FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Johnson v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 1558
File number: NSD 308 of 2023 Judgment of: MARKOVIC J Date of judgment: 11 December 2023 Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal affirming a decision of the first respondent to refuse to grant a visa – whether Tribunal made a jurisdictional error in relation to the primary consideration of the expectations of the Australian community – whether the Tribunal restricted itself to the principles in paragraph 5.2 of Direction No. 90 – Visa refusal and cancellation under section 501 and revocation of a mandatory cancellation of a visa under section 501CA – application dismissed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 499 subs (1) and subs (2A), 501 subs (1) and subs (6), 501CA
Direction No. 65 – Visa refusal and cancellation under s 501 and revocation of a mandatory cancellation of a visa under s 501CA
Direction No. 90 – Visa refusal and cancellation under section 501 and revocation of a mandatory cancellation of a visa under section 501CA
Cases cited: FYBR v Minister for Home Affairs (2019) 272 FCR 454
Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs v HSRN (2023) 297 FCR 662
Plaintiff M1/2021 v Minister for Home Affairs (2022) 400 ALR 417; [2022] HCA 17
SZSZQ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 403
Division: General Division Registry: New South Wales National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Number of paragraphs: 72 Date of hearing: 28 November 2023 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr O Jones Solicitor for the Applicant: Northam Lawyers Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr B Kaplan Solicitor for the First Respondent: MinterEllison Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs ORDERS
NSD 308 of 2023 BETWEEN: NATALIE ANN ASARE APPIAH JOHNSON
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
MARKOVIC J
DATE OF ORDER:
11 DECEMBER 2023
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application is dismissed.
2.The applicant is to pay the first respondent’s costs, as agreed or taxed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
MARKOVIC J:
This is an application for judicial review of a decision of the second respondent (Tribunal). The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the first respondent (Minister) to refuse to grant a Partner (Temporary) (Class UF) visa and Partner (Residence) (Class BC) visa (partner visa) under s 501(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) to the applicant’s husband, who I will refer to as the visa applicant.
The applicant raises one issue in her application for judicial review, namely whether the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error in its treatment of the primary consideration of the expectations of the Australian community. The applicant alleges that the Tribunal…
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- Case
- [2023] FCA 1558
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court held that the AAT did not make a jurisdictional error in its consideration of the expectations of the Australian community. The court emphasised that the primary consideration, as articulated in Direction 90, is a normative statement of the government's views about community expectations, which decision-makers must have due regard to but not equate with their own view on the preferable outcome. The court noted that the AAT had correctly identified the government's views and afforded them due consideration without equating them with the final decision. Therefore, the Tribunal's decision was not materially affected by any alleged error.
The application for judicial review was dismissed, and the applicant was ordered to pay the Minister's costs. This decision underscores the importance of adhering to the statutory framework and the government's articulated views on community expectations in visa decision-making.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application is dismissed.
2. The applicant is to pay the first respondent’s costs, as agreed or taxed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The applicant submits that materiality is unlikely to be controversial, the standard of materiality is an undemanding one, the present case was one where few considerations under Direction 90 were applicable and the expectations of the Australian community was found by the Tribunal to weigh “strongly and determinatively” such that the error, if upheld, should be material to the result. CONSIDERATION The primary consideration, expectations of the Australian community, currently found at paragraph 8.4 of Direction 90, constitutes a normative statement of the Australian government’s views about expectations of the Australian community: see FYBR at [66] (Charlesworth J) and [95] (Stewart J). At [74] of FYBR Charlesworth J relevantly said:I have accepted the Minister’s submission that cl 11.3 is intended to give effect to the principle that the Minister may make a statement of the government’s views about the expectations of the Australian community, which statement may be acted on by the person conferred with the power in a particular case, as recognised in Uelese. In my view, the task of the decision-maker is to identify what is the “government’s view” about community expectations in the particular case, to “have due regard” to that view and to “generally” afford that view more weight than other non-primary considerations in accordance with cl 8(4). The phrase “may be appropriate” does not permit the decision-maker to equate the expectations of the Australian community (as expressed in cl 11.3) with the decision-maker’s own view as to the preferable outcome in the ultimate exercise of the discretion. To construe cl 11.3 in that way would be to ignore the fact that the clause is intended to express a consideration that is capable of being given more weight relative to “other considerations” in the exercise of the discretion, as cl 8(4) of the Direction generally requires. The primary judge was correct to say that importing into cl 11.3 all countervailing factors bearing on the ultimate decision would render cl 8(4) of the Direction unworkable. To like effect at [103] of FYBR Stewart J said:The community expectations, as I construe cl 11.3(1), speak normatively; they are to be applied in every case but they are not expressed in relation to any particular case. This means that it would be wrong for the decision-maker to ask themselves a question along the lines of “what would the community expect in this case?” It is also incorrect to construe the community expectation as expressing or requiring, in any particular case, either the grant or the refusal of the visa. In a particularly egregious case, the weight to be afforded the community expectations would be such that a refusal might be thought to be inevitable, and at the other end of the spectrum a refusal might be thought to be unlikely, but in neither case and in all the area in-between the community expectation will not express or require one or the other. That is a matter for the decision-maker.