| SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA COURT OF APPEAL |
| S EAPCR 2023 0153 |
| DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS | Applicant |
| v | |
| BENJAMIN RODER (a pseudonym)[1] | Respondent |
[1]To avoid the possibility of prejudice in the respondent’s trial, this judgment has been anonymised by the adoption of a pseudonym in place of the name of the respondent.
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| JUDGES: | PRIEST, NIALL and TAYLOR JJA |
| WHERE HELD: | Melbourne |
| DATE OF HEARING: | 17 October 2023 |
| DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 31 October 2023 |
| MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2023] VSCA 262 |
| JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM: | DPP v [Roder] (Unreported, County Court of Victoria, 12 September 2023, Judge McInerney) |
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CRIMINAL LAW – Interlocutory appeal – Sexual offences – Tendency evidence consisting of both charged and uncharged acts – Standard of proof – Whether jury to be directed that charged acts must be proved beyond reasonable doubt – R v Bauer (2018) 266 CLR 56; Dempsey (a pseudonym) v The Queen [2019] VSCA 224; Jury Directions Act 2015, ss 61, 62 considered – Leave to appeal refused.
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| Counsel | ||
| Applicant | Ms S Clancy | |
| Respondent | Mr CK Wareham | |
| Solicitors | ||
| Applicant | Ms A Hogan, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions | |
| Respondent | Dribbin & Brown Criminal Lawyers | |
PRIEST JA
NIALL JA
TAYLOR JA:
The respondent faces trial in the County Court on an indictment charging him with 27 sexual offences against two brothers, ‘MW’ and ‘EW’, between 1999 and 2011.[2] In the relevant period, MW and EW were the respondent’s step-children, he being in a domestic relationship with their mother.
[2]The charges involve incest (14 charges — charges 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 15, 16, 19, 21, 22 and 24); committing an indecent act with or in the presence of a child under 16 (eight charges — charges 1, 3, 4, 12, 14, 17, 18, and 20); committing an indecent act with a 16 or 17 year old child (one charge — charge 11); committing an indecent act with a 16 year old child (two charges – 23 and 25); and indecent assault (two charges — 26 and 27). Charges 1 to 11 relate to EW in a period between 1999 and 2011; and charges 12 to 27 relate to MW in a period between 2001 and 2009.
Pursuant to a notice given under s 97(1)(a) of the Evidence Act 2008, dated 12 September 2023 (‘the notice’), the prosecution seeks to rely on the respondent’s tendency to:
2.1 Have a particular state of mind, namely;
(a)To have an improper sexual interest in his step-children [EW] and [MW], and a willingness to act on that sexual interest by engaging in sexual activity with them.
2.2 Act in a particular way, namely;
(a)A tendency to use his position of trust, physical proximity to and relationship with, his step-children to engage in sexual activity with each of them;
(b)A tendency to take advantage of occasions when he was alone with the complainants to engage in sexual activity with them;
(c)A tendency to engage in sexual activity with each of the complainants when others were nearby…
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- Case
- [2023] VSCA 262
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was tasked with interpreting s 161A, which was introduced to address the confusion caused by Bauer regarding the standard of proof for tendency evidence. The court examined the legislative history and purpose of s 161A, ultimately determining that unless there is a significant possibility that the jury will rely on the tendency evidence as essential to its reasoning in reaching a finding of guilt, the jury must not be directed that such evidence needs to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. However, if evidence is adduced as both tendency evidence and to prove an element of the charge, the jury may be directed that the evidence needs to be proved beyond reasonable doubt, but only to the extent that it is adduced as proof of the element of the charge. The court found that the trial judge should have provided clear directions to the jury to avoid any potential prejudice from the tendency evidence, particularly given the single complainant and the inclusion of acts forming the basis of the charges.
The appeal was dismissed, and the matter was remitted to the trial court for further consideration of the directions to be given to the jury. The court emphasised the need for trial judges to formulate careful and precise directions in cases involving tendency evidence to ensure the proper use of such evidence and to mitigate the risk of prejudice. The case underscores the importance of clear judicial directions in criminal trials, particularly in cases involving sensitive and potentially prejudicial evidence.
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