunal to inform itself in any manner it thought appropriate, not being bound by the rules of evidence, provided that decisions were based on material with rational probative force. The Tribunal found that Services Australia had not discharged its onus to establish that documents 9 and NPP1 were exempt under s 34, and therefore Mr Warren was entitled to inspect them. The Tribunal also considered the application of s 47C, ultimately finding that the public interest favoured disclosure for several documents.

The Tribunal's decision partially set aside the Information Commissioner's decision. While the Information Commissioner had found documents 4, 9, and 10 to be exempt under s 34(1)(a), the Tribunal determined that Services Australia had not provided sufficient particulars to establish the exemption for documents 9 and NPP1. Consequently, Mr Warren was granted access to these documents. The Tribunal also found that several other documents, initially deemed conditionally exempt under s 47C by the Information Commissioner, were not exempt due to the public interest favouring disclosure.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The respondent relied upon statements from Mr Justin Warren[13] and Ms Lyndsey Jackson[14] and an affidavit from a solicitor, Ms Jacinta Lewin.[15] These witnesses were not cross-examined by Services Australia.[13] The statement of Justin Warren dated 10 June 2021 is Exhibit 4.[14] The statement of Lyndsey Jackson dated 4 June 2021 is Exhibit 5.[15] The affidavit of Jacinta Lewin sworn 27 July 2021 is Exhibit 12.Objections to evidence from applicant witnesses Prior to Services Australia’s witnesses being called, the respondent made objections to passages of their affidavit evidence. At that stage I considered there was no unfairness to the respondent if those objections were deferred and further considered after cross-examination. Accordingly, I did not rule on the objections but deferred consideration of them.[16] Services Australia called the two witnesses who were cross-examined. The respondent, as part of his closing submissions, identified the objections to affidavit evidence by reference to an annexure to the respondent’s written closing submissions dated 17 December 2021. Services Australia decided not to rely on some of the paragraphs to which objection was taken[17] but otherwise contended it was a matter for the Tribunal to determine what weight should be given to the remaining paragraphs. The respondent asked that I rule on the objections as part of my written reasons.[18][16] First Transcript page 59.[17] Second Transcript page 111[18] Second Transcript page 114. When considering the approach to be taken with respect to the affidavit evidence I must have regard to legislative provisions in relation to the procedure of the Tribunal and its objects. Section 33(1)(c) of the AAT Act states:the Tribunal is not bound by the rules of evidence but may inform itself on any matter in such manner as it thinks appropriate. Section 33(1)(c) should be read in the context of ss 33(1)(b) and 2A and 39(1) of the AAT Act which provide that: (a)the proceedings of the AAT shall be conducted with as little formality and technicality, and with as much expedition....as a proper consideration of the matters before the Tribunal permit; (b)in carrying out its functions, the Tribunal must pursue the objective of providing a mechanism of review that is fair, just, economical, informal and quick; and(c)the Tribunal shall ensure that every party to a proceeding before the Tribunal is given a reasonable opportunity to present his or her case. Guidance with respect to s 33(1)(c) of the AAT Act came soon after the commencement of the Tribunal from its first President, the late Brenan J in the decision of Pochi v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs[19] (Pochi) as follows:How are facts to be proved, and how is the sufficiency of proof to be determined when there are no rules of evidence binding upon either the Minister or the Tribunal? Section 33 (1) (c) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act provides that: “the Tribunal is not bound by the rules of evidence but may inform itself on any matter in such manner as it thinks appropriate.” …The Tribunal and the Minister are equally free to disregard formal rules of evidence in receiving material on which facts are to be found, but each must bear in mind that “this assurance of desirable flexible procedure does not go so far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational probative force”, as Hughes C.J. said in Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labour Relations Board[(15)]. To depart from the rules of evidence is to put aside a system which is calculated to produce a body of proof which has rational probative force, as Evatt J. pointed out, though in a dissenting judgment, in The King v. War Pensions Entitlement Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Bott: “Some stress has been laid by the present respondents upon the provision that the Tribunal is not, in the hearing of appeals, ‘bound by any rules of evidence’. Neither it is. But this does not mean that all rules of evidence may be ignored as of no account. After all, they represent the attempt made, through many generations, to evolve a method of inquiry best calculated to prevent error and elicit truth. No tribunal can, without grave danger of injustice, set them on one side and resort to methods of inquiry which necessarily advantage one party and necessarily disadvantage the opposing party. In other words, although rules of evidence, as such, do not bind, every attempt must be made to administer ‘substantial justice’”. That does not mean, of course, that the rules of evidence which have been excluded expressly by the statute creep back through a domestic procedural rule. Facts can be fairly found without demanding adherence to the rules of evidence. Diplock L.J. in R. v. Deputy Industrial Injuries Commissioner; Ex parte Moore said: “These technical rules of evidence, however, form no part of the rules of natural justice. The requirement that a person exercising quasi-judicial functions must base his decision on evidence means no more than that it must be based upon material which tends logically to show the existence or non-existence of facts relevant to the issue to be determined, or to show the likelihood or unlikelihood of the occurrence of some future event the occurrence of which would be relevant. It means that he must not spin a coin or consult an astrologer, but he may take into account any material which, as a matter of reason, has some probative value in the sense mentioned above. If it is capable of having any probative value, the weight to be attached to it is a matter for the person to whom Parliament has entrusted the responsibility of deciding the issue”. Lord Denning M.R. in T. A. Miller Ltd. v. Minister of Housing and Local Governmentsaid much the same: “Tribunals are entitled to act on any material which is logically probative, even though it is not evidence in a court of law”, and he repeated that observation in Kavanagh v. Chief Constable of Devon and Cornwall. In the United States where considerable judicial attention has been given to fact finding by administrative tribunals (see Schwartz, Administrative Law, Boston, 1976, pars. 115 et seq.), substantially the same principle has been expressed. It was thought, at one time, that the Consolidated Edisonjudgment required that some legal proof had to be adduced, and that hearsay evidence alone could not support an adverse finding (see Schwartz, par. 118). But in Richardson v. Perales the Consolidated Edison casewas construed in this way: “The contrast the Chief Justice was drawing … was not with material that would be deemed formally inadmissible in judicial proceedings but with material ‘without a basis in evidence having rational probative force’. This was not a blanket rejection by the Court of administrative reliance on hearsay irrespective of reliability and probative value. The opposite was the case”.The majority judgments in Bott's caseshow that the Tribunal is entitled to have regard to evidence which is logically probative whether it is legally admissible or not. Starke J. said: “The Appeal Tribunal can obtain information in any way it thinks best, always giving a fair opportunity to any party interested to meet that information; it is not obliged to obtain such independent medical opinion, for instance, upon oath, and whether cross-examination shall take place upon that opinion is entirely a question for the discretion of the Tribunal; it is not bound by any rules of evidence, and is authorized to act according to substantial justice and the merits of the case”. It will be necessary to return to his Honour's reference to cross-examination, but for the moment the relevance of his Honour's judgment is to be found in the procedural flexibility which it assures to Tribunals which are statutorily freed from the rules of evidence, though required to act upon material which is logically probative. As the New South Wales Law Reform Commission has pointed out in its Report on the Rule against Hearsay, hearsay “has a wide scale of reliability”, and there is no reason why logically probative hearsay should not be given credence. However, the logical weaknesses of hearsay evidence may make it too insubstantial, in some cases, to persuade the Tribunal of the truth of serious allegations.(footnotes removed)[19] (1979) 36 FLR 482 at 492-493).

Decision

Reasons for decision

Services Australia identified 13 documents in its possession in response to Mr Warren’s FOI request and refused access in full to them on the basis that:(a)Documents 1 – 12 were exempt under s 34; and(b)Document 13 was exempt under s 37(2)(b).The Decision of the Information Commissioner Mr Warren applied for a review by the Information Commissioner who, on 11 November 2019, set aside the original decision and made a substituted decision that:(a)Documents 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11 and 12 are not exempt under ss 34 or 47C;(b)Document 13 is not exempt under ss 37(2)(b) or 47E(d); and(c)Documents 4, 9 and 10 are exempt under s 34. The decision and reasons of the Information Commissioner provided as follows:(a)The Information Commissioner was satisfied that documents 4, 9 and 10 are exempt under s 34(1)(a).(b)The Information Commissioner was not satisfied that Services Australia had provided sufficient particulars to establish that documents 1 to 3 were brought into existence for the dominant purpose of briefing a Minister on a document to which s 34(1)(a) applies. In particular, although it appeared that these documents related to proposals and costings relevant to matters that may have been considered by Cabinet, the Information Commissioner found that insufficient particulars had been provided about the context and timing of the creation of the documents to establish that they were brought into existence for the dominant purpose of briefing a Minister on a submission, or proposed submission, to Cabinet at the time of the creation of the documents.(c)The Information Commissioner was not satisfied that Services Australia had provided sufficient particulars to establish that documents 5 to 8 were drafts of documents that were brought into existence for the dominant purpose of briefing a Minister on a document to which s 34(1)(a) applies. In particular, although it appeared that these documents related to proposals relevant to matters that may have been considered by Cabinet, the Information Commissioner found that insufficient particulars had been provided about the context of the creation of the documents and the associated document claimed to be exempt under s 34(1)(a) to establish that s 34(1)(d) applies.(d)With respect to the application of s 34(3) to documents 1 to 3, 5 to 8, 11 and 12, the Information Commissioner said that although it was apparent that the documents included descriptions of proposals and costings that may have been relevant to matters that were considered by Cabinet, it was not apparent how this information disclosed Cabinet’s deliberations or decision on the subject. Further, the Information Commissioner was satisfied that the existence of the deliberation of proposals and costings relating to the subject matter of the documents at issue was officially disclosed when the Government released its 2015/2016 budget statements.(e)The Information Commissioner was satisfied that documents 1 to 3 and 5 to 8 were conditionally exempt under s 47C.(f)The Information Commissioner was not satisfied that documents 11 and 12 were conditionally exempt under s 47C because the material in those documents was purely factual, being statements relating to assumptions that have been made in developing particular costing analysis.(g)Although it was apparent that the documents included descriptions of proposals and costings that may have been relevant to matters that were considered by Cabinet, the Information Commissioner was not satisfied that Services Australia established that the documents disclose Cabinet deliberations or decisions and therefore did not consider that disclosure of the documents would impair the confidentiality of the Cabinet process as Services Australia contended.(h)The Information Commissioner was satisfied that the public interest factors favouring disclosure outweigh the factors against disclosure and found that documents 1 to 3, 5 to 8 and 11 and 12 were not exempt under s 47C.The Application to the Tribunal for Review

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

It follows that the respondent has no entitlement to inspect either document 9 or NPP1. Whilst that may put the respondent in a difficult position, it is necessary to avoid the disclosure of sensitive Cabinet material. I note that in OJG Engineering Pty Ltd and Commissioner of Taxation,[29] Deputy President Boyle said that it is common in FOI matters before the Tribunal that an applicant will not have access to the documents that are the subject of the FOI request, but that this “does not mean that there is a denial of procedural fairness, it is simply an obvious necessity given the nature of the application”.[29] [2019] AATA 4293 at [30].CONSIDERATION It is convenient to address Services Australia’s claims under s 34, and then s 47C, by reference to groups of documents:(a)first, ‘draft’ new policy proposals (NPPs) being documents 4, 9 and 10 - s 34(1)(d) and s 34(3) and s 47C;(b)second, costing spreadsheets being documents 1, 2 and 3 – s 34(3) and s 47C;(c)third, ‘draft’ costing requests being documents 5, 6, 7 and 8 – s 34(3) and s 47C; and(d)fourth, a document setting out certain costing assumptions being document 12 – s 34(3) and s 47C. It is also convenient to note at this stage that:(a)The subject documents relate to a number of welfare payment compliance measures that were proposed between 2015 and 2017 in three main iterations.(b)Documents 1, 9 and 11 relate to the first iteration of welfare compliance measures delivered under the 2015-16 Budget.(c)Documents 2, 4 and 8 relate to the second iteration of welfare compliance measures in the 2015-16 Mid-Year Economic and Fiscal Outlook(d)Documents 3, 10 and 12 also relate to the second iteration of welfare compliance measures(e)Documents 5, 6 and 7 relate to the third iteration of welfare payment compliance measures and are draft internal costing requests seeking formal costings from the DHS Costing Team.CABINET EXEMPTIONThe Interpretation of s 34(1)(d) – draft Cabinet documents Section 34 provides:(1) A document is an exempt document if:(a) both of the following are satisfied:(i) it has been submitted to the Cabinet for its consideration, or is or was proposed by a Minister to be so submitted;(ii) it was brought into existence for the dominant purpose of submission for consideration by the Cabinet; or(b) it is an official record of the Cabinet; or(c) it was brought into existence for the dominant purpose of briefing a Minister on a document to which paragraph (a) applies; or(d) it is a draft of a document to which paragraph (a), (b) or (c) applies.(2) A document is an exempt document to the extent that it is a copy or part of, or contains an extract from, a document to which subsection (1) applies.(3) A document is an exempt document to the extent that it contains information the disclosure of which would reveal a Cabinet deliberation or decision, unless the existence of the deliberation or decision has been officially disclosed.Exceptions(4) A document is not an exempt document only because it is attached to a document to which subsection (1), (2) or (3) applies.Note: However, the attachment itself may be an exempt document.(5) A document by which a decision of the Cabinet is officially published is not an exempt document.(6) Information in a document to which subsection (1), (2) or (3) applies is not exempt matter because of this section if the information consists of purely factual material, unless:(a) the disclosure of the information would reveal a Cabinet deliberation or decision; and(b) the existence of the deliberation or decision has not been officially disclosed.