Chief of Navy v Angre

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Chief of Navy v Angre [2016] FCAFC 171

Appeal from: Angre v Chief of Navy (No 2) [2016] ADFDAT 2
File numbers: NSD 1657 of 2016
NSD 1765 of 2016
Judges: ALLSOP CJ, GRIFFITHS, MORTIMER, PERRY AND GLEESON JJ
Date of judgment: 9 December 2016
Catchwords:

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – appeal from a decision of the Defence Force Discipline Appeal Tribunal on a question of law pursuant to s 52(1) of the Defence Force Discipline Appeals Act 1955 (Cth) – meaning of “decision” – whether confined to a final and operative “decision” –whether the considerations in Director-General of Social Services v Chaney [1980] FCA 108; 47 FLR 80 apply to s 52(1) of the Defence Force Discipline Appeals Act 1955 (Cth) –interlocutory evidentiary ruling not a “decision” – appeal dismissed – discretionary refusal to extend time to apply for review under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) – discretionary dismissal of application for judicial review under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth)

EVIDENCE – first respondent sought leave to appeal out of time to the Defence Force Discipline Appeal Tribunal against convictions entered by a General Court Martial – first respondent applied to Tribunal for leave to adduce certain evidence on appeal – Tribunal granted leave relying on implied power in s 23(1) of the Defence Force Discipline Appeals Act 1955 (Cth) – whether s 23(2) of the Defence Force Discipline Appeals Act 1955 (Cth) is exhaustive of the Tribunal’s power to receive fresh or new evidence

Legislation:

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 44(1)

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) ss 5, 11, 16

Defence Force Discipline Appeals Act 1955 (Cth) ss 15, 17, 19, 23, 23(1)(c), 23(2), 51, 52

Defence Force Discipline Appeals Regulations 1957 (Cth) reg 24

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B

Cases cited:

Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue [2009] HCA 41; 239 CLR 27

Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond [1990] HCA 33; 170 CLR 321

Commissioner of Taxation v Cancer and Bowel Research Association [2013] FCAFC 140; 305 ALR 534

Director-General of Social Services v Chaney [1980] FCA 108; 47 FLR 80

DPP v Wise (a pseudonym) [2016] VSCA 173

Hembury v Chief of General Staff [1998] HCA 47; 193 CLR 641

Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen [1984] FCA 186; 3 FCR 344

Kishore v Tax Practitioners Board [2016] FCA 1328

Master Education Services Pty Ltd v Ketchel [2008] HCA 38; 236 CLR 101

Obeid v The Queen [2016] HCA 9; 90 ALJR 447

R v Abou-Chabake [2004] NSWCCA 356

Date of hearing: 23 November 2016
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 91
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr A Moses SC with Mr B Kaplan
Solicitor for the Applicant: HWL Ebsworth
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr G Sirtes SC with Mr M Gracie
Solicitor for…
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Details
Case
[2016] FCAFC 171
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Chief of Navy v Angre involved an appeal by ABMT Angre against his conviction by a General Court Martial. The dispute centred on the Defence Force Discipline Appeal Tribunal's decision to allow Angre to adduce certain evidence on appeal, which the Chief of Navy contested. The High Court of Australia was asked to decide whether the Tribunal had the authority to permit the introduction of new evidence on appeal under s 23(1) of the Defence Force Discipline Appeals Act 1955 (Cth), or whether s 23(2) was exhaustive of the Tribunal's powers in this regard. The Court also had to determine if an interlocutory evidentiary ruling constituted a "decision" for the purposes of an appeal under s 52(1) of the Appeals Act, and whether the principles in Director-General of Social Services v Chaney applied to such appeals.

The Court found that the Defence Force Discipline Appeal Tribunal did not exceed its powers in granting leave to Angre to adduce certain evidence on appeal, as the statutory language of s 23(1) was broad enough to imply such a power. It concluded that the principles in Chaney were applicable to s 52 of the Appeals Act, which meant that the Court would not permit the principles to be circumvented by allowing a challenge to the Tribunal's evidentiary ruling through judicial review applications prior to the final determination of the appeal. The Court held that an interlocutory evidentiary ruling did not constitute a "decision" for the purposes of an appeal under s 52(1) of the Appeals Act, and therefore the appeal was dismissed. The application for an extension of time to bring a judicial review application under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) was refused, as was the application for judicial review itself under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth).

In summary, the Court dismissed Angre's appeal, refused the application for an extension of time for judicial review, and dismissed the application for judicial review. The reasons for the Court's decision were based on the interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions and the application of the principles set out in Chaney. The Court also noted that no orders as to costs were necessary, as Angre had undertaken to pay the first respondent's reasonable costs of the proceedings.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal under s 52 of the Defence Force Discipline Appeals Act 1955 (Cth) be dismissed.

2. The application for an extension of time within which to file and serve an application for an order of review under s 11(1) of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) be refused.

3. The application for judicial review under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) be dismissed.

4. Reasons to be published in due course.

THE COURT NOTES THAT:

1. No orders as to costs are necessary on the basis that the applicant made an undertaking to the Court to pay the first respondent’s reasonable costs of the proceedings.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

These proceedings were heard by the Court in its original jurisdiction constituted by five judges on 23 November 2016. On that day, the Court made orders dismissing the applicant’s appeal under s 52 of the Defence Force Discipline Appeals Act 1955 (Cth) (Appeals Act), refusing the application for an extension of time in which to bring a judicial review application under s 11 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (AD(JR) Act), and dismissing the application for judicial review under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). These are my reasons for the making of those orders.BACKGROUND The first respondent, ABMT Angre, has applied to the Defence Force Discipline Appeal Tribunal for leave to appeal and an extension of time to appeal against convictions entered by a General Court Martial on 16 and 22 September 2014. The appeal to this court and associated applications for judicial review concern orders made by the Tribunal on 29 July 2016 in connection with ABMT Angre’s appeal to the Tribunal. The Tribunal was constituted by Tracey, Logan and Brereton JJ. By those orders, the Tribunal refused an application by ABMT Angre to amend his grounds of appeal before it, but granted leave to ABMT Angre to adduce certain evidence on his appeal. In these proceedings, the applicant challenges the second order of the Tribunal: namely the order allowing ABMT Angre to adduce certain evidence on the hearing of his appeal. The Tribunal relied for its evidentiary ruling on an implied power in s 23(1) of the Appeals Act. The applicant’s contention is that the Tribunal misconstrued s 23(1) and no such implied power exists. The applicant submitted this was the first time the Tribunal had relied on s 23(1) for the admission of evidence on an appeal, as opposed to s 23(2), which the applicant contended was exhaustive of the Tribunal’s powers to receive new or fresh evidence. ABMT Angre’s application for leave to appeal out of time is scheduled to commence before the Tribunal on 12 December 2016 and these proceedings have been expedited in order to allow the Court to hear and determine them before that date. There is little evidence before the Court about the underlying prosecution and conviction of ABMT Angre. Senior counsel informed the court that the charges against ABMT Angre arose out of an assault. What is apparent from [1]-[10] of the Tribunal’s statement of reasons in relation to the orders under challenge is as follows. On 16 and 22 September 2014, what the Tribunal described as “the first Court Martial” convicted ABMT Angre of three charges. He had faced five charges, but had pleaded guilty to three and it was on those three that he was convicted. He did not immediately apply for leave to appeal against these convictions. The question of what punishment should be imposed on ABMT Angre was the subject of hearing and determination before what the Tribunal described as “the second Court Martial”. Before that hearing on punishment, ABMT Angre raised a number of preliminary legal points, which were heard over a period of 11 days. That hearing also involved the examination of a number of witnesses, some of whom, it appears, had sworn affidavits which were relied upon.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

At 29 August 2016, reg 24 of the Defence Force Discipline Appeals Regulations 1957 (Cth) provided:Procedure following decision on appeal, application or matter(1)When the Tribunal makes its decision on a question of law, an appeal, an application or a matter, the Tribunal must, as soon as practicable after making the decision, prepare a written statement that sets out the decision of the Tribunal on the question of law, appeal, application or matter.(2)The Tribunal must, as soon as practicable after preparing a written statement under subregulation (1), provide a copy of the statement to the Registrar.(3)The Registrar must, as soon as practicable after receiving a written statement under subregulation (2), give to the Registrar of Military Justice:(a) a copy of the statement; and(b)a copy of the record of proceeding of the Tribunal on the question of law, appeal, application or matter.RESOLUTION I address first the question whether any extensions of time are required and, if so, whether they should be granted. Thereafter, I explain why in my opinion the principles set out by a Full Court of this Court in Chaney are applicable to the terms of s 52 of the Appeals Act. From this flows my conclusion that, since Chaney is applicable, it would not be appropriate to allow those principles to be defeated by permitting a challenge to the Tribunal’s evidentiary ruling to be aired through judicial review applications prior to the final determination of the appeal proceeding before the Tribunal in which the ruling was made. The usual approach taken by this Court to this issue of discretion in such circumstances should apply. There is no justifiable basis in the present proceedings to permit the fragmentation of the proceedings before the Tribunal through judicial review.Extensions of time Two issues concerning extension of time are raised by these proceedings. The first concerns the operation of the time limit in s 52 of the Appeals Act, and the second concerns the judicial review application under the AD(JR) Act.Extension of time to bring appeal Section 52(2) of the Appeals Act provides that an appeal from a decision of the Tribunal must be instituted not later than 28 days after the day on which “a copy of a document setting out the terms of the decision of the Tribunal is furnished to the person”, or within such further time as this Court permits. When read with reg 24 of the Defence Force Discipline Appeals Regulations 1957 (which required the Tribunal to prepare a “written statement that sets out the decision of the Tribunal on the … matter”), the “document setting out the terms of the decision of the Tribunal” mentioned in s 52(2) should be construed as referring to Tribunal’s reasons for decision, and not to the orders pronounced by the Tribunal on 29 July 2016. It is not disputed that the Tribunal’s statement of reasons was furnished to the applicant and the first respondent by email from the Associate to the President of the Tribunal, Tracey J, on 29 August 2016. It is also not disputed that the applicant filed his notice of appeal on 26 September 2016, being the 28th day after the statement was provided.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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