Singh v Super City Home Loans Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Singh v Super City Home Loans Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 646

Citation: Singh v Super City Home Loans Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 646
Parties: BALBIR SINGH and PREM JEET KAUR SINGH v SUPER CITY HOME LOANS PTY LTD (ACN 106 474 837), DEBDATTA PAHARI, HELEN PAHARI, BLEIER MORTGAGE CORPORATION PTY LTD (ACN 060 520 854), DAVID BLEIER, ROBERT LOUIS KREMNIZER, SHLOOMP PTY LTD (ACN 000 811 834), BACCUS INVESTMENTS LIMITED (ACN 095 832 072), CHRIS HICKEY and LAWTEAL SECONDS PTY LTD (ACN 113 351 474)
File number: NSD 1601 of 2010
Judge: FOSTER J
Date of judgment: 8 June 2011
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – whether certain individuals and organisations should be added as respondents to this proceeding – whether the whole proceeding should be dismissed pursuant to s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) – whether the pleadings should be struck out in whole or in part pursuant to O 11 r 16 of the Federal Court Rules  
Legislation: Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), ss 58, 60 and 116
Contracts Review Act 1980 (NSW)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 31A
Legal Aid Commission Act 1979 (NSW) s 27(1), s 33
Legal Profession Act 2007 (NSW), s 730
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s 52
Consumer Credit (New South Wales) Code
Federal Court Rules O 6 rr 2, 3, 6 and 8, O 11 r 16, O 20 r 5  
Cases cited: Singh v Ginelle Pty Ltd [2010] NSWCA 310 related
Ginelle Pty Ltd v Singh [2010] NSWSC 579 related
Singh v Ginelle Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 442 related
Apotex Pty Ltd v Les Laboratoires Servier (No 4) [2010] FCA 1202, (2010) 89 IPR 274 followed
Batistatos v Roads and Traffic Authority (NSW) (2006) 226 CLR 256 cited
Cachia v Isaacs (1985) 3 NSWLR 366 followed
Review Australia Pty Ltd v Redberry Enterprise Pty Ltd (2003) 58 IPR 366 followed
Spencer v The Commonwealth (2010) 241 CLR 118 applied
Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Cooper [2004] FCA 78 followed
Date of hearing: 21 April 2011
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 158
Counsel for the Applicants: The First Applicant appeared in person and sought leave to appear on behalf of the Second Applicant
Counsel for the First, Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth Respondents: Mr L Reid
Solicitor for the First, Second, and Third Respondents: Lee & Lyons Lawyers
Solicitor for the Fourth and Fifth Respondents: Wotton + Kearney Lawyers
Counsel for the Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Respondents: Mr A Rogers
Solicitor for the Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Respondents: RL Kremnizer & Co
Counsel for the Ninth and Tenth Respondents: Mr DP Kelly
Solicitor for the Ninth and Tenth Respondents: Mills Oakley Lawyers
Counsel for the proposed Seventeenth Respondent (The Law Society of New South Wales): Ms CA Webster
Counsel for the proposed Eighteenth Respondent (Mr Phillip C Roberts): Mr M Dicker
Solicitor for the proposed Eighteenth Respondent (Mr Phillip C Roberts): Colin Biggers…
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Details
Case
[2011] FCA 646
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Singh v Super City Home Loans Pty Ltd, the Federal Court was required to determine whether certain individuals and organisations should be added as respondents to the proceeding, whether the proceeding should be dismissed under s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), and whether the pleadings should be struck out in whole or in part under O 11 r 16 of the Federal Court Rules. The applicants, Mr Singh and Ms Singh, brought a proceeding against Super City Home Loans Pty Ltd for damages arising from alleged misleading or deceptive conduct and unconscionable conduct. The applicants sought to add other individuals and organisations as respondents but the Court found that there was no reasonable prospect of success for the proceeding against those parties.

The Court considered the meaning and effect of s 31A of the Federal Court Act, which authorises summary disposition on various bases, including where there is no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting or defending a proceeding. The Court emphasised the need to exercise caution when considering summary dismissal and noted that the power should not be used to stultify the development of the law. The Court also considered the distinction between "no reasonable prospect" and "no real prospect" of success, holding that a proceeding may be found to have no reasonable prospect of success even if it is not hopeless or bound to fail.

In dismissing the proceeding, the Court found that the applicants had no reasonable prospect of success due to the lack of evidence to support their claims. The Court also found that the applicants' claims were not frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process, and that the proceeding should not be struck out in whole or in part. The Court ordered that the proceeding be dismissed and that the applicants pay the respondents' costs.

The Court's decision highlights the importance of exercising caution when considering summary dismissal and the need to balance the interests of the parties with the efficient administration of justice. The Court's interpretation of s 31A of the Federal Court Act also provides guidance for future cases involving summary disposition.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The Notice of Motion filed by the applicants on 18 January 2011 be dismissed.

2. The first applicant pay the respondents’ costs of and incidental to that Notice of Motion.

3. The Notice of Motion filed by the applicants on 23 February 2011 be dismissed.

4. The first applicant pay the costs of the persons and organisations listed in the Schedule hereto of and incidental to that Notice of Motion.

5. Pursuant to s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), this proceeding be dismissed.

6. The various Notices of Motion filed by the respondents in which they sought summary dismissal of the proceeding or, alternatively, orders striking out the applicants’ Application and Statement of Claim, or part thereof, otherwise be dismissed.

7. The first applicant pay the costs of the respondents of and incidental to the Notices of Motion referred to in par 6 above.

8. The first applicant pay the respondents’ costs of and incidental to the proceeding.

THE SCHEDULE HEREINBEFORE REFERRED TO

1. The Law Society of New South Wales.

2. Phillip C Roberts.

3. Ben Zipser.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

Section 31A of the Federal Court Act is in the following terms: 31ASummary judgment(1)The Court may give judgment for one party against another in relation to the whole or any part of a proceeding if:(a)the first party is prosecuting the proceeding or that part of the proceeding; and(b)the Court is satisfied that the other party has no reasonable prospect of successfully defending the proceeding or that part of the proceeding.(2)The Court may give judgment for one party against another in relation to the whole or any part of a proceeding if:(a)the first party is defending the proceeding or that part of the proceeding; and(b)the Court is satisfied that the other party has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding or that part of the proceeding.(3)For the purposes of this section, a defence or a proceeding or part of a proceeding need not be:(a)hopeless; or(b)bound to fail;for it to have no reasonable prospect of success.(4)This section does not limit any powers that the Court has apart from this section.(5)This section does not apply to criminal proceedings. In Spencer v The Commonwealth (2010) 241 CLR 118, the High Court considered the meaning and effect of s 31A of the Federal Court Act. The following principles may be gleaned from that decision:(a)Section 31A authorises summary disposition on a variety of bases (at [22] (p 131) per French CJ and Gummow J). At [22], their Honours also said:… It will apply to the case in which the pleadings disclose no reasonable cause of action and their deficiency is incurable. It will include the case in which there is unanswerable or unanswered evidence of a fact fatal to the pleaded case and any case which might be propounded by permissible amendment. It will include the class of case in the longstanding category of cases which are “frivolous or vexatious or an abuse of process”. The application of s 31A is not, in terms, limited to those categories.(b)The power to order summary dismissal pursuant to s 31A is different from the power to strike out defective pleadings pursuant to O 11 r 16 of the Federal Court Rules (at [23] (p 131) per French CJ and Gummow J); (c)The power to terminate proceedings summarily should be exercised with caution (at [24] (p 131) per French CJ and Gummow J). At [24] (p 131), their Honours also said: 24The exercise of powers to summarily terminate proceedings must always be attended with caution. That is so whether such disposition is sought on the basis that the pleadings fail to disclose a reasonable cause of action (General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125 at 128–130 per Barwick CJ) or on the basis that the action is frivolous or vexatious or an abuse of process (Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners (1949) 78 CLR 62 at 91 per Dixon J). The same applies where such a disposition is sought in a summary judgment application supported by evidence. As to the latter, this Court in Fancourt v Mercantile Credits Ltd said ((1983) 154 CLR 87 at 99. See also Webster v Lampard (1993) 177 CLR 598 at 602–603 per Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ):“The power to order summary or final judgment is one that should be exercised with great care and should never be exercised unless it is clear that there is no real question to be tried.”More recently, in Batistatos v Roads and Traffic Authority (NSW) ((2006) 226 CLR 256 at 275 [46]) Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ repeated a statement by Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ in Agar v Hyde ((2000) 201 CLR 552 at 575–576 [57]) which included the following:“Ordinarily, a party is not to be denied the opportunity to place his or her case before the court in the ordinary way, and after taking advantage of the usual interlocutory processes. The test to be applied has been expressed in various ways (Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners (1949) 78 CLR 62 at 91 per Dixon J; General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125 at 130 per Barwick CJ), but all of the verbal formulae which have been used are intended to describe a high degree of certainty about the ultimate outcome of the proceeding if it were allowed to go to trial in the ordinary way.”There would seem to be little distinction between those approaches and the requirement of a “real” as distinct from “fanciful” prospect of success contemplated by s 31A (In A v Essex County Council [2010] 3 WLR 509, the criterion of “real prospect of success” was variously equated to whether the plaintiff “could succeed at a trial”, whether there was a “triable issue” and whether there was the “least doubt”: at [44] per Lord Clarke of Stone-cum-Ebony JSC; at 541 [119] per Baroness Hale of Richmond JSC; at 544 [133] per Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood JSC; at 552 [163] per Lord Kerr of Tonaghmore JSC). That proposition, however, is not inconsistent with the proposition that the criterion in s 31A may be satisfied upon grounds wider than those contained in pre-existing Rules of Court authorising summary dispositions.(d)There must be a high degree of certainty that the applicant/plaintiff cannot succeed if the proceeding is allowed to go to trial in the ordinary way (Batistatos v Roads and Traffic Authority (NSW) (2006) 226 CLR 256 at [46] (p 275) per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ). (e)At [25]–[26], French CJ and Gummow J also said: 25 Section 31A(2) requires a practical judgment by the Federal Court as to whether the applicant has more than a “fanciful” prospect of success. That may be a judgment of law or of fact, or of mixed law and fact. Where there are factual issues capable of being disputed and in dispute, summary dismissal should not be awarded to the respondent simply because the Court has formed the view that the applicant is unlikely to succeed on the factual issue. Where the success of a proceeding depends upon propositions of law apparently precluded by existing authority, that may not always be the end of the matter. Existing authority may be overruled, qualified or further explained. Summary processes must not be used to stultify the development of the law. But where the success of proceedings is critically dependent upon a proposition of law which would contradict a binding decision of this Court, the court hearing the application under s 31A could justifiably conclude that the proceedings had no reasonable prospect of success.26 Where an application under s 31A requires consideration of apparently complex questions of fact, then the caution uttered by Lord Hope is relevant (see above at [21]). The importance of those considerations is amplified if the case involves resolution of issues of law and fact, or mixed law and fact.(f)Section 31A requires that there be “no reasonable prospect of success”. This is a different concept from the concept of “no real prospect of success” (per Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ at [50]–[51] (pp 138–139));(g)The statutory admonition is that a proceeding may be found to have no reasonable prospect of successful prosecution even if it is not hopeless or bound to fail (per Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ at [52] (p 139)). At [52]–[53] (p 139), their Honours went on to say:52… it is important to begin by recognising that the combined effect of sub-ss (2) and (3) is that the inquiry required in this case is whether there is a “reasonable” prospect of prosecuting the proceeding, not an inquiry directed to whether a certain and concluded determination could be made that the proceeding would necessarily fail.53 In this respect, s 31A departs radically from the basis upon which earlier forms of provision permitting the entry of summary judgment have been understood and administered. Those earlier provisions were understood as requiring formation of a certain and concluded determination that a proceeding would necessarily fail. That this was the basis of earlier decisions may be illustrated by reference to two decisions of this Court often cited in connection with questions of summary judgment: Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners ((1949) 78 CLR 62) and General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) ((1964) 112 CLR 125).(h)Section 31A requires a different inquiry to be undertaken from that undertaken under earlier different regimes (per Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ at [56] (p 140));(i)The expression “no reasonable prospect” should be understood in the manner explained by Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ in Spencer as follows (at [58]–[60] (p 141)):58 How then should the expression “no reasonable prospect” be understood? No paraphrase of the expression can be adopted as a sufficient explanation of its operation, let alone definition of its content. Nor can the expression usefully be understood by the creation of some antinomy intended to capture most or all of the cases in which it cannot be said that there is “no reasonable prospect”. The judicial creation of a lexicon of words or phrases intended to capture the operation of a particular statutory phrase like “no reasonable prospect” is to be avoided. Consideration of the difficulties that bedevilled the proviso to common form criminal appeal statutes (Weiss v The Queen (2005) 224 CLR 300 at 312–318 [31]–[47]), as a result of judicial glossing of the relevant statutory expression, provides the clearest example of the dangers that attend any such attempt.59 In many cases where a plaintiff has no reasonable prospect of prosecuting a proceeding, the proceeding could be described (with or without the addition of intensifying epithets like “clearly”, “manifestly” or “obviously”) as “frivolous”, “untenable”, “groundless” or “faulty”. But none of those expressions (alone or in combination) should be understood as providing a sufficient chart of the metes and bounds of the power given by s 31A. Nor can the content of the word “reasonable”, in the phrase “no reasonable prospect”, be sufficiently, let alone completely, illuminated by drawing some contrast with what would be a “frivolous”, “untenable”, “groundless” or “faulty” claim.60 Rather, full weight must be given to the expression as a whole. The Federal Court may exercise power under s 31A if, and only if, satisfied that there is “no reasonable prospect” of success. Of course, it may readily be accepted that the power to dismiss an action summarily is not to be exercised lightly. But the elucidation of what amounts to “no reasonable prospect” can best proceed in the same way as content has been given, through a succession of decided cases, to other generally expressed statutory phrases, such as the phrase “just and equitable” when it is used to identify a ground for winding up a company. At this point in the development of the understanding of the expression and its application, it is sufficient, but important, to emphasise that the evident legislative purpose revealed by the text of the provision will be defeated if its application is read as confined to cases of a kind which fell within earlier, different, procedural regimes.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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