Warren v Chief Executive Officer, Services Australia

Link copied
Case Copied 51 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Warren v Chief Executive Officer, Services Australia [2023] FCA 1337

Appeal from: Services Australia v Warren [2022] AATA 4191
File number(s): VID 763 of 2022
Judgment of: MCELWAINE J
Date of judgment: 3 November 2023
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Application for order pursuant to s 37AF(1)(b) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) – where documents were produced on a confidential basis to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal in support of the respondent’s claim relating to the exemption of Cabinet documents pursuant to s 34 of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) – where documents relate to the Robodebt Scheme – where Royal Commission into the Robodebt Scheme has been since been conducted and final report delivered – where Cabinet deliberations are a matter of historic fact – confidentiality order refused in relation to documents disclosed in part to the Royal Commission – confidentiality order made in relation to material the subject of the substantive appeal which would otherwise render the appeal moot
Legislation:

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) ss 35, 46

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 37AE, 37AF, 37AG

Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) ss 34, 47C, 64

Cases cited:

Air Canada v Secretary of State for Trade [1983] 2 AC 394

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v NSW Ports Operations Hold Co Pty Ltd (No 3) [2020] FCA 1766

Australian Securities Commission v Zarro (No 2) (1992) 34 FCR 427

Bayles by his litigation representative Bayles v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (No 3) [2020] FCA 1397

Burmah Oil Co Ltd v Governor and Company of the Bank of England [1980] AC 1090

Commonwealth of Australia v Northern Land Council (1993) 176 CLR 604

Commonwealth v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2000] FCA 453; 98 FCR 31

Conway v Rimmer [1968] AC 910 at 952

Country Care Group Pty Ltd v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) (No 2) [2020] FCAFC 44; 275 FCR 377

Hogan v Australian Crime Commission [2010] HCA 21; 240 CLR 651

Lee v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2023] FCAFC 22; 296 FCR 272

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Egan [2018] FCA 1320

Motorola Solutions, Inc. v Hytera Communications Corporation Ltd (No 2) [2018] FCA 17

Prygodicz v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2) [2021] FCA 634

Roberts-Smith v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd (No 14) [2021] FCA 552

Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1

Services Australia v Warren [2022] AATA 4191

Division: General Division
Registry: Victoria
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 69
Date of hearing: 16 October 2023
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr HC Cooper
Solicitor for the Appellant: Maurice Blackburn
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr R Knowles SC and Ms E Smith
Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

VID 763 of 2022
BETWEEN:

JUSTIN WARREN

Appellant

AND:

CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, SERVICES AUSTRALIA

Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

MCELWAINE J

DATE OF ORDER:

3 NOVEMBER 2023

THE…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Warren v Chief Executive Officer, Services Australia and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2023] FCA 1337
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Warren v Chief Executive Officer, Services Australia, the Federal Court of Australia was asked to consider an application for suppression orders relating to documents produced to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) in support of the respondent's claim for exemption of certain Cabinet documents under section 34 of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth). The documents pertained to the Robodebt Scheme, and the case arose following the conclusion of the Royal Commission into the Robodebt Scheme. The primary legal issue before the Court was whether the suppression orders were necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice. This question was influenced by the fact that the Royal Commission had already received and exhibited the documents, albeit with redactions for privilege and immunity claims.

The Court considered the statutory requirement to safeguard the public interest in open justice, as expressed in section 37AE of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). It also noted the discretionary power to make suppression orders under section 37AG(1) of the same Act, which includes the ground that the order is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice. The Court determined that suppression orders should only be made in exceptional circumstances and that the necessity for such orders must be stringently assessed. Ultimately, the Court found that while most of the suppression application failed, there were certain extracts from the Cabinet documents that, if disclosed, could prejudice the proper administration of justice. These extracts were specified in the judgment, and the Court made an order prohibiting their disclosure by publication or otherwise in connection with the proceeding.

The Court made an order granting a suppression order for the specified extracts from the Cabinet documents until further order, on the ground that it was necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice. The Court also granted the respondent liberty to provide further submissions in writing within one business day of the publication of the reasons, with a right of reply to the appellant within one business day thereafter. The operation of these orders was stayed until 4 pm on 10 November 2023, and costs were reserved. The decision underscores the Court's commitment to balancing the need for confidentiality in certain circumstances with the overarching principle of open justice.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Until further order, pursuant to s 37AF(1)(b) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), on the ground that it is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice, any disclosure (by publication or otherwise), in connection with this proceeding, of the confidential material at paragraphs [13] and [19(c)(i)] of the Affidavit of Leonie McGregor dated 21 July 2021 be prohibited, save for disclosure to:

(a) the Court and its staff, and any person performing services for the Court, acting in the course of their duties;

(b) the respondent and its legal representatives; or

(c) the Commonwealth and its officers.

2. Liberty is granted to the respondent to provide any further submission as to any document containing material that discloses or is likely to disclose the documents in issue in the substantive appeal in writing within 1 business day of the publication of these reasons, with a right of reply to the appellant within 1 business day thereafter.

3. The operation of these orders is stayed until 4 pm on 10 November 2023.

4. Costs be reserved.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

For the reasons that follow, I have concluded that the Suppression Application largely fails, save that disclosure, by publication or otherwise, in this proceeding of the material listed at paragraphs [13] and [19(c)] of the McGregor Affidavit should be prohibited until further order.EVIDENCE RELIED ON Mr Knowles KC for Services Australia read into evidence without objection affidavits made by Melissa Gangemi, a solicitor in the employ of the Australian Government Solicitor (AGS), made on 7, 16 and 18 August 2023 and a very extensive affidavit made by Thomas Creedon, who is also a solicitor in the employ of the AGS, made on 9 October 2023. Mr Cooper, counsel for Mr Warren, did not challenge any of that evidence. Between October 2022 and July 2023, Mr Creedon was part of a team within the AGS acting for the Commonwealth in the Royal Commission. In that role, his primary duty was to manage claims of legal professional privilege, public interest immunity and parliamentary privilege in respect of the information sought by the Royal Commission in notices to produce and notices to give a statement. In very great detail, Mr Creedon describes the process whereby digital files were established in order to assist the Royal Commission in the discharge of its function. In relation to Cabinet documents, public interest immunity and Cabinet confidentiality were claimed and, where the claims were not accepted, various rulings in relation to those claims were sought from the Royal Commission. This process resulted in either acceptance by the Royal Commission that the production and publication of documents be limited to portions that were not subject to legal professional privilege or public interest immunity or, a number of relevant rulings were made concerning the documents in issue. In all, there are seven rulings covering a range of documents. Each document that was received in evidence by the Royal Commission was publicly exhibited, with redactions to reflect the agreed or determined privilege and immunity claims. However, very many Cabinet documents were produced to the Royal Commission without an assertion of public interest immunity, which explains why the scope of the orders now sought is limited to certain paragraphs, sentences or in some cases single words in items 9-12. This also explains a concern that Katzmann J expressed, speaking for the Court, during oral submissions on 18 August 2023. Put simply, the issue is not simply whether the documents in issue were disclosed publicly but whether the content or substance was disclosed in other documents received in evidence by the Royal Commission. I pause to observe that this is not to say that there has been a waiver of the public interest immunity claims, which is not possible: Air Canada v Secretary of State for Trade [1983] 2 AC 394 at 436 (Lord Fraser); Australian Securities Commission v Zarro (No 2) (1992) 34 FCR 427 at 436 (Drummond J). Rather, in the present case the issue is whether the making of the suppression orders is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice where Services Australia contends that portions of Cabinet documents, that would otherwise have been subject to a class claim on the grounds of public interest immunity, should be withheld despite disclosure of the balance of the Cabinet documents or the information contained therein. In this case it is significant that the Executive Government did not press claims for public interest immunity over a very considerable volume of Cabinet information relating to Robodebt.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Overall, the disclosure of the selected extracts of the Cabinet documents in this case is in a peculiar class of its own.CONCLUSION For these reasons, I am not satisfied that the modified suppression orders sought by Services Australia should be made, save for documents that disclose or are likely to disclose the content of items 1-8 that remain in issue in the appeal. On the oral submission of Mr Knowles, this is limited to paragraphs [13], and [19(c)] of the McGregor Affidavit. In order to ensure that this is the only material that discloses or is likely to disclose the documents in issue, I grant liberty to Services Australia to provide any further submission as to this confined class in writing within 1 business day of the publication of these reasons, with a right of reply to Mr Warren within 1 business day thereafter. The costs of the Suppression Application are reserved, to be determined after determination of the appeal. I order as follows:1.Until further order, pursuant to s 37AF(1)(b) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), on the ground that it is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice, any disclosure (by publication or otherwise), in connection with this proceeding, of the confidential material at paragraphs [13], and [19(c)(i)] of the Affidavit of Leonie McGregor dated 21 July 2021 be prohibited, save for disclosure to: (a)the Court and its staff, and any person performing services for the Court, acting in the course of their duties; (b)the respondent and its legal representatives; or (c)the Commonwealth and its officers.2.Liberty is granted to the respondent to provide any further submission as to any document containing material that discloses or is likely to disclose the documents in issue in the substantive appeal in writing within 1 business day of the publication of these reasons, with a right of reply to the appellant within 1 business day thereafter.3.The operation of these orders is stayed until 4 pm on 10 November 2023.4.Costs be reserved.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

A further point made by Mr Cooper is that the “targeted word searches” undertaken by Mr Creedon likely captured the form of words disclosed, rather than the content of the information, which may have been expressed differently. However, having listened to the submissions of Mr Knowles by reference to the affidavit of Mr Creedon, Mr Cooper ultimately did not press that point. Finally, it was submitted that I should not accept the future inhibition submission, it being framed as “an allegation of prejudice at a high and somewhat unhelpful level of generality”.CONSIDERATION The commencing point is the statutory requirement to safeguard the public interest in open justice that is expressed at s 37AE of the FCA Act:In deciding whether to make a suppression order or non‑publication order, the Court must take into account that a primary objective of the administration of justice is to safeguard the public interest in open justice. This is an overarching principle in the administration of justice in this Court: Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Egan [2018] FCA 1320 at [4] (Allsop CJ). Justice Perram has reasoned that this provision does not require a “balancing exercise” to be undertaken “between the utility of the order and the interest which open justice assumes” under the FCA Act: Motorola Solutions, Inc. v Hytera Communications Corporation Ltd (No 2) [2018] FCA 17 (Motorola) at [6]. Section 37AG(1) confers discretionary power to make a suppression order or a non-publication order on one or more of four grounds including (a) that: “the order is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice”. This requirement is stringent: Hogan v Australian Crime Commission [2010] HCA 21; 240 CLR 651 at [30] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Kiefel JJ). The principles are well understood and conveniently summarised by the Full Court in Country Care Group Pty Ltd v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) (No 2) [2020] FCAFC 44; 275 FCR 377 at [8]-[9] (Allsop CJ, Wigney and Abraham JJ):Suppression or non-publication orders should only be made in exceptional circumstances: Rinehart v Welker (2011) 93 NSWLR 311 (Rinehart v Welker) at [27]; Rinehart v Rinehart (2014) 320 ALR 195 (Rinehart v Rinehart) at [23]. That is both because the operative word in s 37AG(1)(a) is “necessary” and because the court must take into account that a primary objective of the administration of justice is to safeguard the public interest in open justice: Rinehart v Welker at [32]; Rinehart v Rinehart at [25]. The paramount consideration is the need to do justice; publication can only be avoided where necessity compels departure from the open justice principle: Rinehart v Welker at [30]; Rinehart v Rinehart at [26].The critical question is whether the making of a suppression or non-publication order is “necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice”. The word “necessary” in that context is a “strong word”: Hogan v Australian Crime Commission (2010) 240 CLR 651 (Hogan) at [30]. It is nevertheless not to be given an unduly narrow construction: Fairfax Digital Australia and New Zealand Pty Ltd v Ibrahim (2012) 83 NSWLR 52 (Ibrahim) at [8], citing Hodgson JA in R v Kwok (2005) 64 NSWLR 335 at [13]. The question whether an order is necessary will depend on the particular circumstances of the case. Once the court is satisfied that an order is necessary, it would be an error not to make it: Hogan at [33]. There is no exercise of discretion or balancing exercise involved: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Air New Zealand Ltd (No 3) [2012] FCA 1430 at [21].