Hembury v Chief of the General Staff

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

McHUGH, GUMMOW, KIRBY, HAYNE AND CALLINAN JJ

WAYNE RONALD HEMBURY  APPELLANT

AND

CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF  RESPONDENT

Hembury v Chief of the General Staff (M102/1997) [1998] HCA 47
23 July 1998

ORDER

  1. Appeal allowed.

  1. Set aside the order of the Federal Court of Australia and in lieu thereof order that the appeal to that Court be allowed, the convictions quashed and the matter returned to the Defence Force Discipline Appeal Tribunal for the making of such orders as are appropriate conformably with the decision of this Court.

On appeal from the Federal Court of Australia

Representation:

P A Willee QC for the appellant (instructed by Bullards, Solicitors)

R R S Tracey QC with F B Healy for the respondent (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)

Notice:  This copy of the Court’s Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

CATCHWORDS

Wayne Ronald Hembury v Chief of the General Staff

Military law - Court martial procedure - Requirement that members vote in ascending order of seniority - Misdirection as to voting order - Whether a "material irregularity" giving rise to a "substantial miscarriage of justice".

Military law - Court martial procedure - "substantial miscarriage of justice" - Whether jurisprudence deriving from general criminal law applicable.

Military law - Review jurisdiction of Defence Force Discipline Appeal Tribunal and Federal Court of Australia - Whether involves an exercise of Commonwealth judicial power.

Words and phrases - "substantial miscarriage of justice" - "material irregularity".

Defence Force Discipline Appeals Act 1955 (Cth), s 23(1)(c).

Defence Force Discipline Rules (Cth), r 33.

  1. McHUGH J. The question in this appeal is whether the Defence Force Discipline Appeal Tribunal ("the Tribunal") erred in law in holding that a direction that the members of a court-martial vote in order of seniority, contrary to r 33 of the Defence Force Discipline Rules ("the Rules"), was not "a substantial miscarriage of justice" within the meaning of s 23(1)(c) of the Defence Force Discipline Appeals Act 1955 (Cth) ("the Appeals Act"). In my opinion, the Tribunal erred in law in so holding.

  2. The appeal is brought against an order of the Federal Court of Australia which dismissed the appellant's "appeal" against an order of the Tribunal.  The Tribunal's order affirmed the appellant's convictions of engaging in conduct likely to prejudice Army discipline, assaulting a Defence Force member of inferior rank and disobeying a lawful command.

  3. In April 1993, the appellant, a sergeant in the Royal Australian Army, was tried before a restricted court-martial[1] on six charges.  The court-martial acquitted the appellant of two charges, convicted him of three charges and was not required to give a verdict on the remaining charge, which was an alternative charge to one of those on which he was convicted.  The members of the court‑martial were a Lieutenant Colonel, a Major and a Captain.  The Judge Advocate directed the court-martial that:

    "When you come to voting on the questions of guilt, you should vote…

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Details
Case
[1998] HCA 47
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia heard an appeal by Wayne Ronald Hembury against the Chief of the General Staff concerning the procedure of a court martial. The dispute arose from a misdirection given by the Judge Advocate regarding the order in which members of the court martial were to vote, specifically concerning the requirement that voting occur in ascending order of seniority. This misdirection was alleged to constitute a "material irregularity" and a "substantial miscarriage of justice."

The central legal issues before the High Court were whether the misdirection regarding the voting order amounted to a "material irregularity" and, crucially, whether this irregularity resulted in a "substantial miscarriage of justice" within the meaning of the relevant military law provisions. The court also considered whether the jurisprudence developed in the general criminal law concerning "substantial miscarriage of justice" was applicable to military courts martial, and the nature of the review jurisdiction exercised by the Defence Force Discipline Appeal Tribunal and the Federal Court of Australia.

The High Court reasoned that courts martial, unlike courts of law, are not typically comprised of legally trained individuals and do not exercise the judicial power of the Commonwealth. Consequently, a high degree of accuracy in procedural instructions is required to safeguard against unreasonable convictions and to maintain confidence in the military justice system. The court held that the misdirection on voting order was a departure from statutory rules and thus a "material irregularity." However, it found that the phrase "substantial miscarriage of justice" has a specific, technical meaning in legislation governing retrials, implying that proceedings must be conducted in accordance with the law. Given that the actual impact of the misdirection on the court martial's deliberations could not be known without impermissibly intruding on their privacy, and that the facts were undisputed, the court concluded that the misdirection did indeed occasion a substantial miscarriage of justice.

The High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the order of the Federal Court. It ordered that the appeal to the Federal Court be allowed, the convictions be quashed, and the matter be returned to the Defence Force Discipline Appeal Tribunal for appropriate orders to be made in conformity with the High Court's decision.

Orders

Orders of the court

1.

Appeal allowed.

2.

Set aside the order of the Federal Court of Australia and in lieu thereof order that the appeal to that Court be allowed, the convictions quashed and the matter returned to the Defence Force Discipline Appeal Tribunal for the making of such orders as are appropriate conformably with the decision of this Court.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

HUGH J GUMMOW AND CALLINAN JJ (dissent) KIRBY J (dissent) HAYNE J
The alteration of the statutory language in the Appeals Act gave rise to much debate before the Tribunal and in the Federal Court concerning a suggested change in the preconditions for appellate intervention and about who bore the onus to show that a substantial miscarriage of justice had occurred. Although the construction of s 23(1)(c) of the Appeals Act was mentioned briefly during argument to this Court, and raised in a ground of appeal[70], because in this case the relevant facts are undisputed, it is unnecessary to explore these questions. Nothing turns on the onus of proof. The case depends on whether what the Judge Advocate told the court martial was erroneous; whether this amounted to a "material irregularity"; and whether "a substantial miscarriage of justice has occurred".[70]Notice of Appeal to the High Court of Australia, 27 November 1997 at par 2.3.Decisions of the Tribunal and the Federal Court No point was taken, either before the court martial or originally in the appeal to the Tribunal concerning the suggested error of the Judge Advocate's instruction to the court martial. The error was drawn to the notice of the appellant's representative by a member of the Tribunal[71]. It led to an application and leave to add a further ground of appeal. The Tribunal[72], which was obliged to deal with many other grounds of appeal argued for the appellant, dealt with this one quite briefly[73]. After referring to the apparent policy behind r 33[74], it concluded that the direction amounted to a "material irregularity". It rejected the argument that, in the context, the passage complained of was to be construed as a direction to vote "in order of seniority" from the junior to the senior. It held that the meaning of "in order of seniority" was the reverse of what r 33 provided. However, in reaching a conclusion that no miscarriage of justice had resulted, the Tribunal relied on the fact that the court martial had retired for approximately one and three quarter hours to deliberate upon its decision. It said[75]:"It cannot but be the case that before any vote was taken which resulted in the announcement of the verdicts as set out earlier, each of the three officers was well aware of the views of the others, and if contrary to their oath, the junior officers were, or either of them was, willing to mould his or her decision to conform with that of the president, he or she must have had every opportunity to do so, irrespective of the order of voting."[71]Hembury v Commonwealth of Australia (1994) 73 A Crim R 1 at 14.[72]Northrop J (President), Cox J (Deputy President), Badgery-Parker J (Member).[73](1994) 73 A Crim R 1 at 14-15.[74]"[T]o avoid a situation in which junior members of a court martial are overborne by their superior officer": (1994) 73 A Crim R 1 at 14.[75](1994) 73 A Crim R 1 at 15. In the Federal Court, the appeal from the decision of the Tribunal was heard by five judges[76]. By majority[77], the appeal was dismissed. It was accepted that the Judge Advocate, in the passage complained of, had made an error, the inadvertence of which was demonstrated by the correct instruction which he gave on the matter of voting on punishment[78]. Like the Tribunal, the Federal Court was not persuaded that the passage could be construed to mean "in order of seniority" from junior to senior. Before the Federal Court it was common ground that the misdirection constituted a "material irregularity in the course of the proceedings"[79]. This was because it involved a departure from the rule provided by statute. But the question remained whether as a matter of law, "a substantial miscarriage of justice" had occurred. [76](1997) 74 FCR 457; 144 ALR 601.[77]Lockhart, Sheppard and Mathews JJ; Black CJ and Madgwick J dissenting.[78](1997) 74 FCR 457 at 459, 467; 144 ALR 601 at 603, 610.[79]Appeals Act, s 23(1)(c). See (1997) 74 FCR 457 at 478; 144 ALR 601 at 621.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: HUGH J, HAYNE J

A third consideration which reinforces this conclusion is the context in which the rule appears. A court martial is not a court of law. Although it is obliged to dispense justice it has been held that it does not exercise the judicial power of the Commonwealth[130]. It is a body constituted, ordinarily, by lay people. The participation of a member with legal training would be wholly accidental. These features of courts martial are recognised by the detailed provisions made concerning their procedures both by the Discipline Act and by the Rules. This is a reason for requiring a high level of accuracy in the instruction of a court martial about any procedures laid down by the Parliament or by Rules made under Parliamentary authority. A court martial has large powers. The present case is an illustration. The imposition of a punishment (although in this case suspended) of military detention may deprive a citizen of liberty. Rules of procedure have been enacted, or made, both to reduce the risks of unreasonable, irregular or unsafe convictions of the accused and to enhance the confidence of serving officers and of the community more generally in the integrity of military justice. Whereas a greater measure of flexibility might be accorded to a judge exercising the judicial power of the Commonwealth in the ordering of procedures of the court (because by training and experience the judge could ordinarily be expected to protect the essential rights of the accused) the same may not necessarily follow in relation to a non-judicial administrative body with large powers to convict an accused person and to order that he or she be detained, fined and otherwise compulsorily dealt with.[130]Re Tracey; Ex parte Ryan (1989) 166 CLR 518 at 541, 579, 591, 603-604.Intended operation of the Appeals Act It is with these considerations in mind that I return to the intended operation of s 23(1)(c) of the Appeals Act. Reading that paragraph, without knowledge of judicial consideration of similar texts, it would be easy to perceive in the phrase "substantial miscarriage of justice" more than appears. Sheppard J may have done this when he indicated that "substantial" in the context meant a miscarriage which was "grave or serious"[131]. In other contexts, this is certainly what "substantial" may mean[132]. But the expression "substantial miscarriage of justice" is one commonly used in legislation providing for the ordering of retrials. In that context it is "a technical word, and includes [a] technical meaning"[133]. The expression, although an evaluative one, appears in legislation which assumes that the individual affected is entitled to have proceedings before a court martial conducted in accordance with the law. Because, as with a jury, a reviewing tribunal or an appellate court cannot know, or discover (without impermissible invasion of the privacy of the court martial's deliberations[134]) precisely how the members voted and in what order, it is mere speculation to cogitate upon the impact (if any) which the particular misdirection had in fact on the decision of this court martial. The Tribunal, and the majority of the Federal Court, thought it likely to have been insignificant, having regard to the considerable time spent in deliberation. But there is no way of knowing whether this was so.[131](1997) 74 FCR 457 at 479; 144 ALR 601 at 622.[132]TillmannsButcheries Pty Ltd v Australasian Meat Industry Employees' Union (1979) 27 ALR 367 at 382 per Deane J; Re Queensland Co-operative Milling Association Ltd (1976) 8 ALR 481 at 511.[133]Balenzuela v De Gail (1959) 101 CLR 226 at 233 applying Holford v Melbourne Tramway and Omnibus Co Ltd [1909] VLR 497 at 526 per Cussen J.[134]cf United States v Martinez 17 Military Justice Reporter 916 at 920-921 (1984).