Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs v HSRN

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs v HSRN [2023] FCAFC 68

Review of: HSRN and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2022] AATA 4377
File number: NSD 1115 of 2022
Judgment of: MOSHINSKY, STEWART AND JACKMAN JJ
Date of judgment: 11 May 2023
Catchwords: MIGRATION – review of decision of AAT – Direction No. 90 – expectations of the Australian community – whether Tribunal made own assessment – whether the expectations of the Australian community are necessarily adverse when a person has failed the character test – whether error jurisdictional – decision set aside
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 476A, 499, 501, 501CA
Cases cited:

FYBR v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 185; 272 FCR 454

MZAPC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2021] HCA 17; 390 ALR 590

Nathanson v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] HCA 26; 403 ALR 398

Williams v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 674; 226 FCR 112

YNQY v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1466

Division: General Division
Registry: New South Wales
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 49
Date of hearing: 4 May 2023
Counsel for the Applicant C Lenehan SC and T Reilly
Solicitor for the Applicant Australian Government Solicitor
Counsel for the First Respondent R Chia
Solicitor for the First Respondent Alfaro Law
Counsel for the Second Respondent The second respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs.

ORDERS

NSD 1115 of 2022
BETWEEN:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

Applicant

AND:

HSRN

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

MOSHINSKY, STEWART AND JACKMAN JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

11 MAY 2023

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The decision of the second respondent dated 8 November 2022 be set aside.

2.The matter be remitted to the second respondent for redetermination according to law.

3.The first respondent pay the applicant’s costs as agreed or taxed.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

Introduction

  1. This is an application in the Court’s original jurisdiction under s 476A(1)(b) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) seeking judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal by one of its Deputy Presidents. That decision set aside a decision of a delegate of the relevant Minister (now the applicant) to not revoke the cancellation of the first respondent’s permanent resident’s visa pursuant to s 501CA(4) of the Act.

  2. The Tribunal is named as the second respondent, but as it has filed a submitting appearance and has had no further involvement in the matter it is convenient to refer to the first respondent as simply the respondent.

  3. The Minister relies on three grounds of review, with the second and third grounds raising essentially the same error but putting it in two different ways. For the reasons given below, we are satisfied that the Minister…

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Details
Case
[2023] FCAFC 68
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter before the court involved the Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs challenging the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) to set aside a decision not to revoke a visa cancellation. The respondent, a Portuguese citizen with a significant criminal record in Australia, had his visa cancelled under section 501(3A) of the Act due to his failure to pass the character test, and the decision was not revoked upon review by a delegate. The respondent sought further review by the AAT, which was successful in setting aside the delegate's decision. The Minister's appeal to the court was based on the grounds that the AAT erred in its interpretation and application of Direction No. 90 regarding the expectations of the Australian community.

The key legal issues the court needed to decide were whether the AAT correctly interpreted and applied Direction No. 90, particularly in relation to the expectations of the Australian community, and whether any errors made by the AAT were jurisdictional in nature. The court had to determine whether the AAT's assessment of the expectations of the Australian community constituted an independent assessment, which it was not supposed to do according to the Direction, and whether such an error was jurisdictional.

The court found that the AAT had indeed made its own assessment of the expectations of the Australian community, contrary to the clear directive in Direction No. 90 that decision-makers should not independently assess community expectations. The court concluded that this was a jurisdictional error as it involved the AAT failing to follow a direction given by the Minister under the Act. The court relied on previous decisions that held the expectations of the Australian community as expressed in the Direction are not to be independently assessed by decision-makers but rather to be considered as articulated in the Direction itself. This error was significant as it undermined the process by which the AAT was supposed to exercise its discretion under the Act.

The court set aside the decision of the AAT and remitted the matter back to the AAT for redetermination according to law. The court also ordered that the respondent pay the Minister's costs as agreed or taxed. This decision underscores the importance of adhering to the directives provided in policy instruments, such as Direction No. 90, to ensure that decision-makers do not stray from the legislative intent and the framework within which they are supposed to operate.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The decision of the second respondent dated 8 November 2022 be set aside.

2. The matter be remitted to the second respondent for redetermination according to law.

3. The first respondent pay the applicant’s costs as agreed or taxed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The Minister relies on three grounds of review, with the second and third grounds raising essentially the same error but putting it in two different ways. For the reasons given below, we are satisfied that the Minister has established jurisdictional error on the first ground of review. For that reason, the application must succeed and it is unnecessary to consider the other grounds.Background The respondent is a citizen of Portugal. He moved to Australia from what is now the Portuguese Autonomous Region of Madeira with his parents and five siblings in April 1975. He was nine years old. He has lived in, and not left, Australia since then. He speaks little Portuguese. Although he had some prior convictions for minor offences, on 3 May 2007, the respondent was sentenced in the NSW District Court to imprisonment for six years with a three year non-parole period for an offence of sexual intercourse without consent. That is his most serious offence. He served three and a half years before being released on parole. On 29 January 2010, the respondent was informed that a decision had been made not to cancel his visa, but he was warned of the consequences of further offending. On 25 June 2018, the respondent pleaded guilty in the NSW Local Court at Wollongong to an offence of “cause or set fire to the property of another or Crown” and was sentenced to one year imprisonment with a nine month non-parole period. The Tribunal recorded that before the Magistrate the respondent was unable to provide any explanation for his conduct other than the fact that he had lost his employment and began consuming the drug ice at the age of 51 or 52. He claimed that he was under the influence of ice when he set the fire and had no recollection of committing the offence. However, before the Tribunal the respondent claimed that the grass in the park where the fire was lit was untidy and he wanted to clean up the area. On 15 August 2018, the respondent’s visa was mandatorily cancelled under s 501(3A) of the Act. The respondent was renotified of this decision on 20 January 2022 under s 501CA(3) and invited to make representations to the Minister about revocation of the cancellation decision. The respondent took up that invitation. On 16 August 2022, a delegate of the Minister decided, under s 501CA(4) of the Act, not to revoke the cancellation decision. The respondent sought review of the delegate’s decision by the Tribunal. On 8 November 2022, after a hearing on the merits, the Tribunal set aside the delegate’s decision.The statutory framework Under s 501(3A) of the Act, the Minister must cancel a visa that has been granted to a person if the Minister is satisfied that the person does not pass the “character test” and the person is serving a sentence of imprisonment, on a full-time basis in a custodial institution, for an offence. Relevantly, a person does not pass the “character test” under s 501(6)(a) as read with s 501(7)(c) if they have been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 12 months or more.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Paragraph 9 identifies four “Other considerations”, namely, but not limited to, (1) international non-refoulement obligations; (2) extent of impediments if removed; (3) impact on victims; and (4) links to the Australian community, including strength, nature and duration of ties to Australia and impact on Australian business interests.The Tribunal’s decision The Tribunal commenced its reasons by identifying the relevant provisions of the Act and acknowledging the applicability of Direction No. 90. It also identified the four primary considerations and the four “other considerations”. After detailing relevant background, the Tribunal concluded that the respondent does not pass the character test because he has a substantial criminal record as defined in the Act, and identified the remaining question to be whether there is “another reason” why the original decision should be revoked. There is no issue in the review application with regard to the respondent failing the character test. The application is directed to the second question. After setting out relevant facts with regard to the respondent’s background, including aspects of his criminal history, the Tribunal turned to consider the primary considerations. It concluded that the consideration of protecting the Australian community from criminal or other serious conduct weighs against revocation, the consideration of family violence is not relevant and the consideration of the best interests of minor children in Australia weighs slightly in favour of revocation. With regard to the fourth primary consideration, the expectations of the Australian community, the Tribunal correctly identified with reference to para 8.4(4) of the Direction and FYBR v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 185; 272 FCR 454 at [75] that it is not for the decision-maker to assess the expectations of the Australian community for the purpose of applying the consideration – the expectations of the Australian community that decision-makers are required to consider are those set out in Direction No. 90 at paragraph 8.4. The Tribunal also recognised, with reference to YNQY v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1466 at [76], that the consideration is “in substance … adverse to any applicant”. The Tribunal then canvassed aspects of the respondent’s criminality and his medical history and present condition. In the latter regard, the Tribunal considered the report of a forensic psychiatrist, Dr Stephen H Allnutt. The Tribunal noted from the report that the respondent has a history of drug use. He also has mental health diagnoses of a mood disorder – chronic major depressive disorder or a persistent depressive disorder. The Tribunal also noted a number of matters relevant to the hardship that the respondent would likely face if removed to Portugal that Dr Alnutt identified in his report, including that he has no family or friends or job opportunities overseas, he has lived with his mother with whom he has a close bond, and that he would be at a significant disadvantage as compared to a person of normal mind given his recurrent and/or persistent depressive condition and because he is HIV positive. Dr Allnutt concluded that if the respondent were deported, he would likely experience a deterioration in his mental state with aggravation of his mental condition.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Minister puts review ground 1 as follows in the originating application:The Tribunal failed to comply with para 8.4(4) of Direction 90, as at [63] it has made its own assessment of community expectations, and found that they favoured revocation of the cancellation of the first respondent’s visa. Consideration The Full Court in FYBR considered an earlier iteration of Direction No. 90, namely Direction No. 65 that was given by the Minister on 22 December 2014. The essential structure and approach of Direction No. 90 is much the same as Direction No. 65. The earlier Direction also identified primary and “other” considerations. Like Direction No. 90, one of the primary considerations was the expectations of the Australian community. Much of the wording of the relevant paragraphs (paras 6.3 and 11.3) of Direction No. 65 is the same or similar to that in para 8.4 of Direction No. 90, except that the latter Direction is even clearer in material respects, its changed wording having been apparently based in part on the decision in FYBR. Relevantly, in FYBR it was held (by Charlesworth and Stewart JJ in separate judgments, Flick J dissenting) that the relevant clause:(1)expresses an expectation deemed by the Government to be held by the Australian community and that it is not the role of the decision-maker to undertake an assessment of what the community expectations are in each case (at [61], [66]-[67] and [75] per Charlesworth J and [86], [97], [101] and [103]-[104] per Stewart J); and(2)gives expression to an expectation that must of its nature weigh against the grant of a visa in every case (at [75] per Charlesworth J and [86] and [101]-[102] per Stewart J). It was also held that it is up to the decision-maker, after having considered the primary and other considerations, to reach their own view as to whether the non-citizen should or should not be granted a visa or, in the case of a revocation decision, whether or not the cancellation of the non-citizen’s visa should be revoked (at [73] and [79] per Charlesworth J and [92] and [105] per Stewart J). That is to say, although Charlesworth J held that the deemed expectation of the Australian community is that if the non-citizen fails the character test they will have their visa refused or cancelled (at [72] and [75]) and Stewart J disagreed and held that the deemed expectation is that failing the character test will be held against the non-citizen but that the expectation does not speak to the outcome in any given case (at [97] and [103]), the majority were agreed the expectations of the Australian community, as expressed by the Government in the Direction, do not determine the outcome of the decision because all relevant factors have to be weighed up and considered. Direction No. 90 is consistent with the above, save that it is even clearer in certain respects. First, it makes it express in paras 8.4(1) and (2) that the expectation of the community is not that failure of the character test should result in the non-citizen being denied a visa or their visa being cancelled – that expectation is confined to the particularly egregious types of cases set out in para 8.4(2). The character test as expressed in ss 501(6) and (7) of the Act can be failed on lesser bases. Secondly, para 8.4(4) expressly provides that “decision-makers should proceed on the basis of the Government’s views” as articulated in the Direction, “without independently assessing the community’s expectations in the particular case” (emphasis added).