Stankovic v The Hills Shire Council

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Stankovic v The Hills Shire Council [2013] FCA 765

Citation: Stankovic v The Hills Shire Council [2013] FCA 765
Parties: MILOVAN STANKOVIC v THE HILLS SHIRE COUNCIL, WATSON AND WATSON (A FIRM), TERRY GRANT VAN DER VELDE, JASON SHANE CRONAN, CHARLES HOCKEY and KENT LAWYERS (A FIRM)
File number: NSD 1283 of 2013
Judge: YATES J
Date of judgment: 5 August 2013
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for leave to appeal from summary dismissal of proceeding in which applicant sought annulment of bankruptcy and other relief – whether decision attended with sufficient doubt to warrant it being reconsidered by a Full Court – consideration of further applications seeking pro bono legal assistance, trial by jury, injunctions and stays of orders
Legislation: Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 30(5)(b), 37(2)(a), 52(3), 116, 153B, 156A(3)(b)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 24(1A), 24(1D), 31A, 37M
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 4.12, 4.13, 16.21, 26.01
Cases cited: Atieh v Civil Aviation Safety Authority [2013] FCA 20
Decor Corporation Pty Ltd and Another v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397
Kent and Orlizki, in the matter of the Bankrupt Estate of Milovan Stankovic [2012] FCA 333
Stankovic v The Hills Shire Council [2013] FCA 652
Stankovic v The Hills Shire Council (No 3) [2012] FCA 523
Stankovic v Van Der Velde [2012] FCA 1436
The State of New South Wales v Canellis and Others (1994) 181 CLR 309
Date of hearing: 19 July 2013
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 56
Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr M Condon SC with Mr A McGrath
Solicitor for the First Respondent: The Hills Shire Council
Counsel for the Second Respondents: Mr D Grant of Watson & Watson
Counsel for the Third and Fourth Respondents: Mr D Ash
Solicitor for the Third and Fourth Respondents: Watson & Watson
Counsel for the Fifth Respondent: Mr C O’Neill
Solicitor for the Fifth Respondent: Kennedys
Counsel for the Sixth Respondents: Mr T Orlizki of Kent Attorneys

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1283 of 2013

BETWEEN:

MILOVAN STANKOVIC
Applicant

AND:

THE HILLS SHIRE COUNCIL
First Respondent

WATSON AND WATSON (A FIRM)
Second Respondent

TERRY GRANT VAN DER VELDE
Third Respondent

JASON SHANE CRONAN
Fourth Respondent

CHARLES HOCKEY
Fifth Respondent

KENT LAWYERS (A FIRM)
Sixth Respondent

JUDGE:

YATES J

DATE OF ORDER:

5 AUGUST 2013

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Leave to appeal from the Court’s judgment given on 4 July 2013 be refused.

2.The interlocutory application filed by the applicant on 9 July 2013 be dismissed.

3.The applicant’s applications represented by the “notices of motion” filed on 18 July 2013 be dismissed.

4.The applicant pay the respondents’ costs.

Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1283…

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Details
Case
[2013] FCA 765
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Stankovic v The Hills Shire Council, the applicant sought leave to appeal the primary judge’s decision dismissing the applicant’s claims against the respondent. The interlocutory application, additional applications, and claims for pro bono legal assistance were all dependent on the outcome of the application for leave to appeal. The court was required to determine whether there was sufficient doubt in the primary judge’s decision to warrant reconsideration by a Full Court, and if the applicant had established any arguable error on the part of the primary judge.

The court considered the applicant’s various applications for a jury and found that since the primary judge proposed to dismiss the whole proceeding, those applications fell away. The court also examined the evidence presented in the interlocutory application and additional applications, and determined that the basis for the claimed relief now fell away. The court rejected certain paragraphs of affidavits as they were not relevant to the application for leave to appeal and the interlocutory application. The court also noted that the applicant’s attempt to file a Notice of Constitutional Matter after judgment had been reserved did not raise any viable constitutional matter and played no role in the determination of the case.

The court concluded that the applicant had not established that the primary judge’s decision was attended with sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration by a Full Court. The court was not satisfied that the applicant had established any arguable error on the part of the primary judge. The application for leave to appeal was refused, and the interlocutory application and additional applications were dismissed. The applicant was ordered to pay the respondents’ costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The claims for relief in the additional applications are, or appear to be, dependent on leave to appeal being granted in relation to the judgment of 4 July 2013. The claims for pro bono legal assistance appear to relate to the hearing of either the substantive proceeding or an appeal, assuming leave to appeal to be granted. Accordingly, the basis for all the claimed relief now falls away. Insofar as the claims for pro bono legal assistance were intended to relate to the hearing of the application for leave to appeal and the interlocutory application, the matter was determined in the course of hearing those applications, as I have recorded at [8] to [10] above. Rulings on evidence At the hearing of the application for leave to appeal and the interlocutory application, paragraph 6 of an affidavit made by the applicant on 5 July 2013, and paragraphs 6 to 13 of an affidavit made by the applicant on 9 July 2013, were admitted into evidence subject to their relevance being established. Having given full consideration to the application for leave to appeal and the interlocutory application, I am satisfied that that condition has not been satisfied. I reject the paragraphs accordingly.Correspondence from the applicant after the hearing Finally, I should record that, after judgment in this matter was reserved, the applicant sought to file, without leave, a Notice of Constitutional Matter. He was not permitted by the Registry to do so. The document does not raise any viable constitutional matter. It has played no role in my determination of this matter.DISPOSITION The application for leave to appeal should be refused. The interlocutory application and the additional applications should be dismissed. The applicant should pay the respondents’ costs.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Finally, the primary judge dealt with the applicant’s various applications for a jury. His Honour found, correctly, that because he proposed to dismiss the whole of the proceeding, those applications fell away. Conclusion In my view, the applicant has not established that the primary judge’s decision, reflected in the judgment of 4 July 2013, is attended with sufficient doubt to warrant it being reconsidered by a Full Court. Indeed, as I have indicated, I am not satisfied that the applicant has established any arguable error on the part of the primary judge. For this reason alone, leave to appeal should be refused.OTHER MATTERSThe interlocutory application The claims for relief in the interlocutory application before me are dependent on leave to appeal being granted in relation to the judgment of 4 July 2013. In light of my decision to refuse leave, the basis for the claimed relief in the interlocutory application now falls away. In expressing this conclusion, I have taken the first prayer for relief to relate to the proceeding that was dismissed and not to the application for leave to appeal. If the applicant intended that a jury should be appointed to hear his application for leave to appeal, then his application in that regard is misconceived. I would add that the injunction sought in the third prayer for relief is directed to restraining the further development of the Kellyville land. There is no presently existing right possessed by the applicant in aid of which such an injunction could be granted. Moreover, the individual to whom the relief is directed is not before the Court. There is no evidence that he has been given notice of the making of that claim for relief.The additional applications The claims for relief in the additional applications are, or appear to be, dependent on leave to appeal being granted in relation to the judgment of 4 July 2013. The claims for pro bono legal assistance appear to relate to the hearing of either the substantive proceeding or an appeal, assuming leave to appeal to be granted. Accordingly, the basis for all the claimed relief now falls away. Insofar as the claims for pro bono legal assistance were intended to relate to the hearing of the application for leave to appeal and the interlocutory application, the matter was determined in the course of hearing those applications, as I have recorded at [8] to [10] above. Rulings on evidence At the hearing of the application for leave to appeal and the interlocutory application, paragraph 6 of an affidavit made by the applicant on 5 July 2013, and paragraphs 6 to 13 of an affidavit made by the applicant on 9 July 2013, were admitted into evidence subject to their relevance being established. Having given full consideration to the application for leave to appeal and the interlocutory application, I am satisfied that that condition has not been satisfied. I reject the paragraphs accordingly.Correspondence from the applicant after the hearing Finally, I should record that, after judgment in this matter was reserved, the applicant sought to file, without leave, a Notice of Constitutional Matter. He was not permitted by the Registry to do so. The document does not raise any viable constitutional matter. It has played no role in my determination of this matter.DISPOSITION

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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