Saunders v Department of Housing

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QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL


CITATION:

Saunders v Department of Housing [2024] QCATA 81

PARTIES:

RAYMOND SAUNDERS

(applicant/appellant)

v

DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING

(respondent)

APPLICATION NO/S:

APL170-22

ORIGINATING APPLICATION NO/S:

OCL049-20

MATTER TYPE:

Appeals

DELIVERED ON:

1 August 2024

HEARING DATE:

28 May 2024

HEARD AT:

Brisbane

DECISION OF:

Senior Member Brown

ORDERS:

1.     The decision of the Tribunal dated 10 May 2022 is set aside.

2.     The matter is returned to the Tribunal.

CATCHWORDS:

HUMAN RIGHTS – PRIVACY LEGISLATION – privacy complaint - where applicant asserted failure by respondent to amend personal information – where applicant delayed in excess of 6 years to request referral of privacy complaint to the tribunal – whether s 38(1) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) applies to the time for a complainant to request the referral of a privacy complaint to the tribunal – where the tribunal at first instance found the failure by the complainant to request the referral of a privacy complaint ‘as soon as possible’ rendered invalid the referral – whether the Tribunal erred in finding that s 38(1) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) required the complainant to request the referral of his privacy complaint to the tribunal ‘as soon as possible’ – whether the Tribunal erred in finding that the failure by the complainant to request the referral of his privacy complaint ‘as soon as possible’ rendered invalid the referral

Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld)

s 4, s 38
Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld)

s 25

Information Privacy Act 2009 (Qld)

s 6, s 46, s 58, s 165, s 168 s 174, s 175, s 176

Niclin Constructions Pty Ltd v SHA Premier ConstructionsPty Ltd & Anor [2019] QCA 177

Re Conset Investments Pty Ltd [1993] 2 Qd R 244
Saunders v Department of Housing and Public Works [2022] QCAT 159

Valuers Registration Board of Queensland v Murphy [2021] QCA 159

APPEARANCES & REPRESENTATION:

Applicant:

Mr W Isdale instructed by N R Barbi Solicitor

Respondent:

Ms H Davidson instructed by Crown Law

REASONS FOR DECISION

  1. This is an appeal against a decision of the Tribunal dismissing the referral of Mr Davidson’s privacy complaint.

    The decision of the Tribunal

  2. In the proceeding below, the Tribunal identified the following preliminary issue for determination:

    Whether the time limit set out in s 38(4) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), namely ‘as soon as possible’, applies to the time within which a complainant may request the Information Commissioner to refer a privacy complaint to the Tribunal upon being given advice of his or her rights to do so pursuant to sections 175(b) and 176(1) of the Information Privacy Act 2009 (Qld).

  3. The parties filed submissions addressing the preliminary issue. The Tribunal determined that Mr Saunders had not requested that his privacy complaint be referred to the Tribunal as soon as possible and dismissed the referral.[1]  Mr Saunders appeals the decision.

  4. The disposition of the appeal…

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Details
Case
[2024] QCATA 81
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In this case, Mr Saunders appealed against a decision of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (QCAT) that dismissed his privacy complaint. The Tribunal had determined that Mr Saunders had not requested the referral of his privacy complaint to QCAT as soon as possible, and dismissed the referral. The central issue in the appeal was whether section 38(4) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) applied to require Mr Saunders to request the referral of his privacy complaint ‘as soon as possible’. If so, the Tribunal was correct in dismissing the referral for the failure of Mr Saunders to request it as soon as possible.

The court found that the Information Privacy Act 2009 (Qld) was silent on the time period within which a complainant may request the referral of a privacy complaint to QCAT. The learned member of the Tribunal concluded that in the absence of such a time period, section 38(4) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) applied. The court held that in the absence of the application of section 38(4), the time for a complainant to request the referral of a privacy complaint to QCAT would arguably remain open ended. However, the court found that the absence of an express time frame in the Information Privacy Act 2009 (Qld) presumptively called for the application of the time requirement in section 38(4) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld). The court concluded that a requirement to request the referral of a privacy complaint upon ‘as soon as possible’ was not inconsistent with the purpose or the terms of the Information Privacy Act 2009 (Qld). The court found that the requirement was consistent with the Act’s purpose of ensuring the expeditious resolution of disputes.

The court found that the Tribunal was correct in its interpretation of section 38(4) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) and its application to the referral of privacy complaints to QCAT. The court found that the failure of Mr Saunders to request the referral of his privacy complaint ‘as soon as possible’ rendered invalid the referral. The decision of the Tribunal was set aside, and the matter was returned to the Tribunal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The decision of the Tribunal dated 10 May 2022 is set aside.

2. The matter is returned to the Tribunal.

Background

Background to the litigation

Mr Saunders lodged a privacy complaint with the Information Commissioner alleging that the Department of Housing had failed to amend personal information as requested. Mr Saunders did not request the Information Commissioner to refer the privacy complaint to the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (QCAT) for several years after the Commissioner had informed him of his rights to make such a request. When Mr Saunders eventually requested the referral, QCAT dismissed the referral as invalid due to the excessive delay. The Tribunal found that section 38(4) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) required Mr Saunders to request the referral 'as soon as possible'. Mr Saunders appealed against the Tribunal's decision to the Queensland Court of Appeal.

This case involves an appeal from a decision of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (QCAT) that dismissed a referral of a privacy complaint. Initially, Mr Saunders lodged a privacy complaint with the Information Commissioner concerning the Department of Housing's failure to amend personal information. The Information Commissioner notified Mr Saunders of his rights to request a referral to QCAT, but Mr Saunders delayed for over six years before making the request. Upon referral, QCAT dismissed the complaint on the grounds that Mr Saunders had not acted 'as soon as possible'. Mr Saunders appealed this decision to the Queensland Court of Appeal, which accepted the appeal and allowed the grounds of appeal to be amended.

Decision

Reasons for decision

This is an appeal against a decision of the Tribunal dismissing the referral of Mr Davidson’s privacy complaint. The decision of the Tribunal In the proceeding below, the Tribunal identified the following preliminary issue for determination:Whether the time limit set out in s 38(4) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), namely ‘as soon as possible’, applies to the time within which a complainant may request the Information Commissioner to refer a privacy complaint to the Tribunal upon being given advice of his or her rights to do so pursuant to sections 175(b) and 176(1) of the Information Privacy Act 2009 (Qld). The parties filed submissions addressing the preliminary issue. The Tribunal determined that Mr Saunders had not requested that his privacy complaint be referred to the Tribunal as soon as possible and dismissed the referral.[1] Mr Saunders appeals the decision. [1]Saunders v Department of Housing and Public Works [2022] QCAT 159. The disposition of the appeal requires consideration of various provisions of the Information Privacy Act 2009 (Qld) and the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld). The Information Privacy Act 2009 (Qld) (‘IP Act’) Of relevance in this appeal the IP Act provides:(a)Section 44(1) – provides that an individual who has had access to a document of an agency or a document of a Minister may apply to the agency or Minister for amendment of any part of the individual’s personal information contained in the document that the individual claims is inaccurate, incomplete, out of date or misleading;(b)Section 165(1) – provides that an individual whose personal information is, or at any time has been, held by a relevant entity may make a privacy complaint to the information commissioner;(c)Section 174 – provides that Part 4 of the IP Act, ‘Referral of privacy complaints to QCAT’, applies if a privacy complaint is made to the information commissioner and:(i) it does not appear to the commissioner reasonably likely that resolution of the complaint could be achieved through mediation; or(ii) mediation of the complaint is attempted under this chapter but a certified agreement for the resolution of the complaint is not achieved;(d)Section 175 – provides that the information commissioner must give written notice to both the complainant and the respondent for the privacy complaint advising:(i) that Part 4 of the Act applies and why it applies; and(ii) that the commissioner will, if asked by the complainant to do so, refer the privacy complaint to QCAT for hearing.(e)Section 176(1) – provides that the information commissioner must refer the privacy complaint to QCAT, if asked to do so by the complainant, within 20 business days after being asked to refer it.The Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) (‘AI Act’) Section 38(4) of the AI Act provides:If no time is provided or allowed for doing anything, the thing is to be done as soon as possible, and as often as the relevant occasion happens. Section 4 of the AI Act provides:The application of this Act may be displaced, wholly or partly, by a contrary intention appearing in the Act. The privacy complaint by Mr Saunders

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

At the hearing of the appeal Mr Saunders was permitted to amend the grounds of appeal. The amended grounds are:(a)The Tribunal erred in concluding that s 38(4) of the AI Act applied such that Mr Saunders was required to make a request for a referral of his privacy complaint to the OIC “as soon as possible”; (b)If s 38(4) of the AI Act did apply, the Tribunal erred in concluding that the failure by Mr Saunders to request the referral of the complaint to the Tribunal ‘as soon as possible’ resulted in the invalidity of a referral, with the result that the Tribunal was deprived of jurisdiction.ConsiderationGround of appeal 1 – did the Tribunal err in finding that, by operation of s 38(4) of the AI Act, Mr Saunders was required to request the Information Commissioner refer his privacy complaint to the Tribunal ‘as soon as possible’? The IP Act is silent on the time period within which a complainant may request the referral of a complaint to the Tribunal. The learned member concluded that in the absence of such a time period, s 38(4) of the AI Act applied. It is trite to observe that in the absence of the application of s 38(4), the time for a complainant to request the referral of a privacy complaint to the Tribunal would arguably remain open ended. Of course a respondent might, for example, apply to have a referral dismissed pursuant to s 47 of the QCAT Act in circumstances where the respondent asserted prejudice as a result of such delay. In Re Conset Investments Pty Ltd[10] Ryan J considered the forerunner provision of s 38(4). Conset involved an appeal under the Building Units and Group Titles Act 1980 (Qld) (‘BUGT Act’). The (then) Tribunal dismissed an appeal by Conset against an order by a referee. The BUGT Act permitted an appeal from the decision of the Tribunal to the Supreme Court, although no time frame for the filing of the appeal was stipulated in the Act. The appeal was filed more than eight months after the Tribunal decision. Ryan J stated:The words in the first clause of s. 38(5) are, I consider, sufficiently comprehensive to include a situation where no time is prescribed within which any appeal must be instituted. Nobody is, of course, required to institute an appeal, though certain persons may do so. But if a person exercises his entitlement to appeal, no time is prescribed by the Act within which the appeal is to be instituted, and s. 38(5) is therefore applicable.[10][1993] 2 Qd R 244. Niclin Constructions Pty Ltd v SHA Premier ConstructionsPty Ltd & Anor[11] involved a proceeding under the Building and Construction Industry Payments Act 2004 (Qld) (‘BCIPA’). The BCIPA provided for the referral of disputed payment claims to an adjudicator. An adjudication application, once lodged with the Queensland Building and Construction Commission, was required to be served on the respondent. The BCIPA did not specify any time period for such service. Niclin served the adjudication applications twelve business days after the date of lodgement. The adjudicator decided that there had not been effective service of the applications, that service of the applications was an essential preliminary to the decision making process and that as a consequence he had no jurisdiction to decide the applications. Niclin applied to the Supreme Court for judicial review of the adjudicator’s decision. Ryan J, in dismissing the application, found that the AI Act applied and concluded that service of the applications had not been effected ‘as soon as possible’. The Court of Appeal dismissed Niclin’s appeal. Applegarth J, with whom the other members of the Court agreed, stated:[18] The absence of an express time frame on service in s 21(5)[12] does not, in itself, indicate an intention to displace the time frame stated in s 38(4) of the AIA. Instead, the absence of an express period for service in s 21(5) means that s 38(4) applies, unless a contrary intention appears in the Act. In Attorney-General (Qld) v Australian Industrial Relations Commission, Gleeson CJ stated: “Acts of Parliament are drafted, and are intended to be read and understood, in the light of the Acts Interpretation Act. A particular Act, and the Acts Interpretation Act, do not compete for attention, or rank in any order of priority. They work together. The meaning of the particular Act is to be understood in the light of the interpretation legislation. The scheme of that legislation is to state general principles that apply unless a contrary intention is manifested in a particular Act.”[19] The issue, then, is whether the Act as a whole or its specific terms manifest an intention that s 38(4) of the AIA should not apply, so as to leave the timing of service of an adjudication application a matter entirely for the claimant to decide. Niclin points to two matters: the purpose of the Act, and the presence of other time frames.…[26] One, however, is not concerned with an explanation for the absence of an express time requirement in s 21(5). The absence of an express time requirement presumptively calls for the application of the time requirement in s 38(4) of the AIA. Therefore, what must be explained by Niclin is why the (presumed) presence in s 21(5) of a time requirement to act “as soon as possible” is inconsistent with the Act, which includes a variety of time requirements imposed upon a claimant, a respondent, the registrar and an adjudicator. As discussed, the purpose of the Act does not support the submission that the requirement to serve an adjudication application upon a respondent should be subject to no time limit at all.…[36] A requirement to serve an adjudication application upon the respondent “as soon as possible” is not inconsistent with the Act’s purpose or its terms. It is consistent with the Act’s purpose of ensuring the expeditious resolution of disputes. The interpretation contended for by Niclin, which would allow a claimant to take as long as it likes to serve an adjudication application after lodgement, is unlikely to have been intended by Parliament, so as to displace the presumed application of s 38(4) of the AIA. The Parliament is unlikely to have intended to allow a claimant to delay the progress of an adjudication application for as long as it chooses, leaving the respondent and the adjudicator in a state of uncertainty about when the adjudication process will conclude… (footnotes omitted).[11][2019] QCA 177.[12]The relevant service provision in the BCIPA.