Stankovic v The Hills Shire Council

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Stankovic v The Hills Shire Council [2013] FCA 652

Citation: Stankovic v The Hills Shire Council [2013] FCA 652
Parties: MILOVAN STANKOVIC v THE HILLS SHIRE COUNCIL (ABN 25 034 494 656), WATSON AND WATSON, TERRY GRANT VAN DER VELDE, JASON SHANE CRONAN, CHARLES HOCKEY and KENT LAWYERS (ABN 38 086 937 738)
File number: NSD 1571 of 2012
Judge: FOSTER J
Date of judgment: 4 July 2013
Corrigendum: 8 July 2013
Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY – whether a discharged bankrupt’s claim for an order that his bankruptcy be annulled should be summarily dismissed – whether the former bankrupt’s other claims for damages should be summarily dismissed
Legislation: Australian Consumer Law, s 20 and s 21
Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), ss 30(5), 52, 116, 149, 153B and 156A
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 31A
Federal Court Rules 2011, rr 16.02, 16.03, 16.21 and 26.01
Land and Environment Court Rules 1996, Pts 12.2, 15.3, 15.4 and 15.9
Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW)
Cases cited: Baulkham Hills Shire Council v Stankovic [2005] NSWLEC 110 related
Baulkham Hills Shire Council v Stankovic (No 5) [2008] NSWLEC 327 related
The Hills Shire Council v Stankovic [2009] FMCA 478 related
Baulkham Hills Shire Council v Stankovic [2009] FMCA 529 related
Kent and Orlizki, in the matter of the Bankrupt Estate of Milovan Stankovic [2012] FCA 333 related
Stankovic v The Hills Shire Council (No 3) [2012] FCA 523 related
Stankovic v Van Der Velde [2012] FCA 1436 related
Stankovic v Baulkham Hills Shire Council [2013] FMCA 178 related
Stankovic v Van Der Velde [2013] FCAFC 57 related
Commonwealth v Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394 cited
Henderson v Henderson (1843) 67 ER 313 cited
Re Oates; Ex parte Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1987) 17 FCR 402 followed
Rigg v Baker (2006) 155 FCR 531 followed
Singh v Super City Home Loans Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 646 cited
Date of hearing: 5 June 2013
Place: Canberra (via video link to Sydney) (Heard in Sydney)
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 158

Counsel for the Applicant:

The Applicant appeared in person

Counsel for the First Respondent:

Mr MK Condon SC and Mr McGrath

Solicitor for the First Respondent:

Mr M Pearce of The Hills Shire Council

Solicitor Advocate for the Second Respondent:

Mr D Grant

Counsel for the Third and Fourth Respondents:

Mr DPM Ash

Solicitor for the Second, Third and Fourth Respondents:

Watson and Watson

Counsel for the Fifth Respondent:

Mr DA Lloyd

Solicitor for the Fifth Respondent:

Kennedys

Solicitor Advocate for the Sixth Respondent:

Mr T Orlizki

Solicitor for the Sixth Respondent: Kent Attorneys

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Stankovic v The Hills Shire Council [2013] FCA 652

CORRIGENDUM

1.On the second page of the judgment, the Solicitor for the First Respondent should read “Mr M Pearce of The Hills Shire Council”, instead of “Ms M Pearce of The Hills Shire Council”. 

2.In paragraph 60 of the Reasons for Judgment, at the beginning of the third sentence, commencing…

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Details
Case
[2013] FCA 652
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Federal Court of Australia, Milovan Stankovic has brought an action against The Hills Shire Council and other respondents, seeking the annulment of his bankruptcy, damages for alleged unconscionable conduct under the Australian Consumer Law, and a claim against one respondent for breach of a contingency fee arrangement. The core of the dispute revolves around Stankovic's bankruptcy and the circumstances leading to it, including the actions of the Council and the conduct of the other respondents. The court was tasked with determining whether Stankovic's claim for annulment of his bankruptcy and his claims for damages should be summarily dismissed.

The court considered whether Stankovic's prior actions and orders barred his current application for annulment of his bankruptcy. It was noted that Stankovic's discharge from bankruptcy does not, by itself, prevent him from applying for annulment. The court further examined whether the prior consent orders and the dismissal of a previous annulment application should prevent Stankovic from pursuing his current application. The court concluded that the dismissal of the previous annulment application did not constitute a judicial determination on the merits, and thus, Stankovic was not barred from making another annulment application. The court also found that Stankovic's prior actions did not amount to an abuse of process in the context of this case.

The court ruled that Stankovic's claims for annulment of his bankruptcy and for damages should not be summarily dismissed. However, the court dismissed the interlocutory applications made by Stankovic and ultimately his originating application, ordering that the proceeding be dismissed. The court also ordered Stankovic to pay the respondents' costs of the interlocutory applications and the proceeding.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The following Interlocutory Applications made to the Court by the applicant (Milovan Stankovic) be dismissed:

(a) Interlocutory Application (styled “Application in a Case”) filed in Court on 13 March 2013;

(b) Interlocutory Application filed on 3 June 2013; and

(c) Interlocutory Application (styled “Amended Application”) dated 1 June 2013 but not filed whereby the applicant sought to add Giulia Inga as an additional respondent in this proceeding and also claimed other relief.

2. Pursuant to s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and r 26.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011, the applicant’s Originating Application filed on 12 October 2012 and the whole of this proceeding be dismissed.

3. The applicant pay the respondents’ costs of and incidental to the Interlocutory Applications specified in Order 1 above and their costs of and incidental to this proceeding.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

In his Statement of Claim, Mr Stankovic appears to make three broad claims. First, a claim pursuant to s 153B of the Bankruptcy Act for an order annulling his bankruptcy. Second, a claim for damages pursuant to s 20 and s 21 of the Australian Consumer Law (ACL) against all respondents by reason of unconscionable conduct on the part of each of them as alleged in pars 10 and 11 of the Statement of Claim. Third, a claim against Kent for claiming an entitlement to fees and disbursements as against Mr Stankovic in breach of the true arrangement which he contends was a contingency fee arrangement (as to which, see par 13 of the Statement of Claim). THE RELEVANT FACTS The Council commenced the L & E Court proceedings in late 2004. In those proceedings, the Council sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the Stankovics requiring them to clean up the property and to cease keeping pigs there. At a listing in the L & E Court on 24 November 2004, the Council’s claims for relief were listed for hearing on 19 January 2005. On 9 January 2005, the hearing fixed for 19 January 2005 was vacated. On that occasion, the proceedings were adjourned to 16 February 2005 before the Class 4 judge. On 16 February 2005, when the matter was called on before the Class 4 judge, there was no appearance on behalf of the Council. Mr Stankovic appeared on his own behalf (unrepresented). His wife did not appear. The judge who took the list on that day dismissed the L & E Court proceedings “… for want of prosecution”. On 22 February 2005, the Council applied to the L & E Court to have the L & E Court proceedings reinstated. On 4 March 2005, the L & E Court fixed 14 March 2005 as the hearing date for the L & E Court proceedings. Mr Stankovic was present in Court on 4 March 2005. It is not clear from the file index of the L & E Court tendered in evidence before me whether any formal order reinstating the L & E Court proceedings was ever made. Nonetheless, it is clear that the Court and all of the parties thereafter proceeded upon the basis that those proceedings had been reinstated. On 14 March 2005, a judge of the L & E Court (Pain J) heard the L & E Court proceedings. Mr Stankovic again appeared on his own behalf. His wife filed a submitting appearance. On that day, her Honour delivered Reasons for Judgment ex tempore and made final orders (Baulkham Hills Shire Council v Stankovic [2005] NSWLEC 110). Her Honour was called upon to consider whether Mr and Mrs Stankovic should be restrained from keeping pigs at the property and whether they were maintaining a junk yard at the property in breach of the residential zoning applicable to the property. The Council had issued a number of notices and orders to the Stankovics in relation to the storage of building material, second hand items and general rubbish on the property in the period between October 2001 and late 2003. Following further inspections in the first half of 2004, the Council had decided to take action against the Stankovics.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Rule 26.01(1)(a) effectively reproduces the text embodied in s 31A of the Federal Court Act. Rule 26.01(1)(c) requires that the causes of action relied upon are so obviously untenable that they could not possibly succeed. Rule 26.01(1)(d) picks up the general principles by which Courts guard against misuse of their processes and procedures. Discussion and DecisionAnnulment Mr Stankovic’s discharge from bankruptcy does not, of itself, bar his application for annulment (Re Oates; Ex parte Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1987) 17 FCR 402 at 404–405 per Sheppard J). The trustees and Kent both submitted that the orders made by consent on 2 June 2009 in proceeding SYG 1333 of 2008 and the orders made by consent on 13 October 2009 in the first annulment proceeding operate to prevent Mr Stankovic from bringing his current annulment application either because there is relevantly a res judicata or issue estoppel or because of the extended principle explained by Wigram VC in Henderson v Henderson (1843) 67 ER 313 at 319. The other respondents did not make submissions directed to Mr Stankovic’s annulment application. They confined their submissions to their contention that his damages case should be summarily dismissed or struck out. The trustees and Kent also submitted that Mr Stankovic is estopped from bringing and pursuing his present annulment application in the sense discussed in Commonwealth v Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394 because he pursued his rights under the Bankruptcy Act to have all or, at least, part of the proceeds of sale of the property declared to be protected moneys under s 116 of that Act which course of action necessarily proceeded upon the assumption that he was bankrupt and upon the additional assumption that the sequestration order had been validly made whereas he was now pursuing a course of action which is founded upon the proposition that the sequestration order ought not to have been made. I do not think that Mr Stankovic is barred, as a matter of law, from now seeking to have his bankruptcy annulled. Although judgments or orders given or made by consent without any prior judicial determination on the merits might, in an appropriate case, constitute res judicata or amount to an issue estoppel in respect of all of the fundamental matters necessarily decided by the giving of that judgment or the making of those orders, in the circumstances of the present case, the dismissal of the first annulment proceeding without more does not carry with it any judicial determination of any particular issue or claim. In any event, I see no reason why a bankrupt should be confined to making only one annulment application. The Bankruptcy Act does not so provide and I am not aware of any authority which supports such a proposition. In any particular case, second and subsequent annulment applications may encounter serious difficulties because of the way in which earlier applications were approached by the bankrupt or because of the reasons given by the Court for rejecting the application. But these are matters to be considered and determined by the Court when it comes to decide the subsequent applications. It may be that eventually a point is reached where making a particular annulment application constitutes an abuse of process because it does no more than attempt to re-litigate matters which have been dealt with in prior applications. I do not think that such a point has been reached in the present case.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

As at 7 August 2012, of the $1.8 million paid to the trustees, the trustees still held $1,244,597.37. By the time of the hearings before me on 5 June 2013, that amount had been substantially reduced by reason of the payment of trustees’ remuneration and legal fees incurred in relation to litigation instigated and pressed by Mr Stankovic in 2012 and this year. I was told from the Bar table that it was now unlikely that the trustees would have sufficient funds to pay in full the admitted debts of all creditors without further recourse to the moneys held in the controlled moneys account. In addition, Milka Stankovic has been pressing for the release of further funds to her. As I understand the present position in the Family Court, no final determination as to the appropriate split of the matrimonial property has yet been made. CONSIDERATIONMr Stankovic’s Contentions On 21 November 2012, the NSW District Registrar made an order that Mr Stankovic file and serve all affidavits upon which he intended to rely in support of his application for an order that his bankruptcy be annulled. Subsequently, the Court ordered Mr Stankovic to file and serve all affidavits upon which he intended to rely at the hearing of the respondents’ Interlocutory Applications for summary dismissal or strike-out. Mr Stankovic filed and served several affidavits sworn by him. Those which he read and relied upon before me were:(a)Affidavit sworn on 12 November 2012 and filed on the same day.(b)Affidavit sworn on 3 December 2012 and filed on the same day.(c)Affidavit sworn on 5 March 2013 and filed on the same day.(d)Affidavit sworn on 13 March 2013 and filed on the same day.(e)Affidavit sworn on 1 May 2013 and filed on 2 May 2013.(f)Affidavit sworn on 9 May 2013 and filed on 10 May 2013.(g)Affidavit sworn on 3 June 2013 and filed on the same day. The material contained in Mr Stankovic’s affidavits is largely argumentative and, to some extent, irrelevant. Nonetheless, I have had regard to the contents of his affidavits in order to ensure that my appreciation of the relevant facts is both accurate and complete and also to ensure that I have grasped and considered such of his arguments as are relevant to the matters at hand. Mr Stankovic did not file any Written Submission as directed although he did make oral submissions. All of the respondents filed Written Submissions and also addressed me orally. I should also record that, on 11 June 2013, after I had reserved my decision, Mr Stankovic endeavoured to file a Written Submission. He had no permission to do so. I directed Registry staff not to accept the document for filing but rather merely to note its lodgment date. The document has been placed in the Court file. I have not had regard to the contents of this document. On 18 June 2013, Mr Stankovic attempted to file a “Notice of Motion” and a supporting affidavit sworn by him on 17 June 2013 in which he sought against the Council an order for production of documents and a further order in the following terms:[An order] that his Honour’s Reserved Judgment be set aside so that more evidence can be presented to the Court in the interests of justice.