Lin v Rail Corporation New South Wales

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Lin v Rail Corporation New South Wales [2011] FCA 546

Citation: Lin v Rail Corporation New South Wales [2011] FCA 546
Appeal from: Application for leave to appeal: Lin v Rail Corporation New South Wales [2011] FCA 261
Parties: HUAI NING LIN KNOWN AS SARAH LIN v RAIL CORPORATION NEW SOUTH WALES and FAIRFAX MEDIA PUBLICATIONS PTY LTD
File number: NSD 422 of 2011
Judge: BUCHANAN J
Date of judgment: 25 May 2011
Legislation: Fair Trading Act 1987 (NSW) ss 43, 68(2), 72(6)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 24(1A), 24(1D)(b), 31A(2)
Federal Court Rules O 20 r 5, O 20 r 6, O 52 r 10, O 52 r 15(2)
Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) ss 14(1), 63, 73
Real Property Act 1900 (NSW)
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ss 51AB, 82(2)
Universal Declaration of Human Rights Article 17
Cases cited: Deighton v Telstra Corporation Limited [1997] FCA 1568
Lin v Rail Corporation New South Wales [2011] FCA 261
Gleeson v Secretary, Department of Family, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2011] FCA 437
Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344
Jess v Scott (1986) 12 FCR 187
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273
Parker v The Queen [2002] FCAFC 133
Re Luck (2003) 78 ALJR 177
Sharman License Holdings Ltd v Universal Music Aust Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 802
Walton v Gardiner (1993) 177 CLR 378
Date of hearing: 3 May 2011
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: No catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 23
Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr MR Elliott
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Henry Davis York
Counsel for the Second Respondent: Mr DJ Hand
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Ms G Hambly of Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 422 of 2011

BETWEEN:

HUAI NING LIN KNOWN AS SARAH LIN
Applicant

AND:

RAIL CORPORATION NEW SOUTH WALES
First Respondent

FAIRFAX MEDIA PUBLICATIONS PTY LTD
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

BUCHANAN J

DATE OF ORDER:

25 MAY 2011

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for leave to appeal filed on 11 April 2011 be dismissed with costs.

Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
The text of entered orders can be located using Federal Law Search on the Court’s website.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 422 of 2011

BETWEEN:

HUAI NING LIN KNOWN AS SARAH LIN
Applicant

AND:

RAIL CORPORATION NEW SOUTH WALES
First Respondent

FAIRFAX MEDIA PUBLICATIONS PTY LTD
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

BUCHANAN J

DATE:

25 MAY 2011

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This judgment deals with an application for leave to appeal against a decision of a judge of this Court on 24 March 2011 (Lin v Rail Corporation New South Wales [2011] FCA 261 (“2011…

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Details
Case
[2011] FCA 546
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Lin v Rail Corporation New South Wales involved the applicant's appeal against the dismissal of her claims in proceedings brought in 2010 and 2003. The applicant sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of her claims by Rares J, arguing various grounds, including that the statutory limitation periods did not apply and that the application of these periods would contravene the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Federal Court was required to determine whether any of the grounds provided a sufficient basis for granting leave to appeal.

The court found that the applicant's arguments were without merit. It held that the statutory limitation periods were properly applied and that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights did not provide a basis for overriding domestic legislation. The court further noted that the applicant's reliance on Order 20 r 6 of the Federal Court Rules was misplaced, as the notice of motion filed in the 2003 proceedings had been rendered ineffective by the dismissal of the appeal. The court concluded that there was no prospect of the appeal succeeding if leave was granted.

Given the lack of merit in the applicant's arguments, the application for leave to appeal was dismissed with costs. The court held that despite the applicant being unrepresented, there was no reason to deviate from the ordinary rule regarding costs.

The court's decision was clear in dismissing the application for leave to appeal, underscoring the strength of the grounds on which the original dismissal was made. The applicant's arguments were found to be without substance, and the application was dismissed with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for leave to appeal filed on 11 April 2011 be dismissed with costs.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Order 20 r 6 had no application to any part of the proceedings commenced by the applicant in 2010 because the whole of those proceedings was dismissed by Rares J. Order 20 r 6 did not apply either to any part of the 2003 proceedings which, as Rares J pointed out, had been dismissed in their entirety. As earlier observed, the notice of motion filed on 2 December 2005 in those proceedings did not survive the dismissal of the applicant’s appeal on 22 March 2006. Accordingly, the applicant’s fourth contention provides no reason to grant leave to appeal.Conclusion There is no substance in any of the arguments advanced by the applicant. There is no prospect that an appeal could succeed if leave to appeal was granted. The application for leave to appeal must be dismissed. No reason has been advanced why, notwithstanding that the applicant is unrepresented, the ordinary rule as to costs should not apply. The application for leave to appeal will therefore be dismissed with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

It follows from the existence of the limitations in s 14(1) of the Limitation Act, s 72(6) of the Fair Trading Act and s 82(2) of the Trade Practices Act that no arguable error has been identified in the conclusion stated by Rares J in the 2011 judgment that the whole of the 2010 proceedings were statute barred. There is, in my view, no prospect of disturbing this conclusion on appeal if leave to appeal was granted. Neither of the applicant’s first two contentions would provide a basis to grant leave to appeal.Universal Declaration of Human Rights The applicant did not identify the common law right said by her to be represented by “Australian Property Law” but her broad contention is that a statutory limitation period would be contrary to Article 17(2) of the Declaration as it would result in the arbitrary deprivation of her property. In Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273 (“Teoh”) Mason CJ and Deane J (with whom Toohey J and Gaudron J in substance or in terms agreed on this issue) said (at 286):It is well established that the provisions of an international treaty to which Australia is a party do not form part of Australian law unless those provisions have been validly incorporated into our municipal law by statute. This principle has its foundation in the proposition that in our constitutional system the making and ratification of treaties fall within the province of the Executive in the exercise of its prerogative power whereas the making and the alteration of the law fall within the province of Parliament, not the Executive. So, a treaty which has not been incorporated into our municipal law cannot operate as a direct source of individual rights and obligations under that law. The Declaration is not part of the municipal law of Australia, although its acceptance by the government of Australia may, in appropriate circumstances, aid in the construction of a statute or subordinate legislation which is ambiguous (Teoh at 287). Article 17 of the Declaration could not have the effect or operation suggested by the applicant, whatever its terms. The actual terms of Article 17 of the Declaration have no apparent relevance, in any event, to the proceedings commenced by the applicant in 2010. Article 17 provides:(1)Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others.(2)No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property. As Rares J pointed out in the 2011 judgment (at [36], [38]), Article 17 does not bear upon the contractual relations of the applicant with either of the respondents, nor have any effect on a statutory limitation upon a statutory right of action. The applicant’s reliance on Article 17 of the Declaration was misconceived. That contention provides no independent reason to permit an appeal to be argued.Residue of proceedings The applicant relied on O 20 r 6 of the Federal Court Rules to argue that her notice of motion filed in the 2003 proceedings on 2 December 2005 (while an appeal was pending) remained outstanding for hearing and determination. Order 20 rule 6 deals with the residue of proceedings not wholly determined by an order under s 31A of the Federal Court Act or O 20 r 5. Order 20 r 6 provides:Residue of proceedings6 (1) Subrule (2) applies if, in a proceeding commenced before 1 December 2005:(a) a party applies for:(i) a judgment under rule 2; or(ii) an order for stay or dismissal under rule 4; and(b)the proceeding is not wholly determined by judgment or dismissal or is not wholly stayed.(2) The proceeding may be continued for a claim or part of a claim not disposed of by judgment or dismissal and not stayed.(3) Subrule (4) applies if, in a proceeding commenced on or after 1 December 2005:(a) a party applies for:(i) an order for stay or dismissal under rule 5; or(ii) a judgment under section 31A of the Act; and(b) the proceeding is not wholly determined by judgment or dismissal or is not wholly stayed.(4) The proceeding may be continued for a claim or part of a claim not disposed of by judgment or dismissal and not stayed.