HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
GLEESON CJ,
GAUDRON, McHUGH, GUMMOW, KIRBY, HAYNE AND CALLINAN JJ
RE PACIFIC COAL PTY LIMITED & ORS RESPONDENTS
EX PARTE: CONSTRUCTION, FORESTRY,
MINING AND ENERGY UNION & ANOR PROSECUTORS
Re Pacific Coal Pty Limited
Ex parte: Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union
[2000] HCA 34
15 June 2000
S137/1998
ORDER
Order nisi granted 6 November 1998, as amended by orders made 19 May 1999 and 11 November 1999, discharged with costs.
Representation:
No appearance for the first respondent
C N Jessup QC with M P McDonald for the second respondent (instructed by Freehill Hollingdale & Page)
R J Buchanan QC with G C Martin SC for the third to thirty-eighth respondents (instructed by Freehill Hollingdale & Page)
R C Kenzie QC with I Taylor for the prosecutors (instructed by R L Whyburn & Associates)
Interveners:
D M J Bennett QC, Solicitor-General for the Commonwealth with I M Neil and L J Hardiman intervening on behalf of the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)
P A Keane QC, Solicitor-General for the State of Queensland with S J Lee intervening on behalf of the Attorney-General for the State of Queensland (instructed by Crown Solicitor for the State of Queensland)
P A Keane QC, Solicitor-General for the State of Queensland with S G E McLeish intervening on behalf of the Attorney-General for the State of Victoria (instructed by Victorian Government Solicitor)
R J Meadows QC, Solicitor-General for the State of Western Australia with J C Pritchard intervening on behalf of the Attorney-General for the State of Western Australia (instructed by Crown Solicitor for the State of Western Australia)
N J Williams with P Ginters intervening on behalf of the Attorney-General for the State of New South Wales (instructed by Crown Solicitor for the State of New South Wales)
Notice: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
GLEESON CJ,
GAUDRON, McHUGH, GUMMOW, KIRBY, HAYNE AND CALLINAN JJ
CONSTRUCTION, FORESTRY,
MINING AND ENERGY UNION & ANOR PLAINTIFFS
AND
THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA DEFENDANT
Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v The Commonwealth
15 June 2000
S138/1998
ORDER
Amended question reserved for consideration of the Full Court answered as follows:
Question:On the basis of the facts pleaded in the Plaintiffs' Statement of Claim, and admitted in the Defendant's Defence, are any of the following laws invalid:
(a)Section 3 of the Workplace Relations and Other Legislation Amendment Act 1996 (Cth) to the extent that it purports to give effect to item 50 in Part 2 of Schedule 5 of the Workplace Relations and Other Legislation Amendment Act 1996 (Cth); or
(b)Section 3 of the Workplace Relations and Other Legislation Amendment Act 1996 (Cth) to the extent that it purports to give effect to subitems 51(1), (2) and (3) in Part 2 of Schedule 5 of the Workplace Relations and Other Legislation Amendment Act 1996 (Cth)?
Answer:(a) No.
(b)No.
Plaintiffs to pay defendant's…
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- Case
- [2000] HCA 34
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the Court was whether section 3 of the WROLA Act, in giving effect to the specified items in Schedule 5, constituted a law with respect to conciliation and arbitration for the prevention and settlement of industrial disputes extending beyond the limits of any one State, as permitted by section 51(xxxv) of the Constitution. This required the Court to determine if the Parliament possessed the constitutional power to legislate in a manner that rendered specific provisions of an award ineffective, thereby altering the balance of an award that had been established through the conciliation and arbitration process.
The majority of the Court reasoned that the power conferred by section 51(xxxv) of the Constitution extends to laws dealing with the processes of conciliation and arbitration, including the incidental power to enact legislation appropriate to effectuate that power. Crucially, the Court affirmed that this legislative power also encompasses the ability to repeal or partially repeal earlier laws enacted under that power. Applying this principle, the Court found that Parliament could legislate to render certain provisions of an award ineffective, provided the legislation retained the character of a law with respect to conciliation and arbitration. The Court concluded that the offending items could be excised, leaving section 3 of the WROLA Act otherwise operative and valid.
The Court ordered that the order nisi be made absolute with costs in favour of the prosecutors against the respondents, and that a writ of prohibition issue to prevent the respondents from giving effect to the decisions of the Commission that were the subject of the proceedings. Writs of certiorari and mandamus were also ordered to remove and quash the decisions and to command the Commission to determine the applications in accordance with law. In a separate matter, the Court answered a reserved question with "Yes" and deemed the second part of the question unnecessary to answer, ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs' costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
Order nisi granted 6 November 1998, as amended by orders made 19 May 1999 and 11 November 1999, discharged with costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
The CFMEU challenged the validity of these provisions, arguing that they were beyond the legislative power of the Commonwealth under section 51(xxxv) of the Constitution, which grants the Commonwealth the power to make laws with respect to conciliation and arbitration for the prevention and settlement of industrial disputes extending beyond the limits of any one state. The union claimed that the Commonwealth did not have the power to directly alter an existing award made by the process of conciliation and arbitration, as this would effectively allow the Commonwealth to change the internal balances and compromises within an award, benefiting one side in the industrial relationship. The union contended that such a change could not be justified under the conciliation and arbitration power, as it would no longer be the outcome of the constitutionally permissible process but rather the product of federal legislation.
The High Court was asked to determine whether section 3 of the WROLA Act, to the extent that it gave effect to item 50 and subitems 51(1), (2), and (3) in Part 2 of Schedule 5, was a law with respect to conciliation and arbitration for the prevention and settlement of industrial disputes extending beyond the limits of any one state under section 51(xxxv) of the Constitution. The Court had to consider whether the Commonwealth had the power to directly alter an existing award made by the process of conciliation and arbitration, and if so, whether such alteration was within the scope of the conciliation and arbitration power. The case raised significant questions about the extent of the Commonwealth's legislative power under section 51(xxxv) and the limits of the conciliation and arbitration power.
This case involves a legal challenge to the validity of certain provisions of the Workplace Relations and Other Legislation Amendment Act 1996 (Cth) ("WROLA Act") brought by the Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union against Pacific Coal Pty Ltd and the Commonwealth. The matter came before the High Court of Australia as an appeal on questions of law from the Federal Court of Australia. The Union sought to overturn provisions of the WROLA Act that they argued were invalid as they purported to give effect to certain items in the Schedule to the Act, which dealt with altering existing awards in a manner that extended beyond the conciliation and arbitration power under section 51(xxxv) of the Constitution. The Federal Court had initially found in favour of the Union, but the respondents appealed to the High Court. In the High Court, the Union and the Commonwealth agreed that the only challenge was to the validity of the specific items in the Schedule to the WROLA Act. The High Court heard arguments on the validity of these provisions and delivered its judgment, finding that certain items were invalid as they exceeded the conciliation and arbitration power, but allowing other provisions to stand. The Court also granted orders to enforce its decision, including prohibiting the respondents from giving effect to the invalid items and quashing decisions that relied on them.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: GLEESON CJ, GAUDRON J, CALLINAN J
The effect of item 50 in Pt 2 of Sched 5 to the WROLA Act is to partially repeal ss 148(1) and 149(1) of the principal Act. Once that is appreciated, the question whether the Parliament may legislate to render certain provisions of an award ineffective takes on another aspect. The question asks whether Parliament may legislate so as to deprive some provisions of an award of effect while continuing the effect of and binding parties to other provisions of the same award.The conciliation and arbitration power: Constitution s 51(xxxv) generally There are three general matters that should be noted at the outset with respect to s 51(xxxv) of the Constitution. First, the power to make laws with respect to "conciliation and arbitration for the prevention and settlement of industrial disputes extending beyond the limits of any one State" clearly extends to laws dealing with the processes of conciliation and arbitration, including the authorisation of persons or bodies to perform those functions, and the specification of "the manner in which, and the conditions on which, [they are to] carry out [those] functions"[20]. In this regard, Parliament may make it a condition of the discharge of the functions of conciliation and arbitration that certain matters are or are not to be the subject of one or other or both of those processes. Thus, for example, it may legislate so as to limit the matters that may be the subject of arbitration, or of award provision, so long as the resulting law has the character of a law with respect to conciliation and arbitration for the prevention or settlement of interstate industrial disputes.[20]Waterside Workers' Federation of Australia v Commonwealth Steamship Owners' Association (1920) 28 CLR 209 at 218 per Knox CJ. The second matter that should be noted is that s 51(xxxv) is not concerned exclusively with the processes of conciliation and arbitration. Those processes lie at the heart of the legislative power conferred by s 51(xxxv) of the Constitution. But as with every legislative power conferred by the Constitution, s 51(xxxv) carries with it the power to enact legislation which is "appropriate to effectuate the exercise of [that] power"[21] – the "implied incidental power", as it has come to be known[22].[21]Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1 at 27 per Mason CJ. See also Attorney-General (WA) v Australian National Airlines Commission (1976) 138 CLR 492 at 515 per Stephen J; Alexandra Private Geriatric Hospital Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth (1987) 162 CLR 271 at 281.[22]See, for example, Attorney-General (WA) v Australian National Airlines Commission (1976) 138 CLR 492 at 508 per Stephen J; Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1 at 85 per Dawson J; Cunliffe v The Commonwealth (1994) 182 CLR 272 at 296 per Mason CJ. The third matter that should be noted with respect to the legislative power conferred by s 51(xxxv) is that, as with other legislative powers, it is not only a power to legislate but, also, a power to repeal or partially repeal earlier laws passed pursuant to that power[23]. However, a question may arise, when an Act purports to partially repeal an earlier Act, whether, if amended, that earlier Act would retain the character which gave it its constitutional validity[24]. If it would not, other questions arise. Those questions will be considered later in these reasons.[23]Kartinyeri v The Commonwealth (1998) 195 CLR 337 at 355-356 per Brennan CJ and McHugh J, 368-370 per Gaudron J, 376 per Gummow and Hayne JJ, cf 421422 per Kirby J. See also R v Public Vehicles Licensing Appeal Tribunal (Tas); Ex parte Australian National Airways Pty Ltd (1964) 113 CLR 207 at 226.[24]Kartinyeri v The Commonwealth (1998) 195 CLR 337 at 357 per Brennan CJ and McHugh J, 369 per Gaudron J; Air Caledonie International v The Commonwealth (1988) 165 CLR 462 at 472.