Cement Australia Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Cement Australia Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2010] FCAFC 101

Citation: Cement Australia Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2010] FCAFC 101
Appeal from: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Cement Australia Pty Ltd [2010] FCA 294
Parties: CEMENT AUSTRALIA PTY LTD ACN 104 053 474, CEMENT AUSTRALIA HOLDINGS PTY LTD ACN 001 085 561, CEMENT AUSTRALIA (QUEENSLAND) PTY LTD ACN 009 658 520, POZZOLANIC ENTERPRISES PTY LTD ACN 010 367 898, POZZOLANIC INDUSTRIES PTY LTD ACN 010 608 947, CHRISTOPHER GUY LEON and CHRISTOPHER STEPHEN WHITE v AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION AND CONSUMER COMMISSION
File number: QUD 130 of 2010
Judges: KEANE CJ, GILMOUR AND LOGAN JJ
Date of judgment: 18 August 2010
Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for leave to appeal from interlocutory judgment granting leave to amend statement of claim – application made on first day of trial and necessitated vacation of trial dates – whether Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 20(3) and s 24(1AA) rendered application incompetent – whether primary judge entitled to act on statement of counsel as sufficient evidence of reason of late application – effect on administration of justice

Held:  application for leave to appeal competent – no reasonable argument that order should be set aside – no substantial prejudice to appellant – application for leave to appeal refused

Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 20(3), 24(1AA), 37M, 37N
Cases cited: Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd v Philip Morris Inc (1981) 148 CLR 170 cited
Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175 considered
Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 applied
Dye v Commonwealth Securities Limited (No 2) [2010] FCA 817 disapproved
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 applied
Rigato Farms Pty Ltd v Ridolfi [2001] 2 Qd R 455 cited
Date of hearing: 9 August 2010
Place: Brisbane
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 78
Counsel for the Appellants: Mr N Hutley SC with Ms S Brown
Solicitor for the Appellants: Gilbert + Tobin
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr S Couper QC with Mr D Kelly SC and Mr M Hodge
Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

QUD 130 of 2010

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

CEMENT AUSTRALIA PTY LTD ACN 104 053 474
First Appellant

CEMENT AUSTRALIA HOLDINGS PTY LTD ACN 001 085 561
Second Appellant

CEMENT AUSTRALIA (QUEENSLAND) PTY LTD ACN 009 658 520
Third Appellant

POZZOLANIC ENTERPRISES PTY LTD ACN 010 367 898
Fourth Appellant

POZZOLANIC INDUSTRIES PTY LTD ACN 010 608 947
Fifth Appellant

CHRISTOPHER GUY LEON
Sixth Appellant

CHRISTOPHER STEPHEN WHITE
Seventh Appellant

AND:

AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION AND CONSUMER COMMISSION
Respondent

JUDGES:

KEANE CJ, GILMOUR AND LOGAN JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

18 AUGUST 2010

WHERE MADE:

BRISBANE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for leave to appeal be refused with costs.

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Details
Case
[2010] FCAFC 101
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Cement Australia Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission involved a dispute where the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) sought leave to amend its statement of claim. Cement Australia Pty Ltd opposed this application and subsequently applied for leave to appeal against the trial judge's decision to grant the ACCC leave to amend. The Federal Court was tasked with determining whether the application for leave to appeal was competent, and if it should be allowed or refused.

The key legal issues centered around whether the application for leave to appeal was rendered incompetent by provisions in the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and whether the primary judge was justified in accepting the statements of counsel as sufficient evidence for the late application. The court also had to consider the effect of the application on the administration of justice and whether there was substantial prejudice to the appellant.

The court found that the application for leave to appeal was competent and there was no reasonable argument that the order should be set aside. The court held that there was no substantial prejudice to the appellant, and thus the application for leave to appeal was refused. The court reasoned that the trial judge was entitled to act on the statements of counsel as sufficient evidence of the reason for the late application, given the context of the proceedings and the overall administration of justice.

In conclusion, the court ordered that the application for leave to appeal be refused with costs. This decision underscores the importance of balancing the need for a just resolution of disputes with the principles of efficiency and case management in litigation.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for leave to appeal be refused with costs.

Note:

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Before turning to the particular grounds of complaint agitated in this Court by the Cement Australia parties, we should observe that insofar as the trial judge gave significant weight to the consideration that the achievement of justice in the particular case before him favoured allowing the amendment, that was not contrary to the decision in Aon Risk or anything in s 37M or s 37N of the Federal Court Act. Nothing in Aon Risk or the Federal Court Act suggests that this consideration is not relevant to the exercise of the discretion to permit or refuse an amendment. Rather, the point made in Aon Risk is that this consideration must not be allowed to trump other relevant considerations, including considerations of the kind reflected in s 37M and s 37N of the Federal Court Act.NO EVIDENCE OF AN ERROR OF JUDGMENT BY THE ACCC The trial judge found that there was an error of judgment by the ACCC of the type contemplated by the High Court in Aon Risk: see at [34], [77] and [109]. In so finding, his Honour acted upon the acknowledgment by counsel for the ACCC that they had not previously identified the problem: see at [27] and [34]. The Cement Australia parties submit that his Honour erred in this regard. The Cement Australia parties do not dispute that the ACCC’s counsel did not previously identify the problem with the way the market had been pleaded. However, they contend that there was no evidence from the ACCC or its solicitors deposing as to the reason it had not sought to make the amendment earlier and as to whether the ACCC, by its staff or its solicitors, had previously considered the alternative market or the possibility that its product definition was too broad. They say that this was the position despite:(a) an affidavit having been provided on behalf of the Cement Australia parties in support of their opposition to the application to amend;(b) the High Court in Aon Risk emphasising the need for such evidence; and (c) the absence of evidence from the ACCC being specifically raised in oral submissions and the respondent being asked whether it intended to lead such evidence. While he acknowledged the absence of such sworn evidence, the trial judge appears to have accepted the statements of counsel for the ACCC as being sufficient evidence of the position of the respondent. The Cement Australia parties contend that these statements did not constitute a proper basis upon which to find that there was an error of judgment absent such an explanation from the ACCC itself. The absence of such evidence, they argued, was critical given the denial of the markets alleged by the ACCC, the evidence of the ACCC’s witnesses that fine grade flyash may be a distinct product, the findings of the ACCC’s expert as to the product market as well as the evidence of the Cement Australia parties as to the preference for supply of fine grade flyash for use in making concrete: see at [22]. Accordingly they contend that, in this context, it was a matter upon which evidence had to be provided.

Decision

Reasons for decision

There is, in our respectful opinion, nothing in the observations of French CJ which supports the view that this Court should not have regard to the facts as they presently appear in the exercise of its discretion to grant leave to appeal or to refuse the ACCC’s application for leave to amend its statement of claim.CONCLUSION AND ORDERS It has not been demonstrated by the Cement Australia parties that the decision of the primary judge is attended by sufficient doubt to warrant the grant of leave to appeal or that the grant of leave to appeal would be necessary to correct a substantial injustice to them. We are also unable to discern a subsisting substantial injustice to the Cement Australia parties, the correction of which would warrant the grant of leave to appeal. The application for leave to appeal should be refused with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

We propose to address these arguments after first making some general observations.GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS In Aon Risk, the proceedings were commenced in December 2004 against three insurers for indemnity for loss from fire suffered in January 2003. The broker, Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd, (“Aon”) was joined as a defendant in June 2005. On the third day of the trial, which had been set down for four weeks, the plaintiff sought an adjournment of the trial against Aon and foreshadowed an application for leave to amend its claim to allege a substantially different case. The trial was adjourned, but the application for leave to amend the plaintiff’s claim was not heard until approximately two weeks later in November 2006, and the decision to grant leave was not made until October 2007. The plaintiff, in an affidavit in support of its application for leave to amend “did not offer any explanation for the need to amend”: see Aon Risk 239 CLR 175 at [53]. The learned judge who allowed the amendment, and the majority of the Court of Appeal, considered that the application was to be resolved on the basis that the new allegations raised “real triable issues” and that the case “fell squarely within principles to be drawn from JL Holdings”: see Aon Risk 239 CLR 175 at [62]-[63]. Lander J, who dissented in the Court of Appeal of the ACT, held that “it could be inferred that (the plaintiff) deliberately adopted the course that it did (in not raising the new claim earlier)” and that the plaintiff “should have been required to conduct its case ‘in accordance with the decision it made some years before’”: see Aon Risk 239 CLR 175 at [64]. In Aon Risk 239 CLR 175 at [98], Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ noted that “a just resolution of proceedings remains the paramount purpose” under the rules of court there under consideration; but that “what is a ‘just resolution’ is to be understood in light of the purposes and objectives stated”. Their Honours observed:Speed and efficiency, in the sense of minimum delay and expense, are seen as essential to a just resolution of proceedings. This should not detract from a proper opportunity being given to the parties to plead their case, but it suggests that limits may be placed upon re pleading, when delay and cost are taken into account. The Rule’s reference to the need to minimise costs implies that an order for costs may not always provide sufficient compensation and therefore achieve a just resolution. It cannot therefore be said that a just resolution requires that a party be permitted to raise any arguable case at any point in the proceedings, on payment of costs. Their Honours at [111]-[113] rejected the proposition that the powers of a court to allow an amendment to a pleading should, as a general rule, be exercised in favour of allowing the amendment subject only to the payment of costs thrown away as a result. Their Honours said:An application for leave to amend a pleading should not be approached on the basis that a party is entitled to raise an arguable claim, subject to payment of costs by way of compensation. There is no such entitlement. All matters relevant to the exercise of the power to permit amendment should be weighed. The fact of substantial delay and wasted costs, the concerns of case management, will assume importance on an application for leave to amend. Statements in J L Holdings which suggest only a limited application for case management do not rest upon a principle which has been carefully worked out in a significant succession of cases. On the contrary, the statements are not consonant with this Court's earlier recognition of the effects of delay, not only upon the parties to the proceedings in question, but upon the court and other litigants. Such statements should not be applied in the future.A party has the right to bring proceedings. Parties have choices as to what claims are to be made and how they are to be framed. But limits will be placed upon their ability to effect changes to their pleadings, particularly if litigation is advanced. That is why, in seeking the just resolution of the dispute, reference is made to parties having a sufficient opportunity to identify the issues they seek to agitate.In the past it has been left largely to the parties to prepare for trial and to seek the court's assistance as required. Those times are long gone. The allocation of power, between litigants and the courts arises from tradition and from principle and policy. It is recognised by the courts that the resolution of disputes serves the public as a whole, not merely the parties to the proceedings.(Footnotes omitted).