Criminal Law—Appeal—Verdict—Whether unsafe or unsatisfactory—Role of appellate court—Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (N.S.W), s. 6(1)*. *Section 6(1) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (N.S.W.) required the Court of Criminal Appeal to allow an appeal against conviction if it was "of opinion that the verdict of the jury should be set aside on the ground that it is unreasonable, or cannot be supported, having regard to the evidence, or that the judgment of the court of trial should be set aside on the ground of the wrong decision of any question of law, or that on any other ground whatsoever there was a miscarriage of justice".
Headnote
Held by Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ, (1) that where, notwithstanding that there is evidence to sustain a verdict of guilty, a court of criminal appeal is asked to conclude that the verdict is unsafe or unsatisfactory, the court must ask whether it thinks that upon the whole of the evidence it was open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was guilty. In answering that question the court must pay full regard to the fact that the jury is the body entrusted with the primary responsibility of determining guilt or innocence and the fact that the jury has had the benefit of having seen and heard the witnesses.
(2) That in most cases a doubt experienced by an appellate court as to the guilt of the accused will be one which a jury ought also to have experienced. It is only where a jury's advantage in seeing and hearing the evidence is capable of resolving a doubt experienced by an appellate court that it may conclude that no miscarriage of justice occurred. That is to say, when the evidence lacks credibility for reasons which are not explained by the manner in which it was given, a reasonable doubt experienced by the court is a doubt which a reasonable jury ought to have experienced. If the evidence contains discrepancies, displays inadequacies, is tainted or otherwise lacks probative force in such a way as to lead the appellate court to conclude that, even making full allowance for the advantages enjoyed by the jury, there is a significant possibility that an innocent person has been convicted, it is bound to act and to set aside the verdict.
Chamberlain v. The Queen (No. 2) (1984), 153 CLR, at pp. 618619, and Chidiac v. The…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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Details
AGLC
M v the Queen [1994] HCA 63
Case
[1994] HCA 63
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court of Australia considered an appeal by M against the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal of New South Wales. The central dispute concerned whether the verdict of the jury in M's trial was unsafe or unsatisfactory, and consequently, whether the Court of Criminal Appeal had erred in upholding that verdict.
The High Court was required to determine the proper role of an appellate court when reviewing a jury's verdict under section 6(1) of the *Criminal Appeal Act 1912* (N.S.W.). Specifically, the Court had to consider the circumstances under which an appellate court should set aside a jury's verdict on the grounds that it was unreasonable, unsupported by the evidence, or that a miscarriage of justice had occurred.
The High Court held that the Court of Criminal Appeal had failed to properly exercise its powers under section 6(1). The Court emphasised that an appellate court is not merely to review the evidence to see if it could support the verdict, but rather to determine if the verdict is, in all the circumstances, unsafe or unsatisfactory. Applying this principle, the High Court concluded that the verdict against M was indeed unsafe and unsatisfactory, leading to a miscarriage of justice. Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal, quashed M's convictions, and entered verdicts of acquittal.
Orders
Orders of the court
Appeal allowed.
Set aside the order of the Court of Criminal Appeal of New South Wales and in lieu thereof order that the appeal to that Court against convictions be allowed and that the appellant's convictions be quashed and verdicts of acquittal entered.