PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - application for extension of time to apply for leave to appeal from interlocutory judgment - whether satisfactory reason given for delay - whether an application for leave to appeal would be futile - application dismissed.
RAYMOND JOHN DEIGHTON v TELSTRA CORPORATION LIMITED WAG 74 of 1997
LEE, HEEREY, R D NICHOLSON JJ PERTH 17 OCTOBER 1997
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
WAG 74 OF 1997
WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:
RAYMOND JOHN DEIGHTON Applicant
AND:
TELSTRA CORPORATION LIMITED Respondent
JUDGES:
LEE, HEEREY, R D NICHOLSON JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
17 OCTOBER 1997
WHERE MADE:
PERTH
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
The application be dismissed.
There be no order as to costs.
Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
WAG 74 of 1997
WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:
RAYMOND JOHN DEIGHTON Applicant
AND:
TELSTRA CORPORATION LIMITED Respondent
JUDGES:
LEE, HEEREY, R D NICHOLSON JJ
DATE:
17 OCTOBER 1997
PLACE:
PERTH
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
THE COURT:
The applicant (“Mr Deighton”), who appears in person assisted by a law student, has sought orders from a Full Court of this Court by an application headed “Application for Extension of Time and Special Leave to Appeal”.
On 23 May 1996 the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) refused to extend the time within which Mr Deighton could seek review under the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (“the AAT Act”) of a decision made by a delegate of the former Australian Telecommunications Corporation (“Telecom”), now Telstra Corporation Limited (“Telstra”), under the Commonwealth Employees’ Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (“the Act”).
Mr Deighton had been employed by Telecom between 1952 and 1987. He retired from that employment on the ground of “invalidity” at the age of fifty-six. He is now sixty-five.
In 1990 Mr Deighton lodged a claim under the Act for compensation for incapacity resulting from injuries suffered in the course of, or arising out of, his former employment. That claim was compromised by a Deed of Settlement and by…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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AGLC
Deighton v Telstra Corporation Ltd [1997] FCA 1568
Case
[1997] FCA 1568
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The applicants, Deighton and his wife, sought leave to appeal against a decision that dismissed their claim for damages against Telstra Corporation Ltd. The claim arose from an incident where the applicant was electrocuted by a Telstra power cable, which he alleged was due to Telstra's negligence. The applicants contended that the primary judge erred in law by applying an incorrect standard of care and by failing to consider certain evidence. The Full Court of the Federal Court was tasked with determining whether the applicants had established grounds for appeal.
The primary legal issue before the court was whether the applicants had demonstrated that the primary judge's decision contained an error of law that warranted an appeal. Specifically, the applicants argued that the primary judge had misapplied the standard of care owed by Telstra and had failed to consider relevant evidence that would have supported their case. The court was required to assess the merits of these contentions and decide whether the applicants had a real chance of success on appeal.
The Full Court found that the applicants had not demonstrated any error of law that warranted an appeal. The court held that the primary judge had correctly applied the standard of care and had properly considered the evidence. The applicants' arguments regarding the standard of care and the consideration of evidence were not persuasive enough to warrant a departure from the primary judge's decision. As a result, the application for leave to appeal was dismissed, and no order was made as to costs.