The King v Ryan Churchill (a pseudonym) - [2025] HCA 11

HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
GAGELER CJ,
GORDON, GLEESON, JAGOT AND BEECH‑JONES JJ
THE KING APPELLANT
AND
RYAN CHURCHILL (A PSEUDONYM) RESPONDENT
The King v Ryan Churchill (a pseudonym)
[2025] HCA 11
Date of Hearing: 14 February 2025
Date of Judgment: 2 April 2025
M94/2024
ORDER
1.Appeal allowed.
2.Set aside the orders made by the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria on 28 June 2024 and, in their place, order that the respondent's appeal to the Court of Appeal be dismissed.

On appeal from the Supreme Court of Victoria
Representation
B F Kissane KC with S C Clancy for the appellant (instructed by Office of Public Prosecutions (Vic))
B W Walker SC with R B Shann SC and H L Canham for the respondent (instructed by Doogue + George Defence Lawyers)
Notice: This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

GAGELER CJ, GORDON, GLEESON, JAGOT AND BEECH-JONES JJ. The issue of principle raised by this appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria (Beach, Taylor and Orr JJA)[1] is whether, in a trial of a sexual offence governed by the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic) and the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic), where evidence that the complainant was distressed at the time of making a pre-trial complaint was relied upon by the prosecution to support the complainant's version of events, there are "substantial and compelling reasons"[2] for the trial judge to warn the jury that: (1) before the evidence of distress could be used for that purpose the jury had to be satisfied that there was a causal link between the distress and the alleged offending; and (2) such evidence generally carries little weight. As will be explained, there are no such reasons and a trial judge is not required to give such directions.
[1]Ryan Churchill (a pseudonym) v The King [2024] VSCA 151.
[2]See s 16 of the Jury Directions Act.
The Court of Appeal was wrong to hold that such directions were required to be given by the trial judge to the jury in the trial of the respondent in the County Court of Victoria in which he was found guilty of two offences of incest contrary to s 44(2) of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) and, accordingly, was wrong to hold that the absence of such directions occasioned a substantial miscarriage of justice warranting the setting aside of his convictions for those offences under s 276 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic).
In a trial of a sexual offence in Victoria, evidence that a complainant was distressed at the time of making a pre-trial complaint is ordinarily relevant and admissible. It is relevant within the meaning of s 55 of the Evidence Act on either or both of two bases: as evidence that, if accepted, could, first, enhance the credit of the complainant if the jury were to find a…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

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Details

Case: [2025] HCA 11
Decision Date: 2 April 2025

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an appeal by the prosecution against a decision of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria. The dispute concerned the adequacy of directions given by a trial judge to a jury regarding evidence of a complainant's pre-trial distress when making a complaint of sexual offences against the respondent. The Court of Appeal had quashed the respondent's convictions and ordered a retrial, finding that the trial judge's directions on this evidence gave rise to a substantial miscarriage of justice.

The central legal issues before the High Court were whether the trial judge's directions concerning the use of the complainant's distress evidence were lawful and regular, and whether they occasioned a miscarriage of justice. Specifically, the court had to determine if there were substantial and compelling reasons for the trial judge to have warned the jury about the necessity of finding a causal link between the complainant's distress and the alleged offending, and whether a warning about the general weight of distress evidence was required. The respondent, by way of a notice of contention, argued that the Court of Appeal's decision should be affirmed on the basis that the trial judge was obliged to instruct the jury on the need to establish a causal link between the distress and the offending.

The High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the orders of the Court of Appeal and dismissing the respondent's appeal to that court. The High Court reasoned that the trial judge's directions, when read as a whole, were not erroneous. The trial judge had instructed the jury that evidence of the complaint could be used as evidence of the fact that the conduct complained of had occurred and as evidence relevant to the complainant's credibility, while also cautioning the jury that it would be a mistake to treat the complaint as independent of the complainant and warning of the need for caution when considering the complainant's evidence. The Court of Appeal's reliance on its previous decisions, which formulated a general proposition requiring specific directions on a rational causal link and the limited weight of distress evidence, was found to be misapplied in this instance. The High Court concluded that the trial judge's directions did not give rise to a substantial miscarriage of justice.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal allowed.

2. Set aside the orders made by the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria on 28 June 2024 and, in their place, order that the respondent's appeal to the Court of Appeal be dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

GAGELER CJ, GORDON, GLEESON, JAGOT AND BEECH-JONES JJ

Turning, later in his directions to the jury, to the complainant's mother's evidence of the complainant's complaint that she had been raped by the respondent, the trial judge instructed the jury that this evidence of complaint could be used in two ways: first as evidence of the fact that the conduct complained of had occurred; second as evidence relevant to the credibility of the complainant. The trial judge nevertheless emphasised that it would be "a mistake" for the jury to treat the complainant's mother's evidence of the complainant's statement that she had been raped by the respondent as "independent of the complainant". The trial judge separately warned the jury of the need for "caution" when considering the evidence of the complainant.The decision of the Court of Appeal The Court of Appeal granted the respondent leave to appeal and allowed the appeal on a single ground, to the effect that the trial judge's directions in relation to the use the jury could make of the evidence of the distress of the complainant at the Children's Court when making the complaint to her mother gave rise to a substantial miscarriage of justice. In consequence, it quashed the convictions and ordered a retrial. In so doing, the Court of Appeal drew on its decision in Paull v The Queen,[9] delivered before the trial, together with its decisions in Seccull v The King[10] and Nimely (a pseudonym) v The King,[11] delivered after the trial, to observe that "[o]n any view, the causal link between the [respondent's] alleged offending and the distress exhibited by the complainant at the Children's Court was a weak one". The Court of Appeal formulated and applied to the case before it the following general proposition:[12] "if a distress direction of the kind given by the [trial] judge was to be given ... [i]t required the trial judge to direct the jury specifically about the need for the jury to be satisfied that there was a rational causal link between the distress and the alleged offending; and also to warn the jury of the fact that distress evidence generally carries little weight". [9][2021] VSCA 339.[10](2022) 69 VR 454.[11][2023] VSCA 20.[12][2024] VSCA 151 at [52].The appeal to this Court Having been granted special leave to appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeal, the prosecution argued pursuant to its notice of appeal in this Court that the directions given by the trial judge were lawful and regular, and occasioned no miscarriage of justice. Pursuant to his amended notice of contention in this Court, and consistently with Paull, Seccull and Nimely, the respondent argued that the decision of the Court of Appeal should be affirmed on the ground that the trial judge was obliged to instruct the jury that it needed to be satisfied that the complainant's distress was caused by the respondent's offending, and not by some other cause, in order to use evidence of the complainant's distress when making the complaint to her mother as indirect evidence of the respondent's offending. Consideration of that argument is bound up with consideration of the argument on the ground of appeal and need not be separately addressed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: GAGELER CJ, GORDON, GLEESON, JAGOT AND BEECH-JONES JJ

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