Li v Chief of Army

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Li v Chief of Army [2013] FCAFC 20

Citation: Li v Chief of Army [2013] FCAFC 20
Appeal from: Li v Chief of Army (2012) 261 FLR 226
Parties: TING LI v CHIEF OF ARMY
File number: NSD 541 of 2012
Judges: KEANE CJ, DOWSETT, LOGAN, JAGOT & YATES JJ
Date of judgment: 26 February 2013
Catchwords: CRIMINAL LAW  – court martial – restricted court martial – creating a disturbance – whether intention to commit disturbance required – meaning of “disturbance” – whether alternative charges available other than under Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 (Cth) – Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), Sch, ss 3.2, 4, Division 5 – Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 (Cth), ss 3, 20, 26, 33(b).
DEFENCE AND WAR – court martial – restricted court martial – creating a disturbance – whether intention to commit disturbance required – meaning of “disturbance” –Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), Sch, ss 4.1, 5.2, 5.6 – Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 (Cth), ss 3, 20, 26, 33(b).
HUMAN RIGHTS – discrimination – racial discrimination – whether person has consequential right to confront and protest another person who has allegedly engaged in racial discrimination –Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth), s 18C.
Legislation:

Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) ss 13, 15AA
Court Martial and Defence Force Magistrate Rules (Cth) r 9(2)(b)
Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), ss 3, 4, 55 & Division 5
Defence Act 1903 (Cth) s 9A
Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 (Cth) ss 3, 20, 26, 33, 52, 56, 57, 60
Defence Force Discipline Appeals Act 1955 (Cth) ss 4.2, 5.2, 5.6, 23, 26, 52
Defence Legislation (Application of Criminal Code) Act 2001 (Cth)
Naval Defence Act 1910 (Cth)

Racial Discrimination Act 1995 (Cth), s 18C

Police Offences Act 1935 (Tas) ss 15, 15B
Summary Offences Act (NT) s 47
Vagrants, Gaming and Other Offences Act 1931 (Qld) s 7

Armed Forces Act 2006 (UK) s 21
Courts-Martial (Appeals) Act 1951
Naval Discipline Act 1661 s 22

Naval Discipline Act 1957

Criminal Code 1985 (Canada) ss 55, 175
Summary Offences Act 1981 (NZ) s 4

Cases cited:

Addison v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police [2004] 1 WLR 29 considered
Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue (Northern Territory) (2009) 239 CLR 27 cited
Brooker v The Police [2007] 3 NZLR 91 considered
Burdett v Abbot (1812) 4 Taunt 401 considered
Coco v The Queen (1994) 179 CLR 427 applied
Coleman v Power (2004) 220 CLR 1 considered
Groves v The Commonwealth (1982) 150 CLR 113 cited
Hembury v Chief of General Staff (1998) 193 CLR 641 applied
Johnson v Miller (1937) 59 CLR 467 cited
Jones v Chief of Navy (2012) 205 FCR 458 cited
KBT v The Queen (KBT) (1997) 191 CLR 417 distinguished
Kuru v New South Wales (2008) 236 CLR 1 considered
Li v Chief of Army (2012) 261 FLR 226 referred to
McLeod v United Kingdom (1998) 27 EHRR 493 considered
Neave v Ryan

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Details
Case
[2013] FCAFC 20
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Li v Chief of Army involved an appeal by the appellant, a former member of the Australian Defence Force, against a decision of the Defence Force Discipline Appeal Tribunal. The appellant was convicted of creating a disturbance under section 33 of the Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 (Cth) following an incident with his supervisor, Mr Snashall, on 3 February 2010. The Tribunal upheld the conviction, and the appellant now appeals to the court. The appeal focuses on the interpretation of the offence of creating a disturbance, the particularization of the prosecution case, and the directions given to the court martial regarding these matters. The appellant argues that the court martial panel should have been directed to consider whether Mr Snashall, rather than the appellant, created the disturbance, especially given the appellant's perception of a racial slur.

The court examined the legal issues concerning the interpretation of the term "disturbance" under the Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 (Cth), the requirement of intention to create a disturbance, and whether alternative charges were available under other legislation such as the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth). The court found that the appellant's actions constituted a disturbance as they involved violent or disorderly disputation and were likely to cause a response from anyone present. Furthermore, the court held that the appellant's intention to engage in the conduct, not necessarily to create a disturbance, was sufficient to satisfy the fault element of the offence. The court rejected the appellant's argument that Mr Snashall should be considered the primary creator of the disturbance, concluding that the appellant's actions in initiating and pursuing the confrontation with Mr Snashall led to the disturbance.

The court's reasoning led to the dismissal of the appeal. The appellant's conviction for creating a disturbance was upheld, and no alternative charges were found to be more appropriate. The court affirmed that the appellant, by his conduct and intention, fulfilled the elements of the offence as directed by the Judge Advocate. The final orders of the court were to dismiss the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The appellant now appeals to this Court under s 52(1) of the Appeals Act. An appeal to this Court is available only “on a question of law involved in a decision of the Tribunal in respect of an appeal [to the Tribunal] under” the Appeals Act. Before turning to discuss the questions of law said to be involved in the decision of the Tribunal, it is desirable first to summarise the evidence adduced at the court martial and the issues raised in the appeal to the Tribunal insofar as those issues remain relevant to the questions agitated in the appeal to this Court.THE EVIDENCE AT THE COURT MARTIAL The evidence given to the court martial of the circumstances of the incident of 3 February 2010 was summarised by the Tribunal at [14]-[29] of its Reasons. What follows reflects that summary. The appellant joined the ADF in 1995 as a sailor. After his discharge from the service, he studied law, joined the Army Reserve and, after qualifying as a lawyer, joined the Regular Army as a legal officer. At the time of this incident he was posted to Defence Legal in the office of the Director-General at the Campbell Park Offices, Campbell, in the Australian Capital Territory. Mr Andrew Snashall held the position of Director of Special Financial Claims in the ADF. At all relevant times, Mr Snashall was the supervisor of staff who were located on a floor above the appellant’s office. Mr Snashall first met the appellant when the appellant had sought to discuss a financial claim with Mr Snashall’s staff. Subsequently, in about July 2009, Mr Snashall encountered the appellant, his wife and infant child on a visit to the appellant’s workplace and allegedly made a remark: “I see you have been polluting the world with your genes”. The appellant thought this remark to be inappropriate and offensive, with a racial flavour, but said nothing. Nor did he make any complaint about Mr Snashall to the authorities. The events giving rise to the charge took place during the morning of 3 February 2010 on the fourth level of the Campbell Park offices and mostly in and about an office occupied by Mr Snashall in the Special Financial Claims Directorate. According to Mr Snashall, on various occasions through 2009, he observed the appellant talking to staff under Mr Snashall’s supervision. Mr Snashall considered some of the visits and their duration distracted his staff from their work. He spoke to the appellant on several occasions asking that the appellant cease these interruptions. In the afternoon of 2 February 2010, Mr Snashall saw the appellant talking to an employee who was attending to urgent duties. Mr Snashall asked the appellant to leave and then returned to his office. The appellant went into an empty nearby office to make a private telephone call. Mr Snashall came into the room, queried the appellant’s presence in his directorate and asked him to leave. Each man gave evidence that the other spoke and acted aggressively. The appellant gave evidence that, in the course of their subsequent conversation, Mr Snashall said words to the effect: “I meant everything I have said to you” over the past year. According to the appellant, this remark revived the comment made in July 2009 and indicated that it was meant offensively. According to the appellant, it was against this background that the appellant said that he returned to Mr Snashall’s office the following morning to seek an explanation for Mr Snashall’s attitude to him.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Finally, there is the appellant’s argument that, in all the circumstances, and particularly the circumstance that the appellant was actuated by a concern to receive an explanation from Mr Snashall for a racial slur which he perceived had been made, the panel should have been instructed to consider whether Mr Snashall, rather than the appellant, created the disturbance. This argument, too, must be rejected. On a strict view, the appellant could still be guilty of causing a disturbance even if Mr Snashall could also be said to have created the disturbance; but on any view of the evidence, it is clear beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant, by initiating and pursuing the confrontation with Mr Snashall, created the disturbance which occurred on 3 February 2010.CONCLUSION AND ORDERS The appellant’s contentions should be rejected. The appeal should be dismissed. On 8 April 2011, after a trial by restricted court martial, the appellant was convicted of the offence of creating a disturbance contrary to s 33 of the Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 (Cth) (the “DFDA”). No verdict was taken on an alternative charge of prejudicial conduct. The appellant appealed unsuccessfully to the Defence Force Discipline Appeal Tribunal (the “Tribunal”) and now appeals to this Court. Pursuant to s 52 of the Defence Force Discipline Appeals Act 1955 (Cth) (the “Appeals Act”), such an appeal must be “on a question of law involved in a decision of the Tribunal in respect of an appeal under this Act”. Section 33 of the DFDA provides:A person who is a defence member or a defence civilian is guilty of an offence if the person is on service land, in a service ship, service aircraft or service vehicle or in a public place and the person:(a)assaults another person; or(b)creates a disturbance or takes part in creating or continuing a disturbance; or(c)within the view or hearing of another person, engages in conduct that is obscene; or(d)uses insulting or provocative words to another person.Maximum punishment: Imprisonment for 6 months. The appellant was charged as follows: Although the appellant raises numerous other criticisms of the proceedings at first instance and in the Tribunal, I propose to address only:·the approach taken to the construction of s 33 of the DFDA;·the particularization of the prosecution case; and·the directions given as to these matters. In all other respects I agree with the approach taken by Keane CJ and Jagot and Yates JJ whose draft reasons I have read. Their Honours have set out the evidence and principal statutory provisions, making it unnecessary that I do so. I have also read the reasons prepared by Logan J.THE JUDGE ADVOCATE’S DIRECTIONS CONCERNING THE CHARGE Concerning the offence of creating a disturbance, the Judge Advocate said, in his directions, that it contained three physical elements and three fault elements. He continued:The first physical element is circumstance, that, at the time of the offence, the defendant was a defence member. For our own purposes, the fault is knowledge, but this particular element of the charge has been admitted.The second physical element is circumstance, the offence occurred on service land. For our purposes the relevant fault element is knowledge of the facts which make it service land, and I will be explaining, shortly, what I mean by that.The third physical element is conduct – that is, that the defendant engaged in conduct which created a disturbance, and the accompanying physical element is an intention, that is, he meant to engage in that conduct, not that he intended to create a disturbance, that he intended to engage in the conduct.Let me say a little more about those elements before I go on to the second charge. Intention: a person has intention with respect to conduct if he means to engage in that conduct. “Creating a disturbance” is not a term or phrase that is defined in the [DFDA]. I can say that creating a disturbance includes brawling and violent or disorderly disputation.Here, the prosecution case is that it involved violent or disorderly disputation. The conduct must be such as to be likely to cause a response from anyone present who saw or heard the incident; that response could be to intervene to stop the disturbance, or to report it, or to leave the area because of the unsettling effect of the disturbance. In other words, if you were working in an office and someone was playing loud music nearby, that might disturb you from your work but it wouldn’t be creating a disturbance within the meaning of the Act. There needs to be violent or disorderly disputation, as I say, and there needs to be conduct which must be such as to be likely to cause a response from anyone present who saw or heard the incident.You must also be satisfied of the fault element, which is intention. That does not mean the prosecution has to prove the defendant intended to create a disturbance. The prosecution has to prove the accused intended to engage in the acts that amounted to a disturbance, if you find the conduct amounted to a disturbance. To summarize, has the prosecution proved that the accused engaged in conduct that amounted to a disturbance? If yes, did he intend to engage in that conduct? As I said, the prosecution does not have to prove that the accused set out to create a disturbance; the prosecution has to prove that the conduct of the accused was such as to create a disturbance and he intended to engage in that conduct.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.