Singh v Super City Home Loans Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Singh v Super City Home Loans Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 83

Citation: Singh v Super City Home Loans Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 83
Appeal from: Application for leave to appeal and application for extension of time: Singh v Super City Home Loans Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 646
Parties: BALBIR SINGH v SUPER CITY HOME LOANS PTY LTD (ACN 106 474 837), DEBDATTA PAHARI, HELEN PAHARI, BLEIER MORTGAGE CORPORATION PTY LTD (ACN 060 520 854), DAVID BLEIER, ROBERT LOUIS KREMNIZER, SHLOOMP PTY LTD, BACCUS INVESTMENTS PTY LTD (ACN 095 832 072), CHRIS HICKEY, LAWTEAL SECONDS PTY LTD, DANNY BERAN, ROGER BERAN, HELEN MARGARET OWEN, GRAHAM DOUGLAS OWEN, THOMAS BRADSHAW, PAMELA MAUDE BRADSHAW, THE LAW SOCIETY OF NEW SOUTH WALES (ACN 000 000 699), PHILLIP C ROBERTS and BEN ZIPSER
File number(s): NSD 1053 of 2011
Judge: KATZMANN J
Date of judgment: 14 February 2012
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE — Application for leave to appeal from interlocutory judgment — orders refusing leave to join multiple respondents and for summary dismissal under s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) — application for extension of time to seek leave to appeal — Federal Court of Australia Rules 1979 (Cth) — O 52 r 15(2) — whether special reasons include misconception by litigant in person about nature of judgment —whether judgment attended by sufficient doubt to warrant its reconsideration
Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 31A, 20, 24
Federal Court Rules 1979 (Cth) O 6 rr 2 and 8; O 46 r 7A, O 52 rr 10(2A)(b) and 15(2)
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 1.04(2), 36.57
Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 730
Cases cited:

Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd v Phillip Morris Inc (1981) 148 CLR 170
Apotex Pty Ltd v Les Laboratoires Servier (No 4) (2010) 89 IPR 274
Bizuneh v Minister for Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 128 FCR 353
British American Tobacco Australia Services Limited v Laurie (2011) 242 CLR 283
Cement Australia Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2010) 187 FCR 261
Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1997) 33 FCR 397
Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337
Hogan v Australian Crime Commission (2010) 240 CLR 651
House v King (1936) 55 CLR 499
Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344
In re the Will of F B Gilbert (dec’d) (1946) 46 SR (NSW) 318
Jackamarra v Krakouer (1998) 195 CLR 516
Jess v Scott (1986) 12 FCR 187
JohnsonTiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Pty Ltd (2000) 104 FCR 564
Lin v Rail Corporation New South Wales [2011] FCA 546
Mann v Medical Practitioners Board of Victoria (2004) 21 VAR 429
Manolakis v District Registrar, South Australia District Registry, Federal Court of Australia (2008) 170 FCR 426
Parker v The Queen [2002] FCAFC 133
Perry v Comcare [2006] FCA 481
Samsung Electronics Co Ltd v Apple Inc [2011] FCAFC 156
Spencer Deighton…

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Details
Case
[2012] FCA 83
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Singh v Super City Home Loans Pty Ltd involved the Singhs, who were seeking to add multiple respondents to their proceeding, and Super City Home Loans Pty Ltd, which was already a party. The dispute centred on the Singhs' attempts to join additional respondents, their motion for summary dismissal, and their application for an extension of time to appeal an interlocutory judgment. The court was required to decide whether the Singhs had special reasons to join the additional respondents, whether the judgment was attended by sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration, and whether the Singhs' application for an extension of time to appeal was valid. The court considered the Singhs' arguments regarding the joinder of additional respondents and their motion for summary dismissal. The court found that the Singhs had not provided a draft amended application or statement of claim to articulate the claims against the proposed additional respondents. The court also found that the Singhs' motion for summary dismissal was not supported by sufficient evidence or legal argument. Regarding the application for an extension of time to appeal, the court noted that the Singhs had not demonstrated any special reasons for the delay, such as a misconception about the nature of the judgment. The court ultimately dismissed the Singhs' amended notice of motion, ordered them to pay the respondents' costs, and denied their application for an extension of time to appeal the interlocutory judgment. The court held that the Singhs had not provided sufficient grounds for joining additional respondents, and their motion for summary dismissal was not well-founded. Furthermore, the Singhs' application for an extension of time to appeal was deemed invalid due to the lack of special reasons for the delay.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The amended notice of motion filed by the applicant on 6 July 2011 be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the respondents’ costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The primary judge directed the registrar not to accept for filing the notice of motion or the affidavit in support. All other notices of motion were fixed for hearing on 21 April 2011. On that day counsel for the 17th to 19th proposed additional respondents (the Law Society, Mr Roberts and Mr Zipser) appeared to resist the February joinder motion. All other parties appeared with the exception of the 11th to 16th respondents and all except the Singhs were legally represented.The background to the application to join the 17th to 20th respondents To understand the application to join the 17th to 20th respondents it is necessary for me to say something about proceedings the Singhs brought elsewhere. The following summary is derived from the judgments in those proceedings. On 6 February 2009 Ginelle filed a statement of claim in the NSW Supreme Court seeking possession of the Londonderry property and repayment of a mortgage debt incurred by Mr and Mrs Singh. In their defence Mr and Mrs Singh pleaded that the loan was governed by the NSW Code in that it was for personal and domestic purposes within the meaning of s 11 of the Code. Ginelle later applied for summary judgment against the Singhs. On 25 February 2009 Mr and Mrs Singh filed a claim in the Consumer, Trader and Tenancy Tribunal of New South Wales (“CTTT”) against Super City, the Paharis, the Bleier Mortgage Corporation, Baccus and Lawteal. On 9 June 2009 Mr and Mrs Singh signed short minutes of order in which they agreed to pay Ginelle in accordance with a schedule of payments in default of which Ginelle was to cause judgment to be entered and to proceed to enforce the judgment. Hoeben J made orders in accordance with those short minutes. The schedule was not met. Consequently, on 1 December 2009 judgment was entered in Ginelle’s favour and the Court gave Ginelle leave to issue a writ of possession over the Londonderry property. The writ was issued on 2 February 2010 and the Sheriff issued a notice to the Singhs to vacate the premises by 16 March 2010. On 1 March 2010 Mr Singh filed a notice of motion seeking to have set aside the judgment of 1 December 2009 and the agreement of 9 June 2009 and to stay the execution of the writ. The motion was heard by Latham J on 8 and 9 March 2010 at which time the Singhs were represented by counsel. Her Honour dismissed the motion with costs. She noted the instructions apparently given to their counsel that the Singhs disputed that the words “re‑financing business loan” were written by them. The words the Singhs disputed appeared in a Consumer Credit Code Declaration they signed on 17 September 2008. At the time they were represented by Lincoln Kelly, solicitor, of Noel F Bracks & Company. The declaration was in the following terms and the signatures of Mr and Mrs Singh were witnessed by Mr Kelly. We declare that the credit to be provided to me by the credit provider is to be applied wholly or predominantly for business or investment purposes (or for both purposes), namely; (here insert in mortgagor’s handwriting the purpose of the loan)Refinancing business loan

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In the result, the proposed ground of breach of procedural fairness is doomed to fail. The allegations that the evidence was misrepresented (draft grounds 3 and 4) The primary judge noted that the evidence was untested and that it was reasonably clear that some of the facts would be disputed. His Honour said he would not attempt to resolve any disputes as to the facts. His Honour’s summary of the facts was largely taken from Mr Singh’s affidavit affirmed on 14 December 2010 and an affidavit of Mr Bleier affirmed on 16 March 2011. He said that it should be regarded as a summary in which the Singhs’ evidentiary case is articulated in the most favourable light possible. Despite this, Mr Singh submitted that his Honour misapprehended some important facts concerning his and his wife’s financial position. In particular, he submitted that his Honour was wrong when he stated that he and his wife had no funds of their own to pay out Mr Carver. In oral argument, when asked where the money to pay out Mr Carver was, Mr Singh replied: My son was supposed to get married in August, your Honour, and Indian marriages are very huge, huge weddings. What this had to do with the issue is obscure. Mr Singh did not say that he and his wife expected to come into money as a result of the wedding (or, indeed, that there was in fact a wedding). When asked whether there was any evidence before the primary judge to show that the Singhs had funds of their own to pay out Mr Carver, Mr Singh replied:I told him from this table. Mr Singh also submitted that the findings his Honour made concerning the flaws in his misrepresentation case were themselves grossly flawed because the Bleier Mortgage Corporation and Mr Bleier do not say that they organised the loan for the settlement of the case against Mr Carver. That is, however, beside the point. The written submissions relied on paragraphs 22 to 25 of the affidavit filed on 29 June 2011 but they amount to no more than submissions, as Mr Singh effectively conceded (at p 36 of the transcript). Mr Singh then drew attention to his loan application form completed on 7 May 2007 and pointed to the value of the Green Valley property ($350,000), with a mortgage of $200,000. But the point his Honour was making concerned available funds. To get the benefit of the discounted settlement figure in the Carver proceeding, the Singhs had to pay $95,000 by 14 May 2007 or $97,500 by 28 May 2007. The loan application disclosed the Singhs had no money in the bank. There was no evidence to show that the funds were otherwise available to them, at least without selling the property, and there was no evidence that they had any intention to sell the property. Before the primary judge Mr Singh in fact conceded that he did not have the money and needed to refinance in order to pay out Mr Carver. The following exchange appears in the transcript of the argument on 21 April 2011:HIS HONOUR: Mr Singh, do you accept that in the circumstance you’ve found yourself, in a month or two or so before May 2007, that you did need to refinance from somewhere in order to set out (sic) the Carver problem?MR SINGH: Yes, we needed money to refinance.HIS HONOUR: You needed to refinance.MR SINGH: Yes.

Decision

Reasons for decision

No draft proposed amended application or statement of claim was presented to the primary judge articulating the claims against any of the proposed additional respondents. The decision of the primary judge After hearing from all the parties on 21 April 2011 the primary judge reserved his judgment. On 8 June 2011 his Honour dismissed with costs the January and the February joinder motions before dismissing the whole of the proceeding under s 31A of the FCA Act . In his reasons (at [24]) his Honour identified the issues before him as:(a)Whether, pursuant to O 6 r 2 and r 8 of the Federal Court Rules, any of the proposed eleventh to twentieth respondents should be joined as parties to this proceeding.(b)Whether the whole or, alternatively, part of the applicants’ Statement of Claim should be struck out because it fails to disclose any reasonable cause of action or because it has a tendency to cause prejudice, embarrassment or delay in the proceeding or because it is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court (as to which see O 11 r 16 of the Federal Court Rules).(c)Whether, pursuant to s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) … the Court should give judgment in favour of the respondents because the Court is satisfied that the applicants have no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting this proceeding.(d)Alternatively, whether, pursuant to O 20 r 5 of the Federal Court Rules, the Court should order that this proceeding be summarily dismissed because it is frivolous or vexatious or is an abuse of the process of the Court.(e)Whether the applicants are entitled to summary judgment against the respondents and proposed respondents and indemnity costs against their lawyers. His Honour went on to resolve those issues. He did not therefore deal with the January notice of motion or any prayer in the 23 February notice of motion apart from the joinder application. It was unnecessary do so following the disposition of the joinder application and the motions for summary dismissal. The joinder application The primary judge noted that that the Singhs had not propounded a draft amended application or a draft amended statement of claim. His Honour observed that “to a very large extent” he was left to speculate about the causes of action they might rely upon if leave were to be granted. He said that was unsatisfactory and the Court should not be forced to “sort through a myriad of disparate facts and matters in order to see whether, in the Court’s opinion, some cause of action can possibly be discerned”. He then extracted passages from Mr Singh’s written submissions, which was all the proposed additional respondents (or the Court) had to discern the potential causes of action. His Honour went on to summarise the effect of the evidence filed by the Singhs before considering the relevant rules and legal principles. He found that no arguable claim had been articulated against any of the proposed additional respondents and the evidence before the Court suggested it was “extremely unlikely” any claim could legitimately be mounted.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.