Brar and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (Migration) [2024] AATA 1040 (12 March 2024)
Division:GENERAL DIVISION
File Number: 2023/9617
Re:Kamaljeet Singh Brar
APPLICANT
AndMinister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs
RESPONDENT
DECISION
Tribunal:Member McLean Williams
Date of decision: 12 March 2024
Date of written reasons: 13 May 2024
Place:Brisbane
Pursuant to section 43 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), the Tribunal sets aside decision dated 18 December 2023 made by the Respondent’s delegate and substitutes it with a decision to revoke the mandatory cancellation of the Applicant’s visa.
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Member McLean WilliamsCatchwords
MIGRATION – Non-revocation of mandatory cancellation of visa – where the Applicant fails the character test- whether there is another reason to revoke the mandatory cancellation decision- application of Ministerial Direction No. 99 – Tribunal finding there is another reason to revoke the mandatory cancellation decision – decision under review set aside and substituted
Legislation
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth)Cases
FYBR v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 185
Khalil v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 151
Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs v HSRN [2023] FCAFC 68Suleiman v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 594
Secondary Materials
Ministerial Direction No. 99 - Visa refusal and cancellation under section 501 and revocation of a mandatory cancellation of a visa under section 501CA
REASONS FOR DECISION
Member McLean Williams
13 May 2024
On 12 March 2024 the Tribunal determined pursuant to the review power under section 501CA(4) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (‘the Act’) to set aside the decision of the Respondent’s Delegate not to revoke the mandatory cancellation of the Applicant’s Class SN Subclass 190 Skilled Nominated Permanent Visa (‘the visa’).
On 26 March 2024 a transcript of the hearing of the evidence in the Application for Review before the Tribunal on 27 and 28 February 2024 became available.
In accordance with the Full Federal Court decision in Khalil v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 151 (‘Khalil’), the Tribunal now publishes the written reasons for the ‘short form’ decision made on 12 March 2024. In Khalil, the Full Federal Court had said:
‘The AAT Act thus draws a clear distinction between the decision of the Tribunal under s 43 which is, relevantly, what causes the 84-day period to stop running, and the reasons for decision. In BTR plc v Westinghouse Brake and Signal Company (Australia) Ltd (1992) 34 FCR 246 the Tribunal had handed down a decision on a review of a decision of the Australian Securities Commission that was before it, confirming an exemption that the Commission had granted on certain conditions, but substituting different conditions. At the time of announcing the decision the Tribunal did not give any reasons. It delivered written reasons some 14 days later. Beaumont J held (at 271 273, Lockhart and Hill JJ agreeing at 253) that the Tribunal's omission to provide reasons at the…
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- Case
- [2024] AATA 1040
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the Tribunal was the application of Ministerial Direction No. 99, which provides a framework for decision-makers exercising the discretion to revoke a mandatory visa cancellation. This involved weighing the primary considerations, such as the protection of the Australian community, against other considerations, including the applicant's personal circumstances and rehabilitation. The Tribunal had to assess the seriousness of the offending conduct and the risk of re-offending, while also considering factors that might justify revocation.
The Tribunal reasoned that while the applicant's offending conduct was objectively serious, it fell within the lower end of the range for such offences. Crucially, the Tribunal accepted expert evidence from a clinical forensic psychologist, Mr Jeffrey Cummins, who assessed the applicant as a low risk of re-offending. Mr Cummins' opinion was that the applicant had "comprehensively 'learnt his lesson'" and that alcohol, a contributing factor to the offending, had been ceased since the applicant's charge. The Tribunal found that these factors, particularly the low risk of re-offending and the applicant's demonstrated remorse and rehabilitation efforts, constituted "another reason" to revoke the mandatory cancellation.
Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the decision to refuse to revoke the mandatory cancellation of Mr Brar's visa and substituted a decision to revoke the mandatory cancellation.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Notably, these considerations are to be regarded as ‘other’ as opposed to ‘secondary’ considerations. As noted by Colvin J in Suleiman v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 594 at [23]: ‘...Direction 65 [now Direction 99] makes clear that an evaluation is required in each case as to the weight to be given to the ‘other considerations’ (including non-refoulement obligations). It requires both primary and other considerations to be given ‘appropriate weight’. Direction 65 does provide that, generally, primary considerations should be given greater weight. They are primary in the sense that absent some factor that takes the case out of that which pertains ‘generally’ they are to be given greater weight. However, Direction 65 does not require that the other considerations be treated as secondary in all cases. Nor does it provide that primary considerations are ‘normally’ given greater weight. Rather, Direction 65 concerns the appropriate weight to be given to both ‘primary’ and ‘other considerations’. In effect, it requires an inquiry as to whether one or more of the other considerations should be treated as being a primary consideration or the consideration to be afforded greatest weight in the particular circumstances of the case because it is outside the circumstances that generally apply.’PRIMARY CONSIDERATION 1: PROTECTION OF THE AUSTRALIAN COMMUNITY Paragraph 8.1 of the Ministerial Direction requires that the Tribunal keep in mind that the Australian Government is committed to protecting the Australian community from harm in consequence of criminal activity or other serious conduct by non-citizens. Decision-makers are required to have particular regard for the principle that entering or remaining in Australia is a privilege that Australia confers on non-citizens, in the expectation that they are, (and have been) law-abiding; will respect important institutions; and will not cause or threaten harm to the Australian community. This requires consideration of ‘the nature and seriousness of the non-citizen’s conduct to date’, as well as ‘the risk to the Australian community’ in the event that the non-citizen were to commit further offences, or to engage in other serious forms of conduct, if allowed to remain in Australia.The nature and seriousness of the Applicant’s conduct to date The Respondent Minister submits[20] that sexual assault against a child is ‘objectively very serious’, and points to the victim impact statements of both the complainant, and of her mother - as were presented to the Court in Victoria upon the Applicant’s sentencing - in demonstration of the specific harm caused by the Applicant. [20] Respondent’s SFIC paragraph [21]. On behalf the Applicant it is submitted[21] that although the Applicant’s index offence is objectively serious, it nonetheless remains within the lower end of the range of seriousness for such an offence.[21] Applicant’s SFIC paragraphs [40] & [45].