Director of Public Prosecutions v Roder (a pseudonym)

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SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA
COURT OF APPEAL

S EAPCR 2023 0153

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS Applicant
v
BENJAMIN RODER (a pseudonym)[1] Respondent

[1]To avoid the possibility of prejudice in the respondent’s trial, this judgment has been anonymised by the adoption of a pseudonym in place of the name of the respondent.

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JUDGES: PRIEST, NIALL and TAYLOR JJA
WHERE HELD: Melbourne
DATE OF HEARING: 17 October 2023
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 31 October 2023
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: [2023] VSCA 262
JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM: DPP v [Roder] (Unreported, County Court of Victoria, 12 September 2023, Judge McInerney)

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CRIMINAL LAW – Interlocutory appeal – Sexual offences – Tendency evidence consisting of both charged and uncharged acts – Standard of proof – Whether jury to be directed that charged acts must be proved beyond reasonable doubt – R v Bauer (2018) 266 CLR 56; Dempsey (a pseudonym) v The Queen [2019] VSCA 224; Jury Directions Act 2015, ss 61, 62 considered – Leave to appeal refused.

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Counsel

Applicant Ms S Clancy
Respondent Mr CK Wareham

Solicitors

Applicant Ms A Hogan, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions
Respondent Dribbin & Brown Criminal Lawyers

PRIEST JA
NIALL JA
TAYLOR JA:

  1. The respondent faces trial in the County Court on an indictment charging him with 27 sexual offences against two brothers, ‘MW’ and ‘EW’, between 1999 and 2011.[2]  In the relevant period, MW and EW were the respondent’s step-children, he being in a domestic relationship with their mother.

    [2]The charges involve incest (14 charges — charges 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 15, 16, 19, 21, 22 and 24); committing an indecent act with or in the presence of a child under 16 (eight charges — charges 1, 3, 4, 12, 14, 17, 18, and 20); committing an indecent act with a 16 or 17 year old child (one charge — charge 11); committing an indecent act with a 16 year old child (two charges – 23 and 25); and indecent assault (two charges — 26 and 27).  Charges 1 to 11 relate to EW in a period between 1999 and 2011; and charges 12 to 27 relate to MW in a period between 2001 and 2009.

  2. Pursuant to a notice given under s 97(1)(a) of the Evidence Act 2008, dated 12 September 2023 (‘the notice’), the prosecution seeks to rely on the respondent’s tendency to:

    2.1     Have a particular state of mind, namely;

    (a)To have an improper sexual interest in his step-children [EW] and [MW], and a willingness to act on that sexual interest by engaging in sexual activity with them.

    2.2     Act in a particular way, namely; 

    (a)A tendency to use his position of trust, physical proximity to and relationship with, his step-children to engage in sexual activity with each of them;

    (b)A tendency to take advantage of occasions when he was alone with the complainants to engage in sexual activity with them; 

    (c)A tendency to engage in sexual activity with each of the complainants when others were nearby…

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Details
Case
[2023] VSCA 262
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Director of Public Prosecutions v Roder concerns an interlocutory appeal regarding sexual offences and the admissibility of tendency evidence. The defendant, Roder, was charged with various sexual offences. The prosecution sought to introduce both charged and uncharged acts as tendency evidence, aiming to establish a pattern of behaviour. The legal issues at the heart of the case revolve around the standard of proof applicable to such evidence and whether the jury should be directed that the charged acts must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, as per the principles established in R v Bauer (2018) 266 CLR 56 and Dempsey (a pseudonym) v The Queen [2019] VSCA 224. These issues are particularly relevant given the introduction of s 161A of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW), which was enacted in response to Bauer and seeks to clarify the direction to be given to juries in relation to tendency evidence.

The court was tasked with interpreting s 161A, which was introduced to address the confusion caused by Bauer regarding the standard of proof for tendency evidence. The court examined the legislative history and purpose of s 161A, ultimately determining that unless there is a significant possibility that the jury will rely on the tendency evidence as essential to its reasoning in reaching a finding of guilt, the jury must not be directed that such evidence needs to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. However, if evidence is adduced as both tendency evidence and to prove an element of the charge, the jury may be directed that the evidence needs to be proved beyond reasonable doubt, but only to the extent that it is adduced as proof of the element of the charge. The court found that the trial judge should have provided clear directions to the jury to avoid any potential prejudice from the tendency evidence, particularly given the single complainant and the inclusion of acts forming the basis of the charges.

The appeal was dismissed, and the matter was remitted to the trial court for further consideration of the directions to be given to the jury. The court emphasised the need for trial judges to formulate careful and precise directions in cases involving tendency evidence to ensure the proper use of such evidence and to mitigate the risk of prejudice. The case underscores the importance of clear judicial directions in criminal trials, particularly in cases involving sensitive and potentially prejudicial evidence.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In the wake of Bauer, s 161A was introduced into the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW).[18] It provides:[18]See Stronger Communities Legislation Amendment (Miscellaneous) Act 2020, sch 1, 1.8 [8]. The provision was introduced on 1 March 2021.161A Direction not to be given regarding tendency or coincidence evidence (1) A jury must not be directed that evidence needs to be proved beyond reasonable doubt to the extent that it is adduced as tendency evidence or coincidence evidence. (2) If evidence is adduced as both tendency evidence or coincidence evidence and as proof of an element or essential fact of a charge before the jury, the jury may be directed that the evidence needs to be proved beyond reasonable doubt, but only to the extent that it is adduced as proof of the element or essential fact. (3) Subsection (1) does not apply if a court is satisfied— (a) there is a significant possibility that a jury will rely on an act or omission as being essential to its reasoning in reaching a finding of guilt, and (b) evidence of the act or omission has been adduced as tendency evidence or coincidence evidence. It will be noticed at the outset that s 161A is expressed in different terms to s 61 of the JDA,[19] which, to risk repetition, provides that the ‘only matters that the trial judge may direct the jury must be proved beyond reasonable doubt are … the elements of the offence charged’. The effect of s 161A is that, unless there is a significant possibility that the jury will rely on an act (or omission) introduced as tendency (or coincidence) evidence as being essential to its reasoning in reaching a finding of guilt, to the extent that the evidence is adduced as tendency (or coincidence) evidence the jury must not be directed that evidence needs to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. If evidence is adduced as both tendency (or coincidence) evidence and to prove an element of a charge, the jury may be directed that the evidence needs to be proved beyond reasonable doubt, but only to the extent that it is adduced as proof of the element of the charge.[19]Cf JS v R [2022] NSWCCA 145, [45]–[46] (Basten JA, Hamill and Dhanji JJ agreeing) (‘JS’). Since its introduction, s 161A has been considered by the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal in a number of cases.[20] In the most recent of those, Rassi, the appellant was convicted of four counts of sexual offending against a step-child sometime between 1995 and 1998. The prosecution relied on both charged acts and uncharged acts as tendency evidence. Hamill J, with whom Beech-Jones CJ at CL (‘subject to … six matters’) and Button J agreed, observed that in cases where the prosecution relies on tendency evidence, trial judges must formulate careful directions fashioned to address the particular circumstances of the case.[21] Such directions must guard against the improper use of tendency evidence and the potential for prejudice which is inherent in such evidence.[22] The fact that there was a single complainant, and that the acts relied upon to prove the asserted tendency included those forming the basis of the counts in the indictment, made it particularly important for the directions to be clear and precise.[23][20]JS; Kanbut v R [2022] NSWCCA 259 (Beech-Jones CJ at CL, Adamson and Campbell JJ); Gardiner v R [2023] NSWCCA 89 (Adamson JA, Button and McNaughton JJ); and Rassi v R [2023] NSWCCA 119 (Beech-Jones CJ at CL, Button and Hamill JJ) (‘Rassi’).[21]Rassi, [73].[22]Ibid [74].[23]Ibid [77].

Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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