Pickering v Centrelink

Case [2008] FCA 561


FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Pickering v Centrelink [2008] FCA 561

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – summary dismissal – no cause of action – no private right to claim damages – jurisdiction – no ‘matter’ – O 20 r 5 of the Federal Court Rules

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 31A, 31A(2), 31A(3)
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B(1A)

Federal Court Rules O 20 r 5

Degiorgio v Dunn (No 2) (2005) 62 NSWLR 284
Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners (1949) 78 CLR 62
Duncan v Lipscombe Child Care Services Inc (2006) 150 IR 471
General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner of Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125
Gimson v Victorian WorkCover Authority [1995] 1 VR 209
Jones v Department of Employment [1989] QB 1
NBGZ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 143 FCR 434
Scott v Pedler [2004] FCAFC 67
Scott v Secretary, Department of Social Security [2000] FCA 1241
Swain v Hillman [2001] 1 All ER 91
Walton v Gardiner (1993) 177 CLR 378
Wang v Secretary, Department of Employment and Workplace Relations [2006] FCA 898
White Industries Aust Ltd and Another v Federal Commissioner of Taxation and Another (2007) 160 FCR 298
X v South Australia (No 3) [2007] SASC 125
Young v Holloway [1895] P 87

JEFFREY PICKERING v CENTRELINK

WAD 45 OF 2008

MCKERRACHER J
18 APRIL 2008
PERTH


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

WAD 45 OF 2008

BETWEEN:

JEFFREY PICKERING
Applicant

AND:

CENTRELINK
Respondent

JUDGE:

MCKERRACHER J

DATE OF ORDER:

18 APRIL 2008

WHERE MADE:

PERTH

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application be dismissed.

2.The applicant is to pay the respondent’s costs of the application and the motion today, to be taxed if not agreed.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

WAD 45 OF 2008

BETWEEN:

JEFFREY PICKERING
Applicant

AND:

CENTRELINK
Respondent

JUDGE:

MCKERRACHER J

DATE:

18 APRIL 2008

PLACE:

PERTH

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

REVISED FROM TRANSCRIPT

INTRODUCTION

  1. The applicant, Mr Pickering has on 7 March 2008 filed an application against the respondent, Centrelink supported by an affidavit sworn by him.  The application reads:

    Centerlink (sic) has refused to allow me to speak to the autorize (sic) review officer reguarding (sic) being banned from Centerlink (sic)  This has been going on since the 1st November 2007.  Since 1975 I have been arguing with Centerlink (sic) about their duties and obligation to me.  It has got to the suitation (sic) that the Centerlink (sic) physchirist (sic) Peter Clarke believes I am mentally unstable.  Now I cannot talk to anyone without threatening to kill even the police have told me I am mental.  Therefor (sic) because of Centerlink (sic) and being in jail at times I am now sueing (sic) Centerlink (sic) for $2,700,000 for all the stress agrevation (sic) stupidity and time in jail that Centerlink (sic) has put me through for not…

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AGLC
Pickering v Centrelink [2008] FCA 561
Case
[2008] FCA 561
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Pickering v Centrelink involved the applicant, Mr Pickering, seeking to challenge a decision made by Centrelink, the respondent. The primary dispute centred on the procedural aspects of the case, specifically whether the application should be summarily dismissed under s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act and O 20 r 5 of the Federal Court Rules. The Court was tasked with determining whether Mr Pickering's application had any reasonable prospect of success, given the stringent criteria set out in the cited legislation and rules.

The legal issues that the Court needed to address were whether the application was so lacking in merit or substance as to be not fairly arguable, and if the application could be considered frivolous or vexatious. The Court examined the relevant provisions, noting that the standard for determining the lack of reasonable prospects of success was lower than previously established by the High Court. However, the Court also emphasised that the threshold was still substantial, requiring a determination of whether there was a realistic prospect of success, as opposed to a fanciful one. The Court reviewed the evidence and submissions to assess if Mr Pickering's application met the criteria for dismissal under the specified provisions.

The Court found that Mr Pickering's application did not meet the threshold for summary dismissal. The Court concluded that there was a realistic prospect of success on the application, and therefore, the motion for summary dismissal was dismissed. The Court further ordered that the applicant pay the respondent's costs of the application and the motion, to be taxed if not agreed. This decision underscored the importance of thoroughly evaluating the merits of an application against the stringent criteria set by the Federal Court Act and Rules, while also acknowledging the need for a realistic, as opposed to a fanciful, prospect of success.

ORDERS:
1. The application be dismissed.
2. The applicant is to pay the respondent’s costs of the application and the motion today, to be taxed if not agreed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

2. The applicant is to pay the respondent’s costs of the application and the motion today, to be taxed if not agreed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

MCKERRACHER J
The submissions focused on two grounds, namely, s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act and O 20 r 5 of the Federal Court Rules. Those provisions provide as follows:Section 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act reads as follows:Summary judgment(1)The Court may give judgment for one party against another in relation to the whole or any part of a proceeding if: (a)the first party is prosecuting the proceeding or that part of the proceeding; and (b)the Court is satisfied that the other party has no reasonable prospect of successfully defending the proceeding or that part of the proceeding. (2)The Court may give judgment for one party against another in relation to the whole or any part of a proceeding if: (a)the first party is defending the proceeding or that part of the proceeding; and (b)the Court is satisfied that the other party has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding or that part of the proceeding. (3)For the purposes of this section, a defence or a proceeding or part of a proceeding need not be: (a)hopeless; or (b)bound to fail; for it to have no reasonable prospect of success. (4)This section does not limit any powers that the Court has apart from this section. Order 20 r 5 of the Federal Court Rules reads as follows:5Stay or dismissal (proceedings commenced on or after 1 December 2005)(1)This rule applies to a proceeding commenced on or after 1 December 2005 if the Court is satisfied that, for the proceeding generally or for a claim for relief in the proceeding:(a)the proceeding or claim is frivolous or vexatious; or(b)the proceeding or claim is an abuse of the process of the Court.(2)The Court may order that the proceeding be stayed or dismissed generally or in relation to the claim for relief.(3)The Court may receive evidence on the hearing of an application for an order under subrule (2). To the extent that the respondent relies upon s 31A in its motion, it is required to establish that there is ‘no reasonable prospect of success’ on Mr Pickering’s application. As observed by Heerey J in Duncan v Lipscombe Child Care Services Inc (2006) 150 IR 471, s 31A of the Federal Court Act 1976 (Cth) was introduced to establish a lower standard for strike outs (either of claims or defences) than that previously laid down by the High Court’s decisions in Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners (1949) 78 CLR 62 and General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner of Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125. Nevertheless, while the test is lower, as Barrett J in Degiorgio v Dunn (No 2) (2005) 62 NSWLR 284 held, for the purposes of the comparable provision in New South Wales (‘without reasonable prospects of success’) meant ‘so lacking in merit or substance as to be not fairly arguable’. In Swain v Hillman [2001] 1 All ER 91, Court of Appeal per Lord Woolf MR said at 92: The words "no real prospect of succeeding" do not need any amplification, they speak for themselves. The word "real" distinguishes fanciful prospects of success or ... they direct the court to the need to see whether there is a "realistic" as opposed to a "fanciful" prospect of success.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: MCKERRACHER J

Full text does not contain this section.