FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Samson Maritime Pty Ltd v Aucote [2014] FCAFC 182
Citation: Samson Maritime Pty Ltd v Aucote [2014] FCAFC 182 Appeal from: Noel Aucote v Samson Maritime Pty Ltd [2014] AATA 296 Parties: SAMSON MARITIME PTY LTD v NOEL AUCOTE File numbers: NSD 585 of 2014
NSD 765 of 2014Judges: ALLSOP CJ, RARES J AND MCKERRACHER J Date of judgment: 22 December 2014 Catchwords: ADMIRALTY – seafarers compensation – whether Administrative Appeals Tribunal had jurisdiction to determine application for compensation under Seafarers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1992 (Cth) in respect of injury suffered by seafarer – where s 19 of the Act provided different nexuses for its application – whether nexuses independent or cumulative – where seafarer employed by vessel owner using vessel in construction of wharf – whether s 19(1) required vessel to be engaged only in interstate or international trade or commerce – whether s 19(2) applied to seafarer because vessel owner was a trading corporation – whether s 19(2) of the Act applied independently of s 19(1) and (1A) – whether s 19(1)(a) extended to activities “with respect to” trade and commerce between Australia and places outside Australia – where vessel used to assist in construction of wharf to be used for international carriage of iron ore and cooperated closely with internationally-registered ships
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – whether s 19(1) of Seafarers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1992 (Cth) limited scope and application of the Act to matters arising in trade or commerce between Australia and places outside Australia – whether s 19(2) of Act created independent basis for claim under Act if seafarer’s employer a trading corporation – consideration of beneficial purpose of Act – consideration of historical context of Act
Legislation: Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth)
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth)
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth)
Navigation Act 1912 (Cth)
Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth)
Sea and Submerged Lands Act 1973 (Cth)
Seafarers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1992 (Cth)
Seaman’s Compensation Act 1911 (Cth)
Shipping Registration Act 1981 (Cth)
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth)Cases cited: Actors and Announcers Equity Association of Australia v Fontana Films Pty Ltd [1982] HCA 23; (1982) 150 CLR 169 referred to
Alphapharm Pty Ltd v H Lundbeck A/S [2014] HCA 42; (2014) 314 ALR 182 applied
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v DB Management Pty Ltd (2000) 199 [2000] HCA 7; CLR 321 applied
Butler v Boston and Savannah Steam-Ship Co 130 US 527 (1889) referred to
Commissioner for Railways (NSW) v Agalianos [1955] HCA 27; (1955) 92 CLR 390 applied
D’Emden v Pedder [1904] HCA 1; 1 CLR 91 referred to
Director General of Social Security v Chaney [1980] FCA 87; (1980) 47 FLR 80 referred to
Empire Shipping Company Inc v Owners of the Ship ‘Shin Kobe Maru’ [1991] FCA 499; (1991) 32 FCR 78 referred to
Ex parte Garnett 141 US 1 (1891) referred to
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Consolidated Media…
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- Case
- [2014] FCAFC 182
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the statutory language of s 19, focusing on the interplay between s 19(1) and s 19(2) of the Act. Samson contended that s 19(2) could only apply if s 19(1) and (1A) also applied, meaning the vessel must be engaged in trade or commerce between Australia and places outside Australia. The court noted that, while the vessel was not directly engaged in trade or commerce, it did cooperate closely with internationally-registered ships. The court also considered the beneficial purpose of the Act and its historical context, which emphasised the protection of seafarers employed on vessels involved in international trade. Ultimately, the court found that s 19(2) provided an independent basis for the AAT’s jurisdiction, as it extended the Act to cover employees of trading corporations, regardless of whether the vessel was directly engaged in trade or commerce.
The Federal Court dismissed Samson’s appeal and application for constitutional writ relief, holding that the AAT had jurisdiction to determine Mr Aucote’s compensation claim. The court ruled that s 19(2) of the Act provided an independent basis for the AAT’s jurisdiction, which applied to Mr Aucote because he was employed by a trading corporation. The court ordered that the appeal and the application for constitutional writ relief be dismissed, with Samson to pay the respondent’s costs. This decision clarified that the AAT could exercise jurisdiction over compensation claims brought by seafarers employed by trading corporations under s 19(2) of the Act, even if the vessel was not directly involved in trade or commerce.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The application under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) be dismissed.
3. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal and the application.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Next, Samson argued that the Tribunal erred in construing s 19(2) as independently supporting its jurisdiction to determine Mr Samson’s claim for compensation under the SRC Act. Samson contended that s 19(2) was governed by, and did not operate outside the scope, or independently, of s 19(1) and (1A). It submitted that because the SRC Act dealt with persons employed on prescribed ships who were seafarers, s 19(2) could not be read as applying to all employees of an Australian trading corporation who also happened to be seafarers. Rather, Samson submitted, s 19(2) limited the operation of s 19(1) and (1A) to a person who was an employee of a trading corporation on a vessel that was engaged in, among other activities, international or inter-State trade and commerce.Consideration – principles of statutory construction The SRC Act must be construed as a whole in order to ascertain whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction to review Samson’s rejection of Mr Aucote’s claim for compensation. In Alphapharm Pty Ltd v H Lundbeck A/S [2014] HCA 42; (2014) 314 ALR 182 at 193 [42], Crennan, Bell and Gagelar JJ said:The pre-existing law and the legislative history should not deflect the Court from its duty to resolve an issue of statutory construction, which is a text-based activity (See Northern Territory v Collins (2008) 235 CLR 619 at 623 [16] per Gummow ACJ and Kirby J; [2008] HCA 49. See also Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue (2009) 239 CLR 27 at 46-47 [47]). However, both parties recognised that the task of statutory construction in this case required some appreciation of the pre-existing law and the legislative history of relevant provisions. Undoubtedly, questions of policy can inform the Court's task of statutory construction (See Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 233 CLR 307 at 348-351 [80]-[93] per Gummow and Crennan JJ; [2007] HCA 33. See also Zheng v Cai (2009) 239 CLR 446 at 453 [18], 455-456 [28]; [2009] HCA 52; Assistant Commissioner Condon v Pompano Pty Ltd (2013) 87 ALJR 458 at 467 [23]-[24] per French CJ; 295 ALR 638 at 646; [2013] HCA 7). Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ said in Australian Securities and Investments Commission v DB Management Pty Ltd (2000) 199 CLR 321 at 338 [34]-[35]:In Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority ((1998) 194 CLR 355 at 384, per McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ), after pointing out that the duty of a court is to give the words of a statutory provision the meaning that the legislature is taken to have intended them to have, the majority said:“Ordinarily, that meaning (the legal meaning) will correspond with the grammatical meaning of the provision. But not always. The context of the words, the consequences of a literal or grammatical construction, the purpose of the statute or the canons of construction may require the words of a legislative provision to be read in a way that does not correspond with the literal or grammatical meaning.”It may be added that, if a party contends that a provision, by reason of such considerations, should not be given its literal meaning, then such a contention may lack force unless accompanied by some plausible formulation of an alternative legal meaning.