R v BADCOCK

Case [2018] SASCFC 70

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Court of Criminal Appeal)

R v BADCOCK

[2018] SASCFC 70

Judgment of The Court of Criminal Appeal

(The Honourable Justice Vanstone, The Honourable Justice Parker and The Honourable Justice Doyle)

25 June 2018

CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - VERDICT UNREASONABLE OR INSUPPORTABLE HAVING REGARD TO EVIDENCE

CRIMINAL LAW - EVIDENCE - GENERALLY

Appeal against conviction.

Following a trial by jury, the appellant, together with two co-accused, was convicted of murder. At trial, the appellant did not admit his presence at the two locations where the assault of the victim took place nor any participation in the offending.

The case against each of the three accused at trial relied substantially on evidence given by two witnesses, C and R. The evidence of the two witnesses directly implicated the appellant as having been present at the two premises and involved in the assault of the victim. Both witnesses had been provided with immunity from prosecution in exchange for their truthful evidence and were treated by the trial judge as accomplices. The witnesses’ evidence as to the appellant’s presence and participation was not corroborated by any independent evidence.

The appellant relies upon the sole ground of appeal that the guilty verdict of the jury is unreasonable and cannot be supported having regard to the evidence. The appellant in particular identifies various features of the evidence of the two witnesses that he contends undermined the credibility and reliability of their evidence to the extent that a reasonable jury must have entertained doubt as to his guilt.

Held per Doyle J (Vanstone and Parker JJ agreeing), dismissing the appeal:

1.      The matters raised by the appellant as relevant to the credibility and reliability of the two witnesses’ evidence are neither individually nor cumulatively sufficient to render the verdict unreasonable or unable to be supported having regard to the evidence.

2.      The jury were entitled to accept the evidence of the two witnesses as credible and reliable as to the presence and participation of the appellant in the assault of the victim.

3.      In the context of the evidence as a whole, the evidence of the two witnesses was sufficient to entitle a reasonable jury to be satisfied of the appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

M v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 487, applied.
Jenkins v The Queen (2004) 79 ALJR 252; Kanaan v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 109, considered.

R v BADCOCK
[2018] SASCFC 70

Court of Criminal Appeal:       Vanstone, Parker and Doyle JJ

  1. VANSTONE:        I would dismiss the appeal for the reasons given by Doyle J.

  2. PARKER J:         I would dismiss the appeal.  I agree with the reasons of Doyle J.

  3. DOYLE J:            Following a trial by jury, the appellant, together with Kym Barnes and Shane Muckray, was convicted of the murder of Jayson Doelz. 

  4. The prosecution case against the appellant was that he was present and participated in a serious and sustained assault of Mr Doelz on 9 January 2012.  The assault…

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AGLC
R v Badcock [2018] SASCFC 70
Case
[2018] SASCFC 70
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal concerned a criminal conviction where the appellant, R v Badcock, argued that the verdict was unreasonable or insupportable having regard to the evidence. The primary witnesses for the prosecution were accomplices, C and R, whose evidence was not independently corroborated. The dispute centred on the appellant's presence and involvement in an assault. The appeal was heard by Vanstone, Parker and Doyle JJ.

The legal issues before the court were whether the jury was entitled to accept the evidence of the accomplices, C and R, as credible and reliable, and whether their evidence, when considered in conjunction with other evidence presented at trial, was sufficient to satisfy the jury beyond reasonable doubt of the appellant's presence and participation in the assault with the requisite intention or foresight. The court also considered the cumulative effect of any alleged inconsistencies or unreliability in the accomplices' testimony.

The court reasoned that while C and R were accomplices and their evidence lacked independent corroboration, the jury was entitled to accept their versions of events. This entitlement was based on several factors: the broad consistency between their accounts where their narratives overlapped, the support for the nature and timing of the assault provided by the forensic pathologist's evidence, the corroboration of R's account of events at the roadside from two motorists, and the support for the presence of the accused and R from another witness. The court noted that the jury had the advantage of observing and hearing C and R give evidence, and assessing their testimony within the context of the entire trial. The jury was entitled to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the appellant's presence and participation, even if they entertained doubts about certain details or aspects of C's evidence, or if they found R's evidence alone sufficient.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Given the issues raised on appeal, it is appropriate to summarise the key evidence in the prosecution case, being the evidence of C, R, the two motorists, U, M and Dr Langlois (forensic pathologist).Evidence of C C’s evidence was that she was a long-time user of methamphetamine, and that she was involved in the sale of the drug. She agreed that she was a user of methamphetamine in January 2012, and that she would have used it on 9 January 2012, albeit she could not recall the specific circumstances of her use on that day. She remained a user of methamphetamine at the date of the trial, having used as recently as five days prior to giving her evidence. She said that her mother, M, was also a user and dealer. In December 2011, C moved into a rental premises at Royal Avenue, Pooraka. From New Year’s 2011 and continuing through January 2012 until some time after the events in question, the appellant was staying at the Pooraka premises.[1] [1] In March 2012, during an unrelated investigation, police found an overnight bag containing male clothing, some jewellery and identification in the appellant’s name. C’s evidence was that this clothing belonged to the appellant and that he was still staying at her house in March 2012. C gave evidence that about a week prior to 9 January 2012, Mr Doelz visited the Pooraka premises. Also present on this earlier occasion were the appellant, Mark Hocking, Ronnie Heggarty and possibly Mr Barnes and his girlfriend Terrilee Jordan. On this earlier occasion, Mr Doelz was looking to buy methamphetamine from C. He had with him five or six pairs of sunglasses that he wanted to either sell for cash or swap for drugs. C was not interested in the sunglasses, but agreed to extend credit to Mr Doelz and supplied him with two points of methamphetamine. She did so with an expectation she would be repaid at some unspecified future time. The drugs were worth about $200. While Mr Doelz was still at the premises, C feel asleep on the couch. She awoke to the sound of the appellant pacing around in her lounge room, and acting aggressively. He was holding a hammer and saying various things about Mr Doelz, including that Mr Doelz had been going through her things and was a “thieving cunt” and a “shit”. Mr Doelz assured C that he had just been looking for a missing pair of sunglasses. C told Mr Doelz not to worry about it, that he should leave, and that she would put the sunglasses aside if she found them. Mr Doelz then left. The next time C saw Mr Doelz was 9 January 2012. The appellant and Mr Barnes were at the Pooraka premises drinking together, and Ms Jordan was also there. C was in her bedroom, but overheard the two men discussing Mr Doelz and the incident the week before in relation to the sunglasses. They were saying that they should “get him around” and “bash him, get him for it, coming into our female friend’s home and going through her shit”. They used words to describe Mr Doelz which included “thieving cunt, black dog and scumbag”. C at one point called out from her bedroom that they should “shut up … and let it go”.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In this respect, and by way of contrast with the evidence of C, it was significant that R’s evidence was not entirely self-serving. While not attributing himself with a significant role at the Pooraka premises, and maintaining that he did not leave the car at the roadside location, R not only accepted his presence and general involvement, but also accepted, for example, that it was his idea to bleach the clothing and that he was responsible for disposing of that clothing and the liner from the boot of his car.Conclusion For the reasons given, I do not accept that any of the matters raised by the appellant were of a nature or significance that required the jury to entertain doubt as to the evidence of C or R in relation to the appellant’s presence and involvement. They are not of a nature or significance that causes me to experience a doubt about these matters, particularly a doubt that was not capable of being resolved by the jury’s advantage of having seen and heard C and R give evidence, and having seen and heard that evidence in the context of the evidence at trial as a whole. In my view, that is so not only when these matters are considered individually, but also when their cumulative effect is considered. In reaching this view, I have borne in mind their status as accomplices whose evidence was not corroborated by any independent evidence, and hence the danger inherent in relying upon their evidence to convict. However, the jury were entitled to have regard to the broad consistency between their respective versions of events (insofar as they overlapped); the support gained for their accounts of the nature and timing of the two-staged assault of Mr Doelz from the evidence of Dr Langlois; the support for R’s description of the events that occurred by the side of the road in Kersbrook from the evidence of the two passing motorists (and in particular Mr Collins); and the support for the presence of the three accused together with R on the evening of 9 January 2012 (and R’s evidence that he stayed in the car) from the evidence of U. Having considered the evidence of each of C and R in this broader context, the members of the jury were entitled to accept their versions of events as credible and reliable as to the presence and participation of the appellant. They were entitled to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of this evidence, together with the other evidence in the case, that the appellant was present and participated with the requisite intention or foresight. It was not necessary for the jury to have accepted every aspect of C’s evidence to have been satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the appellant’s presence and participation in the assault with the requisite intention or foresight. The jury were entitled to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of these matters while at the same time having doubts about whether C had to some extent downplayed her role, or was otherwise unreliable as to some matters of detail, for instance, arising out of the inconsistencies between the evidence of C and R. Indeed, the jury might well have been satisfied of the appellant’s presence and participation with the requisite intention or foresight based exclusively upon the evidence of R.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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