Bienstein v Attorney General

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Bienstein v Attorney General [2009] FCA 1501

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION – request for access to documents – failure to make decision within 30 days – deemed refusal to grant access – whether Administrative Appeals Tribunal had power to order that a decision be made

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – Administrative Appeals Tribunal – powers – deemed refusal to grant access to documents – whether Tribunal had power to order that decision be made

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – Administrative Appeals Tribunal – procedural fairness – bias – Tribunal not making orders or giving procedural directions sought by applicant – whether reasonable apprehension of bias in protecting ministers from freedom of information requests

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – Administrative Appeals Tribunal – appeal to Court – questions of law – nature of questions of law on which appeal can be brought

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) ss 25(5), 26, 33(1)(a), 37, 42D, 44(1)
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) ss 7, 11(3), 11(4)
Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) ss 11, 15, 16, 18, 24A, 26, 30A, 54, 55(1), 56(1), 56(5), 56(6), 58(1), 66

Re: Bienstein and Attorney-General (Cth) [2004] AATA 896 cited
Re: Bienstein and Minister for Justice and Customs [2004] AATA 895 cited
Bienstein v Attorney-General [2007] FCA 1174 (2007) 162 FCR 405 cited
Bienstein v Attorney-General (Commonwealth of Australia) [2008] AATA 7 cited
Bienstein v Attorney-General (Commonwealth of Australia) [2008] AATA 330 cited
Cashman & Partners v Secretary, Department of Human Services and Health (1995) 61 FCR 301 applied
Director-General of Social Services v Chaney (1980) 47 FLR 80 cited
Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 46 FLR 409 cited
Hounslow v Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (unreported, Federal Court of Australia, Sweeney J, 20 December 1985) cited

HELEN BIENSTEIN v ATTORNEY GENERAL and JUSTICE MINISTER

VID 563 of 2008

HELEN BIENSTEIN v ATTORNEY-GENERAL (CTH) and MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS (CTH)

VID 1 of 2009

GRAY J
15 DECEMBER 2009
MELBOURNE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

VID 563 of 2008

ON APPEAL FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL CONSTITUTED BY MS STEPHANIE FORGIE, DEPUTY PRESIDENT
BETWEEN:

HELEN BIENSTEIN
Applicant

AND:

ATTORNEY GENERAL
First Respondent

JUSTICE MINISTER
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

GRAY J

DATE OF ORDER:

15 DECEMBER 2009

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the respondents’ costs of the appeal.

Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


The text of entered orders can be located using eSearch on the Court’s website.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

VID 1 of 2009

ON APPEAL FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL CONSTITUTED BY MS STEPHANIE FORGIE, DEPUTY PRESIDENT
BETWEEN:

HELEN BIENSTEIN
Applicant

AND:

ATTORNEY-GENERAL (CTH)
First Respondent

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS (CTH)
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

GRAY J

DATE OF ORDER:

15 DECEMBER 2009

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The application be dismissed.

2.        The applicant pay the respondents’…

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Details
Case
[2009] FCA 1501
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Bienstein v Attorney General, Ms Bienstein sought to challenge the failure of the Attorney-General and the Minister for Home Affairs to respond to her request for access to certain documents under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth). The matter was heard in the Federal Court of Australia, where the primary judge dismissed the application and the applicant now appealed against that decision. The central issue before the court was whether the Attorney-General and the Minister for Home Affairs were under a legal obligation to make a decision on Ms Bienstein's request within a specified period.

The court considered the provisions of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) and the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) in determining the legal obligations of the Attorney-General and the Minister for Home Affairs. Section 42D of the AAT Act provided that if a decision was remitted to the person who made it, they could reconsider the decision and either affirm, vary or set it aside and make a new decision. However, there was no positive provision in the FOI Act that imposed a specific duty to make a decision within a 30 day period. The court found that the absence of such a provision tended to suggest that there was no enforceable right to have a decision made. The orders of the Court did not purport to give rise to any such obligation.

The court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the applicant pay the respondents' costs of the appeal. The court found that the orders of the Court did not impose any obligation on the Attorney-General and the Minister for Home Affairs to make a decision on Ms Bienstein's request within a specified period. Instead, the orders left the cases in the hands of the Tribunal, rather than in the hands of the Attorney-General and the Minister. The applicant was also ordered to pay the respondents' costs of the proceeding.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the respondents’ costs of the appeal.

Note:

1. The application be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the respondents’ costs of the proceeding.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

GRAY J
Section 42D of the AAT Act provides:(1)At any stage of a proceeding for review of a decision, the Tribunal may remit the decision to the person who made it for reconsideration of the decision by the person.Powers of person to whom a decision is remitted(2)If a decision is so remitted to a person, the person may reconsider the decision and may:(a) affirm the decision; or(b) vary the decision; or(c)set aside the decision and make a new decision in substitution for the decision set aside.(3) If the person varies the decision:(a)the application is taken to be an application for review of the decision as varied; and(b)the person who made the application may either:(i)proceed with the application for review of the decision as varied; or(ii) withdraw the application.(4)If the person sets the decision aside and makes a new decision in substitution for the decision set aside:(a)the application is taken to be an application for review of the new decision; and(b)the person who made the application may either:(i)proceed with the application for review of the new decision; or(ii)withdraw the application.Time limits(5)The person must reconsider the decision, and do one of the things mentioned in paragraphs (2)(a), (b) and (c), within whichever of the following periods is applicable:(a)if the Tribunal, when remitting the decision, specified a period within which the person was to reconsider the decision—that period;(b)in any other case—the period of 28 days beginning on the day on which the decision was remitted to the person.(6)The Tribunal may, on the application of the person, extend the period applicable under subsection (5).(7)If the person has not reconsidered the decision, and done one of the things mentioned in paragraphs (2)(a), (b) and (c), within the period applicable under subsection (5), the person is taken to have affirmed the decision.(8)If the person affirms the decision, the proceeding resumes.Making a decision Ms Bienstein sought to justify the central proposition of her argument, that each of the Attorney-General and the Minister for Home Affairs was and is required to make a decision on her request, in a number of ways. The one thing she could not do was to point to any provision of the FOI Act imposing a specific duty to make a decision. The effect of s 56(1) of the FOI Act is to treat a failure to make a decision within the 30 day time limit as a deemed decision to refuse to grant access to the document. There is no positive provision to the effect that a decision must be made within the 30 day period. The absence of such a provision tends to suggest that there is no enforceable right to have a decision made. Ms Bienstein said that, once judgment had been given on her earlier applications to the Court, she expected that the Attorney-General and the Minister would each give a decision on her request for access to documents within 30 days. Why she might have expected this is not clear. The orders of the Court certainly did not purport to give rise to any such obligation. Once the Tribunal’s decisions that it did not have jurisdiction to deal with Ms Bienstein’s applications for review were set aside, each case was remitted to the Tribunal to be heard and decided again according to law. The orders clearly left the cases in the hands of the Tribunal, rather than in the hands of the Attorney-General and the Minister.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: GRAY J

Full text does not contain this section.