HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
McHUGH, GUMMOW, KIRBY, HAYNE AND CALLINAN JJ
WAYNE RONALD HEMBURY APPELLANT
AND
CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF RESPONDENT
Hembury v Chief of the General Staff (M102/1997) [1998] HCA 47
23 July 1998
ORDER
Appeal allowed.
Set aside the order of the Federal Court of Australia and in lieu thereof order that the appeal to that Court be allowed, the convictions quashed and the matter returned to the Defence Force Discipline Appeal Tribunal for the making of such orders as are appropriate conformably with the decision of this Court.
On appeal from the Federal Court of Australia
Representation:
P A Willee QC for the appellant (instructed by Bullards, Solicitors)
R R S Tracey QC with F B Healy for the respondent (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)
Notice: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.
CATCHWORDS
Wayne Ronald Hembury v Chief of the General Staff
Military law - Court martial procedure - Requirement that members vote in ascending order of seniority - Misdirection as to voting order - Whether a "material irregularity" giving rise to a "substantial miscarriage of justice".
Military law - Court martial procedure - "substantial miscarriage of justice" - Whether jurisprudence deriving from general criminal law applicable.
Military law - Review jurisdiction of Defence Force Discipline Appeal Tribunal and Federal Court of Australia - Whether involves an exercise of Commonwealth judicial power.
Words and phrases - "substantial miscarriage of justice" - "material irregularity".
Defence Force Discipline Appeals Act 1955 (Cth), s 23(1)(c).
Defence Force Discipline Rules (Cth), r 33.
McHUGH J. The question in this appeal is whether the Defence Force Discipline Appeal Tribunal ("the Tribunal") erred in law in holding that a direction that the members of a court-martial vote in order of seniority, contrary to r 33 of the Defence Force Discipline Rules ("the Rules"), was not "a substantial miscarriage of justice" within the meaning of s 23(1)(c) of the Defence Force Discipline Appeals Act 1955 (Cth) ("the Appeals Act"). In my opinion, the Tribunal erred in law in so holding.
The appeal is brought against an order of the Federal Court of Australia which dismissed the appellant's "appeal" against an order of the Tribunal. The Tribunal's order affirmed the appellant's convictions of engaging in conduct likely to prejudice Army discipline, assaulting a Defence Force member of inferior rank and disobeying a lawful command.
In April 1993, the appellant, a sergeant in the Royal Australian Army, was tried before a restricted court-martial[1] on six charges. The court-martial acquitted the appellant of two charges, convicted him of three charges and was not required to give a verdict on the remaining charge, which was an alternative charge to one of those on which he was convicted. The members of the court‑martial were a Lieutenant Colonel, a Major and a Captain. The Judge Advocate directed the court-martial that:
"When you come to voting on the questions of guilt, you should vote…
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- Case
- [1998] HCA 47
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues before the High Court were whether the misdirection regarding the voting order amounted to a "material irregularity" and, crucially, whether this irregularity resulted in a "substantial miscarriage of justice" within the meaning of the relevant military law provisions. The court also considered whether the jurisprudence developed in the general criminal law concerning "substantial miscarriage of justice" was applicable to military courts martial, and the nature of the review jurisdiction exercised by the Defence Force Discipline Appeal Tribunal and the Federal Court of Australia.
The High Court reasoned that courts martial, unlike courts of law, are not typically comprised of legally trained individuals and do not exercise the judicial power of the Commonwealth. Consequently, a high degree of accuracy in procedural instructions is required to safeguard against unreasonable convictions and to maintain confidence in the military justice system. The court held that the misdirection on voting order was a departure from statutory rules and thus a "material irregularity." However, it found that the phrase "substantial miscarriage of justice" has a specific, technical meaning in legislation governing retrials, implying that proceedings must be conducted in accordance with the law. Given that the actual impact of the misdirection on the court martial's deliberations could not be known without impermissibly intruding on their privacy, and that the facts were undisputed, the court concluded that the misdirection did indeed occasion a substantial miscarriage of justice.
The High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the order of the Federal Court. It ordered that the appeal to the Federal Court be allowed, the convictions be quashed, and the matter be returned to the Defence Force Discipline Appeal Tribunal for appropriate orders to be made in conformity with the High Court's decision.
Orders
Orders of the court
1.
Appeal allowed.
2.
Set aside the order of the Federal Court of Australia and in lieu thereof order that the appeal to that Court be allowed, the convictions quashed and the matter returned to the Defence Force Discipline Appeal Tribunal for the making of such orders as are appropriate conformably with the decision of this Court.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: HUGH J, HAYNE J
A third consideration which reinforces this conclusion is the context in which the rule appears. A court martial is not a court of law. Although it is obliged to dispense justice it has been held that it does not exercise the judicial power of the Commonwealth[130]. It is a body constituted, ordinarily, by lay people. The participation of a member with legal training would be wholly accidental. These features of courts martial are recognised by the detailed provisions made concerning their procedures both by the Discipline Act and by the Rules. This is a reason for requiring a high level of accuracy in the instruction of a court martial about any procedures laid down by the Parliament or by Rules made under Parliamentary authority. A court martial has large powers. The present case is an illustration. The imposition of a punishment (although in this case suspended) of military detention may deprive a citizen of liberty. Rules of procedure have been enacted, or made, both to reduce the risks of unreasonable, irregular or unsafe convictions of the accused and to enhance the confidence of serving officers and of the community more generally in the integrity of military justice. Whereas a greater measure of flexibility might be accorded to a judge exercising the judicial power of the Commonwealth in the ordering of procedures of the court (because by training and experience the judge could ordinarily be expected to protect the essential rights of the accused) the same may not necessarily follow in relation to a non-judicial administrative body with large powers to convict an accused person and to order that he or she be detained, fined and otherwise compulsorily dealt with.[130]Re Tracey; Ex parte Ryan (1989) 166 CLR 518 at 541, 579, 591, 603-604.Intended operation of the Appeals Act It is with these considerations in mind that I return to the intended operation of s 23(1)(c) of the Appeals Act. Reading that paragraph, without knowledge of judicial consideration of similar texts, it would be easy to perceive in the phrase "substantial miscarriage of justice" more than appears. Sheppard J may have done this when he indicated that "substantial" in the context meant a miscarriage which was "grave or serious"[131]. In other contexts, this is certainly what "substantial" may mean[132]. But the expression "substantial miscarriage of justice" is one commonly used in legislation providing for the ordering of retrials. In that context it is "a technical word, and includes [a] technical meaning"[133]. The expression, although an evaluative one, appears in legislation which assumes that the individual affected is entitled to have proceedings before a court martial conducted in accordance with the law. Because, as with a jury, a reviewing tribunal or an appellate court cannot know, or discover (without impermissible invasion of the privacy of the court martial's deliberations[134]) precisely how the members voted and in what order, it is mere speculation to cogitate upon the impact (if any) which the particular misdirection had in fact on the decision of this court martial. The Tribunal, and the majority of the Federal Court, thought it likely to have been insignificant, having regard to the considerable time spent in deliberation. But there is no way of knowing whether this was so.[131](1997) 74 FCR 457 at 479; 144 ALR 601 at 622.[132]TillmannsButcheries Pty Ltd v Australasian Meat Industry Employees' Union (1979) 27 ALR 367 at 382 per Deane J; Re Queensland Co-operative Milling Association Ltd (1976) 8 ALR 481 at 511.[133]Balenzuela v De Gail (1959) 101 CLR 226 at 233 applying Holford v Melbourne Tramway and Omnibus Co Ltd [1909] VLR 497 at 526 per Cussen J.[134]cf United States v Martinez 17 Military Justice Reporter 916 at 920-921 (1984).