Leahy v Commonwealth of Australia

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Leahy v Commonwealth of Australia [2013] FCA 1454

Citation: Leahy v Commonwealth of Australia [2013] FCA 1454
Parties: LOUIS LEAHY PURPORTEDLY FOR LOUIS LEAHY, SOKS DEVELOPMENT PTY LTD (FORMERLY ARMORLOG PTY LTD) AND ADVANCED SYSTEMS ACCOUNTING PTY LTD TRADING AS NUMBERWORLD v COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
File number: ACD 78 of 2013
Judge: FOSTER J
Date of judgment: 6 December 2013
Legislation: Australian Consumer Law, ss 18, 20 and 21
Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), ss 2A, 2C, 45, 46 and 47
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 31A
Industry Research and Development Act 1986 (Cth)
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth)
Privacy Act 1988 (Cth)
Federal Court Rules 2011, rr 16.21, 26.01 and 40.02
Criminal Code, s 142.2
Cases cited: Pickering v Centrelink [2008] FCA 561 followed
Singh v Super City Home Loans Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 646 followed
Spencer v The Commonwealth (2010) 241 CLR 118 applied

Date of hearing:

6 December 2013

Place:

Canberra

Division:

GENERAL DIVISION

Category:

No Catchwords

Number of paragraphs:

41

Counsel for the Applicant:

The Applicant appeared in person

Counsel for the Respondent:

Mr BA Meagher SC

Solicitor for the Respondent:

HWL Ebsworth Lawyers


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

ACD 78 of 2013

BETWEEN:

LOUIS LEAHY PURPORTEDLY FOR LOUIS LEAHY, SOKS DEVELOPMENT PTY LTD (FORMERLY ARMORLOG PTY LTD) AND ADVANCED SYSTEMS ACCOUNTING PTY LTD TRADING AS NUMBERWORLD
Applicant

AND:

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Respondent

JUDGE:

FOSTER J

DATE OF ORDER:

6 DECEMBER 2013

WHERE MADE:

CANBERRA

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The Interlocutory Application filed by the applicant on 24 October 2013 be dismissed.

2.Pursuant to s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and r 26.01(a), (b), (c) and (d) of the Federal Court Rules 2011, the whole of this proceeding be dismissed.

3.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to this proceeding assessed pursuant to r 40.02 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 in the amount of $15,000 inclusive of GST.  

Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

ACD 78 of 2013

BETWEEN:

LOUIS LEAHY PURPORTEDLY FOR LOUIS LEAHY, SOKS DEVELOPMENT PTY LTD (FORMERLY ARMORLOG PTY LTD) AND ADVANCED SYSTEMS ACCOUNTING PTY LTD TRADING AS NUMBERWORLD
Applicant

AND:

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Respondent

JUDGE:

FOSTER J

DATE OF ORDER:

6 DECEMBER 2013

WHERE MADE:

CANBERRA

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This proceeding was commenced on 5 August 2013 by the filing of an Originating Application.  In that Application, the applicant, Mr Leahy, claimed damages of the order of $359,944,335.  Mr Leahy purported to bring this proceeding on behalf of himself and two corporations:  SOKS Development Pty Ltd (formerly called Armorlog Pty Ltd (SOKS) and Advanced Systems Accounting Pty Ltd trading as NumberWorld (NumberWorld).  

  2. Under the heading “Grounds of application”, the applicant set out the causes of action upon…

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Details
Case
[2013] FCA 1454
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Leahy was the plaintiff in a proceeding against the Commonwealth of Australia, seeking to challenge the constitutionality of certain legislation. The Federal Court was required to decide whether the plaintiff's claims were frivolous, vexatious, or had no reasonable prospect of success, in accordance with Rule 26.01 of the Federal Court Rules and Section 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976. The court found that the plaintiff had not pleaded any causes of action that were relevant to the claims made in the proceeding, and that the references to statutory provisions and common law principles in other documents were irrelevant to the claims in the Originating Application. The court also found that the plaintiff had no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding.

The court based its decision on the principles established in Spencer v The Commonwealth and other cases, which state that the power to order summary dismissal should be exercised with caution, and that there must be a high degree of certainty that the applicant cannot succeed if the proceeding is allowed to go to trial in the ordinary way. The court also noted that the statutory requirement of "no reasonable prospect" of success is different from the concept of "no real prospect of success", and that the proceeding may be dismissed even if it is not hopeless or bound to fail. In this case, the court found that the plaintiff's claims were frivolous and vexatious, and that there was no reasonable prospect of success. Therefore, the court dismissed the proceeding in its entirety and ordered the plaintiff to pay the respondent's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The Interlocutory Application filed by the applicant on 24 October 2013 be dismissed.

2. Pursuant to s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and r 26.01(a), (b), (c) and (d) of the Federal Court Rules 2011, the whole of this proceeding be dismissed.

3. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to this proceeding assessed pursuant to r 40.02 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 in the amount of $15,000 inclusive of GST.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Rule 26.01 FCR provides:26.01 Summary judgment(1)A party may apply to the Court for an order that judgment be given against another party because:(a)the applicant has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding or part of the proceeding; or(b)the proceeding is frivolous or vexatious; or(c)no reasonable cause of action is disclosed; or(d)the proceeding is an abuse of the process of the Court; or(e)the respondent has no reasonable prospect of successfully defending the proceeding or part of the proceeding.(2)The application must be accompanied by an affidavit stating:(a)the grounds of the application; and(b)the facts and circumstances relied on to support those grounds.(3)The application and the accompanying affidavit must be served on the party against whom the order is sought at least 14 days before the hearing of the application.(4)If an order is made under subrule (1) dismissing part of the proceeding, the proceeding may be continued for that part of the proceeding not disposed of by the order.(5)If an order is made under subrule (1) giving judgment for the applicant against the respondent for the whole or part of the applicant’s claim, a respondent who has a cross claim against the applicant or some other party may:(a)continue to prosecute the cross claim against the applicant or other party; and(b)apply to the Court for an order staying execution on or enforcement of the judgment until the respondent’s cross claim is determined.Note: See also section 31A of the Act. In Singh v Super City Home Loans Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 646 (Singh), I summarised the principles applicable to summary dismissal in light of the High Court’s decision in Spencer v The Commonwealth (2010) 241 CLR 118. In Singh, I said ([at 129]): In Spencer v The Commonwealth (2010) 241 CLR 118, the High Court considered the meaning and effect of s 31A of the Federal Court Act. The following principles may be gleaned from that decision:(a)Section 31A authorises summary disposition on a variety of bases (at [22] (p 131) per French CJ and Gummow J). At [22], their Honours also said:… It will apply to the case in which the pleadings disclose no reasonable cause of action and their deficiency is incurable. It will include the case in which there is unanswerable or unanswered evidence of a fact fatal to the pleaded case and any case which might be propounded by permissible amendment. It will include the class of case in the longstanding category of cases which are “frivolous or vexatious or an abuse of process”. The application of s 31A is not, in terms, limited to those categories.(b)The power to order summary dismissal pursuant to s 31A is different from the power to strike out defective pleadings pursuant to O 11 r 16 of the Federal Court Rules (at [23] (p 131) per French CJ and Gummow J); (c)The power to terminate proceedings summarily should be exercised with caution (at [24] (p 131) per French CJ and Gummow J). At [24] (p 131), their Honours also said: 24The exercise of powers to summarily terminate proceedings must always be attended with caution. That is so whether such disposition is sought on the basis that the pleadings fail to disclose a reasonable cause of action (General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125 at 128–130 per Barwick CJ) or on the basis that the action is frivolous or vexatious or an abuse of process (Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners (1949) 78 CLR 62 at 91 per Dixon J). The same applies where such a disposition is sought in a summary judgment application supported by evidence. As to the latter, this Court in Fancourt v Mercantile Credits Ltd said ((1983) 154 CLR 87 at 99. See also Webster v Lampard (1993) 177 CLR 598 at 602–603 per Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ):“The power to order summary or final judgment is one that should be exercised with great care and should never be exercised unless it is clear that there is no real question to be tried.”More recently, in Batistatos v Roads and Traffic Authority (NSW) ((2006) 226 CLR 256 at 275 [46]) Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ repeated a statement by Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ in Agar v Hyde ((2000) 201 CLR 552 at 575–576 [57]) which included the following:“Ordinarily, a party is not to be denied the opportunity to place his or her case before the court in the ordinary way, and after taking advantage of the usual interlocutory processes. The test to be applied has been expressed in various ways (Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners (1949) 78 CLR 62 at 91 per Dixon J; General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125 at 130 per Barwick CJ), but all of the verbal formulae which have been used are intended to describe a high degree of certainty about the ultimate outcome of the proceeding if it were allowed to go to trial in the ordinary way.”There would seem to be little distinction between those approaches and the requirement of a “real” as distinct from “fanciful” prospect of success contemplated by s 31A (In A v Essex County Council [2010] 3 WLR 509, the criterion of “real prospect of success” was variously equated to whether the plaintiff “could succeed at a trial”, whether there was a “triable issue” and whether there was the “least doubt”: at [44] per Lord Clarke of Stone-cum-Ebony JSC; at 541 [119] per Baroness Hale of Richmond JSC; at 544 [133] per Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood JSC; at 552 [163] per Lord Kerr of Tonaghmore JSC). That proposition, however, is not inconsistent with the proposition that the criterion in s 31A may be satisfied upon grounds wider than those contained in pre-existing Rules of Court authorising summary dispositions.(d)There must be a high degree of certainty that the applicant/plaintiff cannot succeed if the proceeding is allowed to go to trial in the ordinary way (Batistatos v Roads and Traffic Authority (NSW) (2006) 226 CLR 256 at [46] (p 275) per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ). (e) At [25]–[26], French CJ and Gummow J also said: 25 Section 31A(2) requires a practical judgment by the Federal Court as to whether the applicant has more than a “fanciful” prospect of success. That may be a judgment of law or of fact, or of mixed law and fact. Where there are factual issues capable of being disputed and in dispute, summary dismissal should not be awarded to the respondent simply because the Court has formed the view that the applicant is unlikely to succeed on the factual issue. Where the success of a proceeding depends upon propositions of law apparently precluded by existing authority, that may not always be the end of the matter. Existing authority may be overruled, qualified or further explained. Summary processes must not be used to stultify the development of the law. But where the success of proceedings is critically dependent upon a proposition of law which would contradict a binding decision of this Court, the court hearing the application under s 31A could justifiably conclude that the proceedings had no reasonable prospect of success.26 Where an application under s 31A requires consideration of apparently complex questions of fact, then the caution uttered by Lord Hope is relevant (see above at [21]). The importance of those considerations is amplified if the case involves resolution of issues of law and fact, or mixed law and fact.(f)Section 31A requires that there be “no reasonable prospect of success”. This is a different concept from the concept of “no real prospect of success” (per Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ at [50]–[51] (pp 138–139));(g)The statutory admonition is that a proceeding may be found to have no reasonable prospect of successful prosecution even if it is not hopeless or bound to fail (per Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ at [52] (p 139)). At [52]–[53] (p 139), their Honours went on to say:52… it is important to begin by recognising that the combined effect of sub-ss (2) and (3) is that the inquiry required in this case is whether there is a “reasonable” prospect of prosecuting the proceeding, not an inquiry directed to whether a certain and concluded determination could be made that the proceeding would necessarily fail.53 In this respect, s 31A departs radically from the basis upon which earlier forms of provision permitting the entry of summary judgment have been understood and administered. Those earlier provisions were understood as requiring formation of a certain and concluded determination that a proceeding would necessarily fail. That this was the basis of earlier decisions may be illustrated by reference to two decisions of this Court often cited in connection with questions of summary judgment: Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners ((1949) 78 CLR 62) and General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) ((1964) 112 CLR 125).(h)Section 31A requires a different inquiry to be undertaken from that undertaken under earlier different regimes (per Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ at [56] (p 140));(i)The expression “no reasonable prospect” should be understood in the manner explained by Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ in Spencer as follows (at [58]–[60] (p 141)):58 How then should the expression “no reasonable prospect” be understood? No paraphrase of the expression can be adopted as a sufficient explanation of its operation, let alone definition of its content. Nor can the expression usefully be understood by the creation of some antinomy intended to capture most or all of the cases in which it cannot be said that there is “no reasonable prospect”. The judicial creation of a lexicon of words or phrases intended to capture the operation of a particular statutory phrase like “no reasonable prospect” is to be avoided. Consideration of the difficulties that bedevilled the proviso to common form criminal appeal statutes (Weiss v The Queen (2005) 224 CLR 300 at 312–318 [31]–[47]), as a result of judicial glossing of the relevant statutory expression, provides the clearest example of the dangers that attend any such attempt.59 In many cases where a plaintiff has no reasonable prospect of prosecuting a proceeding, the proceeding could be described (with or without the addition of intensifying epithets like “clearly”, “manifestly” or “obviously”) as “frivolous”, “untenable”, “groundless” or “faulty”. But none of those expressions (alone or in combination) should be understood as providing a sufficient chart of the metes and bounds of the power given by s 31A. Nor can the content of the word “reasonable”, in the phrase “no reasonable prospect”, be sufficiently, let alone completely, illuminated by drawing some contrast with what would be a “frivolous”, “untenable”, “groundless” or “faulty” claim.60 Rather, full weight must be given to the expression as a whole. The Federal Court may exercise power under s 31A if, and only if, satisfied that there is “no reasonable prospect” of success. Of course, it may readily be accepted that the power to dismiss an action summarily is not to be exercised lightly. But the elucidation of what amounts to “no reasonable prospect” can best proceed in the same way as content has been given, through a succession of decided cases, to other generally expressed statutory phrases, such as the phrase “just and equitable” when it is used to identify a ground for winding up a company. At this point in the development of the understanding of the expression and its application, it is sufficient, but important, to emphasise that the evident legislative purpose revealed by the text of the provision will be defeated if its application is read as confined to cases of a kind which fell within earlier, different, procedural regimes.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In the Statement of Claim filed by him, in the affidavits filed by him and in a Written Submission filed by him in respect of the applications which these Reasons for Judgment determine, the applicant has adverted to several statutory provisions and common law concepts and principles which are not mentioned at all in his Originating Application and which have no apparent relevance to the causes of action invoked by the applicant in that Application. The relevance of these references is not apparent to me. I intend to approach the current applications upon the basis that the statutory provisions and general law causes of action upon which the applicant intends to rely at trial are all referred to in his Originating Application. Passing references to other statutory provisions and general law concepts and principles in other documents will be ignored unless they are relevant to the causes of action specified in the Originating Application. CONSIDERATION Section 31A of the FCA is in the following terms:31A Summary judgment(1)The Court may give judgment for one party against another in relation to the whole or any part of a proceeding if:(a)the first party is prosecuting the proceeding or that part of the proceeding; and(b)the Court is satisfied that the other party has no reasonable prospect of successfully defending the proceeding or that part of the proceeding.(2)The Court may give judgment for one party against another in relation to the whole or any part of a proceeding if:(a)the first party is defending the proceeding or that part of the proceeding; and(b)the Court is satisfied that the other party has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding or that part of the proceeding.(3)For the purposes of this section, a defence or a proceeding or part of a proceeding need not be:(a)hopeless; or(b)bound to fail;for it to have no reasonable prospect of success.(4)This section does not limit any powers that the Court has apart from this section.(5)This section does not apply to criminal proceedings. Rule 26.01 FCR provides:26.01 Summary judgment(1)A party may apply to the Court for an order that judgment be given against another party because:(a)the applicant has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding or part of the proceeding; or(b)the proceeding is frivolous or vexatious; or(c)no reasonable cause of action is disclosed; or(d)the proceeding is an abuse of the process of the Court; or(e)the respondent has no reasonable prospect of successfully defending the proceeding or part of the proceeding.(2)The application must be accompanied by an affidavit stating:(a)the grounds of the application; and(b)the facts and circumstances relied on to support those grounds.(3)The application and the accompanying affidavit must be served on the party against whom the order is sought at least 14 days before the hearing of the application.(4)If an order is made under subrule (1) dismissing part of the proceeding, the proceeding may be continued for that part of the proceeding not disposed of by the order.(5)If an order is made under subrule (1) giving judgment for the applicant against the respondent for the whole or part of the applicant’s claim, a respondent who has a cross claim against the applicant or some other party may:(a)continue to prosecute the cross claim against the applicant or other party; and(b)apply to the Court for an order staying execution on or enforcement of the judgment until the respondent’s cross claim is determined.Note: See also section 31A of the Act.