Luck v Chief Executive Officer of Centrelink (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Luck v Chief Executive Officer of Centrelink (No 2) [2015] FCAFC 112

Citation: Luck v Chief Executive Officer of Centrelink (No 2) [2015] FCAFC 112
Appeal from: Luck v Chief Executive Officer of Centrelink [2008] FCA 1506
Parties: GAYE LUCK v CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF CENTRELINK
File number: VID 898 of 2008
Judges: COLLIER, GRIFFITHS AND MORTIMER JJ
Date of judgment: 21 August 2015
Catchwords:

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – appeal from primary judge’s refusal to extend time in which to appeal from and seek review of purported decisions and conduct by Tribunal – whether primary judge erred in finding appellant failed to identify decisions for the purposes of an appeal under s 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) – whether primary judge erred in finding appellant failed to identify decisions for the purposes of judicial review

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – appeal from primary judge’s refusal to extend time in which to appeal from and seek review of purported decisions and conduct by Tribunal – whether primary judge erred in finding allegation of apprehended bias against the Tribunal was bound to fail – no impediment to decision-maker forming opinions in course of review, so long as the decision-maker remains open to persuasion

Legislation: Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) ss 33(1)(a), 44
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) ss 5, 6
Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth)
Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth)
Cases cited: Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond [1990] HCA 33; 170 CLR 321
Barrett v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs [1989] FCA 269; 18 ALD 129
Birdseyev Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2003] FCAFC 232; 76 ALD 321
Commissioner of Taxation v Cancer and Bowel Research Association Inc [2013] FCAFC 140; 305 ALR 534
Deighton v Telstra Corporation Ltd  [1997] FCA 1568
Director-General of Social Services v Chaney [1980] FCA 87; 31 ALR 571
Haritos v Commissioner of Taxation [2015] FCAFC 92
House v The King [1936] HCA 40; 55 CLR 499
Luck v Chief Executive Officer of Centrelink [2008] FCA 1506; 107 ALD 538
Luck v Chief Executive Officer of Centrelink [2015] FCAFC 75
Luck v Secretary of the Department of Human Services [2015] FCAFC 111
Luck v University of Southern Queensland [2014] FCAFC 135; 145 ALD 1
LVR (WA) Pty Ltd v Administrative Appeals Tribunal [2012] FCAFC 90; 203 FCR 166
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng [2001] HCA 17; 205 CLR 507
NADH of 2001 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 328; 214 ALR 264
Rana v Repatriation Commission [2011] FCAFC 123; 196 FCR 137
SZRUI v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 80
Vranic v Commissioner of Taxation [2002] FCAFC 26; 49 ATR 93
Waters v Commonwealth [2015] FCAFC 46
Date of hearing: 21 May 2015
Place: Melbourne
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 44
Counsel for the…
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Details
Case
[2015] FCAFC 112
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal in Luck v Chief Executive Officer of Centrelink (No 2) arose from the appellant's application to the primary judge for an extension of time to appeal to and seek judicial review of decisions and conduct of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal). The primary judge had dismissed the application on the basis that the appeal was bound to fail and the judicial review application had no reasonable prospects of success. The Full Court was asked to consider whether the primary judge had erred in his findings.

The legal issues before the Full Court were whether the primary judge had erred in finding that the appellant had failed to identify decisions for the purposes of an appeal under section 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) and whether the primary judge had erred in finding that the allegation of apprehended bias against the Tribunal was bound to fail. The Full Court also considered whether the primary judge had erred in finding that the appellant had failed to identify decisions for the purposes of judicial review.

The Full Court found that the primary judge had not erred in his findings. The Court noted that the orders made by the Tribunal were entirely beneficial to the appellant, and that the primary judge's finding that the appeal was bound to fail was correct. The Court also found that the primary judge had not erred in finding that the allegation of apprehended bias was bound to fail, as there was no impediment to the decision-maker forming opinions in the course of the review, so long as the decision-maker remained open to persuasion. The Full Court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appellant pay the respondent's costs of and incidental to the appeal.

In conclusion, the Full Court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appellant pay the respondent's costs of and incidental to the appeal. The Court found that the primary judge had not erred in his findings and that the appeal was bound to fail. The Court also found that the allegation of apprehended bias was bound to fail and that the appellant had failed to identify decisions for the purposes of judicial review. The Full Court's decision confirms the importance of identifying decisions for the purposes of an appeal under section 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) and the need for a valid allegation of apprehended bias in order to succeed in a judicial review application.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Leave to appeal from the decision of Tracey J dated 8 October 2008 is granted.

2. The appeal is dismissed.

3. The appellant is to pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons given below, this appeal must be dismissed. Our reasons in this appeal should be read together with our reasons in VID 512 of 2014, Luck v Secretary of the Department of Human Services [2015] FCAFC 111, as these appeals were heard and determined together and there is considerable procedural overlap in the way the appeals have been dealt with, although their underlying subject matter differs.RELEVANT FACTS AND BACKGROUND TO THIS APPEAL As we have noted, the proceeding was commenced in 2008, although the underlying subject matter of the proceeding is several applications made by Ms Luck in 2005 under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) (the FOI Act) for access to documents held by Centrelink. On 28 February 2008, Ms Luck filed an application in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal seeking review of numerous decisions made by the respondent. The present appeal, and the application before the primary judge for an extension of time, arises in the unusual circumstances of the Tribunal having not yet proceeded to a final hearing of Ms Luck’s review application. That is because Ms Luck sought to appeal and seek judicial review of directions made by the Tribunal seeking to prepare the review for hearing, a refusal of leave to amend her review application and certain other procedural decisions taken by the Tribunal. Progress of Ms Luck’s review application in the Tribunal has been delayed pending her appeal to a single judge of this Court, and now from the decision of the primary judge to the Full Court of this Court. One consequence is that the administrative decisions which are the underlying subject matter of both the merits review and the proceedings in this Court are ten years old. The responsibility for that inordinate delay, which is not irrelevant to some of the discretionary considerations that have arisen in relation to the conduct of proceedings in this Court, lies largely with Ms Luck.The Tribunal proceedings to date The Tribunal conducted an interlocutory hearing on 9 May 2008 in response to a jurisdictional issue raised by the respondent that Ms Luck’s application did not clearly identify decisions capable of being reviewed by the Tribunal. At the interlocutory hearing, Ms Luck submitted she had clearly identified the relevant decision, at least by correspondence, as being a decision made on 3 July 2005 which she sought to have reviewed. That decision was (Ms Luck contended) the deemed refusal of an FOI request made by Ms Luck on 3 June 2005, on the basis that Centrelink had failed to respond within the requisite time period. At her request, the Tribunal granted Ms Luck leave to amend her application for review to so identify that decision. Counsel for the respondent did not oppose that grant of leave and conceded that the proposed amendment would suffice to enliven the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. It appears that the Tribunal’s grant of leave to amend the review application was never the subject of any formal orders. However, as recorded in the transcript of the interlocutory hearing, the grant of leave was dealt with in the following terms by the Tribunal:In view of the submission by Ms Luck identifying the decision, I grant leave to her to amend her application to the tribunal that identifies the decision under review to [be] the decision [FOI request] made on 3 June 2005 then deemed to be made on 3 July 2005 as set out in her correspondence dated 7 April 2008.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The grounds of appeal relied upon before the primary judge in the appellant’s s 44 appeal were replicated under ground (e)(ii) of the present appeal, and are set out at [17] below. In addition, Ms Luck sought judicial review under the AD(JR) Act of decisions and conduct on the basis of some 34 grounds, on a generalised basis (for example, grounds (vi) and (vii) “taking an irrelevant consideration into account” and “failing to take a relevant consideration into account in the exercise of a power”; and ground (xvii) “that the decisions was [sic] otherwise contrary to law”). It is not necessary to set out or describe those grounds further, other than by noting our agreement with the primary judge’s finding at [21] that Ms Luck “does no more than recite all of the grounds to be found in ss 5 and 6 of the ADJR Act without making any attempt to relate any particular ground to the conduct of the Senior Member” (nor, we find, to the conduct of the Assistant Registrar whose decisions and conduct were also impugned). THE PRIMARY JUDGE’S CASE MANAGEMENT AND DECISIONS On 4 July 2008, shortly after Ms Luck’s application was filed on 25 June 2008, the parties appeared before the primary judge for directions. His Honour directed that the respondent file and serve contentions of fact and law in opposition to Ms Luck’s application and adjourned the further hearing of the matter. When the matter returned before the primary judge on 20 August 2008, Ms Luck did not appear, having provided on 18 August 2008 a letter to the District Registrar advising she would be unable to appear for health reasons and seeking an adjournment until the latter part of September. On 20 August 2008, his Honour made orders directing the parties to file and serve written submissions and listing the matter for hearing on 8 October 2008. The application for an extension of time was heard and determined ex tempore on 8 October 2008, with settled written reasons following shortly after: see Luck v Chief Executive Officer of Centrelink [2008] FCA 1506; 107 ALD 538. The primary judge refused the application for an extension of time on the basis that the proposed s 44 appeal was bound to fail, and the AD(JR) Act application had no reasonable prospects of success. His Honour found (at [6]) the Tribunal directions “were entirely beneficial to Ms Luck”, and held (at [11]-[13]):It is … essential in appeals brought under s 44 of the AAT Act, that a question or questions of law be identified. If the notice of appeal fails to disclose a question of law the necessary subject matter of the appeal is lacking. Ms Luck has failed to identify any such question of law: see Birdseyev Australian Securities and Investment Commission (2003) 76 ALD 321 at 325.Section 44(1) only provides for an appeal from a “decision” of the Tribunal. In Director-General of Social Services v Chaney (1980) 31 ALR 571 Deane J, with whom Fisher J agreed, held (at 593) that, subject to some immaterial exceptions, “an appeal under s 44(1) of the [AAT] Act lies only from a decision from the Tribunal which constitutes the effective decision or determination of the application for review.” His Honour held that, in the normal case, “such a decision will be the final decision formulated in accordance with the provisions of s 43 of the Act.”The Tribunal in the present case has done no more than give directions with a view to readying Ms Luck’s application for hearing. In no sense are the directions from which she seeks to appeal final or determinative of her application. They do not, therefore, constitute decisions for the purposes of s 44. It follows that she has no right of appeal under that section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

At the time of dismissing the applications, we also made orders granting leave to Ms Luck to file and serve any written submissions she wished to make on this appeal on or before 4 pm on 18 June 2015, and granting the respondent leave to file and serve any submissions in reply on or before 4 pm on 2 July 2015. Ms Luck has not filed any submissions pursuant to that grant of leave.CONSIDERATION As the primary judge pointed out, the orders made by the Tribunal which Ms Luck seeks to impugn were entirely beneficial to her: granting her an extension of time, allowing her to amend her review application, compelling the respondent to give reasons and changing the name of the respondent so that it correctly reflected the proper respondent. An initial point raised by the respondent was whether Ms Luck needed leave to appeal on the basis that the appeal was from an interlocutory decision. It may be accepted that the decision is properly to be characterised as interlocutory: see, for example, Vranic v Commissioner of Taxation [2002] FCAFC 26; 49 ATR 93 citing Deighton v Telstra Corporation Ltd [1997] FCA 1568 and referring to Barrett v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs [1989] FCA 269; 18 ALD 129 at 130. The orders made by Gray J on 28 April 2009 at the relevant Full Court callover clearly treated the primary judge’s decision as interlocutory, and ordered that the question of leave be dealt with on the hearing of the appeal. At the hearing of this appeal on 21 May 2015, the Court requested the respondent provide a transcript of the callover before Gray J. After the hearing, having made enquiries of the transcript provider, the respondent advised the Court there would be a long delay in recovering the transcript due to technical problems encountered by the transcript provider. It was provided on 17 August 2015. That transcript confirms that Gray J made it clear to Ms Luck that leave to appeal may be required. Ms Luck disputed this before Gray J. After all these years, if leave is necessary, we would grant it in order to recognise that it would not serve the interests of the administration of justice to deal with this appeal other than on a final basis and on its merits. Insofar as the grounds of appeal are concerned, the respondent’s submissions spent some considerable time addressing the issue whether the matters raised in the s 44 notice of appeal before the primary judge were questions of law. His Honour found they were not, and this was one of the bases for his refusal to extend time. It also features heavily in Ms Luck’s grounds of appeal before us, in particular ground (e). As we have noted in VID 512 of 2014, Luck v Secretary of the Department of Human Services [2015] FCAFC 111, the Full Court’s decision in Haritos v Commissioner of Taxation [2015] FCAFC 92 has overruled Birdseyev Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2003] FCAFC 232; 76 ALD 321 and cases which adopted that approach to s 44 of the AAT Act. Both the primary judge’s reasons, and the respondent’s submissions on the appeal proceeded on the basis Birdseye was correct, and no criticism can be levelled at either the primary judge or the respondent for adopting that course.