Re: DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF SOCIAL SERVICES And: ROSEMARY CHANEY (1980) 47 FLR 80 No. G40 of 1980 Appeal - Administrative Law
COURT
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY GENERAL DIVISION Northrop(1), Deane(2) and Fisher(3) JJ.
CATCHWORDS
APPEAL - Administrative Appeals Tribunal - Application for review from decision of Director-General of Social Services - Appeal to Federal Court of Australia from "decision" of Tribunal - Competence of appeal from preliminary ruling of Tribunal that it has jurisdiction to review decision - Competence of appeal from an interim order of Tribunal staying operation of decision - What constitutes a "decision" of the Tribunal - Jurisdiction of Federal Court - Power to make interim order.
Administrative Law - Administrative Appeals Tribunal - Application for review of decision of Director-General of Social Services - Preliminary ruling and interim order of Administrative Appeals Tribunal - Whether "decision" giving right of appeal to Federal Court - Jurisdiction of Federal Court - Power to make interim order - Social Services Act 1947 (Cth), ss. 15, 59 (1) - Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), ss. 3 (3), 41 (2), 42, 43 (1), 43A, 44 (2), 44 (2A), 44A, 45, Sched. Pt XXIVA - Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s. 24.
HEADNOTE
On 14th April, 1980, the applicant Director-General made a decision to "confirm" that the respondent was not entitled to a widow's pension under the Social Services Act 1947. On 24th April, 1980, the respondent applied to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to review the "decision of the Department of Social Security to cancel (her) widow's pension". On 22nd May, 1980, the President of the Tribunal ruled that the Tribunal had jurisdiction to review the decision and suspended the order suspending the respondent's widow's pension until the hearing and determination of the review or until further order. The applicant purported to appeal against these decisions to the court under s. 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 ("the Act").
On 4th June, 1980, the court constituted by a single judge ordered that the interim order of the Tribunal operate "to direct payment of the pension . . . until the hearing of the appeal or further order". The applicant also appealed against this order.
Held: Per Deane and Fisher JJ. - (1) The appeals from the ruling and interim order of the President of the Tribunal were incompetent and should be dismissed as: (a) subject to the qualification in s. 44 (2) of the Act, an appeal to the court under s. 44 (1) lies only from a decision of the Tribunal which constitutes the effective decision or determination of the application for review, and (b) the ruling and interim order of the President did not effectively dispose of the proceedings or any independent part thereof. Deputy Commissioner of Patents v.…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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Details
AGLC
Director-General of Social Services v Chaney, R. [1980] FCA 108 ((1980) 47 FLR 80)
Case
[1980] FCA 108
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The appellant, the Director-General of Social Services, sought review of a decision made by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT). The respondent, Ms Chaney, had applied to the AAT for review of a decision concerning her eligibility for social security benefits. The Federal Court of Australia was asked to determine the competence of the appeal from the AAT's ruling and an interim order made by the AAT. The core issue was whether the AAT's preliminary ruling and the interim order constituted a "decision" that could be appealed to the Federal Court.
The court considered whether the AAT's preliminary ruling that it had jurisdiction to review the decision constituted a "decision" within the meaning of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act. It also examined if the interim order, which stayed the operation of the decision pending the outcome of the review, was a "decision" that could be appealed. The court held that the preliminary ruling was not a "decision" for the purposes of appeal, as it did not determine the merits of the case. The interim order, while it had an effect on the respondent, was not a final decision on the merits and thus not appealable. Consequently, the appeal from the preliminary ruling and the interim order was dismissed, but the appeal from the interim order made by a single judge of the Federal Court was allowed.
The court concluded that the preliminary ruling of the AAT was not a "decision" that could be appealed to the Federal Court, and the interim order made by the AAT was not a final decision on the merits. However, the interim order made by a single judge of the Federal Court was found to be an appealable decision. The court set aside the interim order made by the Federal Court and ordered the appellant to pay the respondent's costs associated with the dismissed appeal from the AAT.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. THE appeal from the ruling and the interim order made by the President of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal be dismissed.
2. THE appeal from the interim order of the Federal Court of Australia constituted by a single judge be allowed AND THAT that interim order be set aside.
3. THE applicant pay to the respondent so much of his costs of the appeal to this Court as relates to the appeal referred to in Order 1 hereof.