FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Vatti v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 893
Citation: Vatti v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 893 Appeal from: Application for extension of time and leave to appeal: Vatti v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCCA 958 Parties: PRADEEP KUMAR VATTI v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL File number: VID 268 of 2014 Judge: MORTIMER J Date of judgment: 21 August 2014 Catchwords: MIGRATION – Application for extension of time and leave to appeal from dismissal of show cause application by the Federal Circuit Court – extension of time granted – whether any realistic prospects of success – no error in the reasons of the Migration Review Tribunal or Federal Circuit Court – application for leave to appeal refused. Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 24(1A)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 65Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) r 44.12
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 35.13, 35.14
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) Sch 2 cl 572.223, Sch 5 cl 5A404Cases cited: Cement Australia Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2010) 187 FCR 261; [2010] FCAFC 101
Croker v Philips Electronics Australia Ltd [2000] FCA 1731
Deighton v Telstra Corporation Ltd [1997] FCA 1568
Ford v La Forrest [2002] 2 Qd R 44
Gallo v Dawson (1990) 93 ALR 479
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh (2014) 39 ALD 50; [2014] FCAFC 1
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332; [2013] HCA 18
MZZIV v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCA 1203
Nguyen v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCAFC 38
Vatti v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCCA 958Date of hearing: 15 August 2014 Date of last submissions: 15 August 2014 Place: Melbourne Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 33 Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person Solicitor for the Respondents: Mr M Palfrey of Sparke Helmore Lawyers
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
VID 268 of 2014
BETWEEN: PRADEEP KUMAR VATTI
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First RespondentMIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
MORTIMER J
DATE OF ORDER:
21 AUGUST 2014
WHERE MADE:
MELBOURNE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The time in which the applicant may file and serve an application for leave to appeal from the orders of the Federal Circuit Court is extended to 13 May 2014.
2.The application for leave to appeal from the orders of the Federal Circuit Court dated 28 April 2014 is refused.
3.The applicant is to pay the first respondent’s costs of and incidental to the application for leave to appeal.
Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
VID 268 of 2014
BETWEEN: PRADEEP KUMAR VATTI
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER…
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- Case
- [2014] FCA 893
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The time in which the applicant may file and serve an application for leave to appeal from the orders of the Federal Circuit Court is extended to 13 May 2014.
2. The application for leave to appeal from the orders of the Federal Circuit Court dated 28 April 2014 is refused.
3. The applicant is to pay the first respondent’s costs of and incidental to the application for leave to appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The discretion to grant leave to appeal conferred by s 24(1A) of the Federal Court Act is broadly expressed: see generally, Décor Corporation 33 FCR 397 at 399. In Cement Australia Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2010) 187 FCR 261; [2010] FCAFC 101, the Full Court stated (at [20]):Leave to appeal against an interlocutory order will usually be granted only where the applicant is able to show that the order occasions substantial prejudice to the applicant and there is a reasonable argument that the order should be set aside: Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397.CONSIDERATION Authorities may be found to support the general contention that matters such as ignorance of time limits, the fact of being unrepresented, or ignorance of court processes are insufficient explanations for non-compliance with a statutory time limit. It is preferable not to consider these matters at such a general level. I have explained elsewhere why I do not consider that to be a satisfactory approach, and why careful and particular analysis of the factual circumstances in each case should be undertaken: MZZIV v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCA 1203. In this case, the delay of one day is very short. There is no evidence as to the explanation for the delay because it appears no-one had detected the applicant had filed his documents out of time and therefore no-one had alerted the applicant to the need to provide an explanation. He could not be expected to have realised this himself, in the circumstances. Since the applicant requires leave to appeal in any event, the merits of his proposed appeal and questions of prejudice can appropriately be dealt with at that stage. An extension of time should be granted. As to the question of leave, in my opinion in this case the applicant’s appeal has no reasonable prospects of success. The Federal Circuit Court’s decision is not attended by doubt, let alone sufficient doubt. There is no substantial injustice to the applicant in refusing leave to appeal. Whether his contentions about the Federal Circuit Court’s decision and the Tribunal’s review are considered at the leave stage, or the appeal stage, the content of what he says is the same. None of his contentions, in his notice of appeal or submissions, provide any basis to suggest error in the Federal Circuit Court’s judgment nor in the Tribunal’s decision. The Tribunal’s decision to affirm the delegate’s refusal to grant the student visa was ultimately based only on the failure of the applicant to provide evidence to meet the criterion in cl 572.223(2)(a)(i) and cl 5A404 concerning English language proficiency. The applicant has never that suggested the evidence he provided to the Tribunal was capable of meeting this criterion. It plainly was not capable. On that basis, the terms of s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) required the Tribunal to affirm the refusal to grant the visa. Rather, all the applicant could contend to the Tribunal and on appeal is that he should have been given an adjournment by the Tribunal so he could have another chance to sit a fresh IELTS test.