Criminal Law—Evidence—Mental incapacity of witness—Important Crown witness with mental disability—Warning to jury.
Decisions
GIBBS C.J.: The applicants, Karpany and Bromley, were convicted on a charge that on or about 4 April 1984 at Adelaide they murdered one Stephen Docoza. Their appeals to the Court of Criminal Appeal of South Australia were dismissed and they now seek special leave to appeal to this Court.
2. The Crown case was that the two applicants, accompanied by one Gary Carter, went with Docoza to a place on the bank of the River Torrens near to the Morphett Street bridge and there attacked Docoza when he refused the suggestion of Bromley that he should have sex with him. The dead body of Docoza, naked from the waist down, was found on 9 April 1984 floating in the Torrens and there was medical evidence that supported the view that Docoza was unconscious at the time when he drowned. The effect of the evidence of Carter was sufficiently stated as follows in the judgment of King C.J. in the Court of Criminal Appeal:
"Carter said that Bromley demanded sex from Docoza and was refused. He said that Bromley and Karpany both then set about kicking and punching Docoza and that he rolled into the river. Carter said that Bromley was ducking Docoza's head under the water while Karpany was standing there. Bromley struck Docoza with a barbell, which Carter had been carrying in a bag. According to Carter, the two appellants stripped Docoza naked. Carter said that he had attempted to give some assistance to Docoza and was frightened. He departed leaving the three men together on the bank of the river. Docoza was still then conscious and asking to be left alone. After obtaining a drink of water at a pie cart nearby, Carter went on to the Morphett Street bridge. After a time he saw the two appellants come up from the river area and on to the bridge. They spoke to him but at about that time a police car came along. The two appellants separated and ran in opposite directions. Bromley hid, but the police found him and spoke to him."
It appeared in evidence that Carter was a schizophrenic and that on the night in question, at a time after the alleged murder, he had an episode of that illness and was admitted to a mental hospital. There was independent evidence that supported the evidence of Carter that he was present on the river bank at the time when Docoza was attacked; however, the only such evidence that confirms his evidence that the applicants were also present on that occasion is that to which I am about to refer. It is quite clear that the evidence of Carter as to the manner in which Docoza was attacked was inaccurate in some matters of detail.
3. Bromley…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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Details
AGLC
Bromley v The Queen [1986] HCA 49
Case
[1986] HCA 49
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court of Australia considered an appeal by the applicant, Bromley, against his conviction for murder. The dispute centred on the admissibility of certain evidence obtained during the investigation of the offence.
The primary legal issue before the Court was whether the trial judge had erred in admitting evidence that had been obtained in contravention of the applicant's rights. Specifically, the Court had to determine whether the evidence was rendered inadmissible by reason of the breach of the applicant's right to remain silent and his right to communicate with a lawyer.
The Court reasoned that while the evidence was obtained in circumstances where the applicant's rights were infringed, the trial judge had correctly applied the principles governing the admissibility of such evidence. The Court affirmed that the admissibility of evidence obtained in contravention of a suspect's rights is a matter for the trial judge's discretion, to be exercised by balancing the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect. In this instance, the trial judge had properly considered this balance and concluded that the evidence was admissible.