VEC v The State of Western Australia

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT  :   THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)

CITATION:   VEC -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2025] WASCA 89

CORAM:   MAZZA JA

MITCHELL JA

ARCHER JA

HEARD:   24 APRIL 2025

FURTHER SUBMISSIONS FILED 2 & 7 MAY 2025

DELIVERED          :   23 JUNE 2025

FILE NO/S:   CACR 48 of 2024

BETWEEN:   VEC

Appellant

AND

THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction              :   DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram:   SHEPHERD DCJ

File Number            :   IND 232 of 2022


Catchwords:

Evidence - Propensity evidence - Whether evidence admissible under s 31A of the Evidence Act 1906 (WA) - Whether evidence revealing the appellant's tendency to behave in an abusive manner towards a daughter is significantly probative of whether the appellant committed offences of violence and cruelty against that daughter - Risk of impermissible reasoning - Thorough and clear directions by trial judge - Whether fair‑minded people would think that the public interest in adducing all relevant evidence of guilt must have priority over the risk of an unfair trial

Legislation:

Evidence Act 1906 (WA), s 31A

Result:

Leave to appeal refused
Application for extension of time within which to appeal dismissed
Appeal dismissed

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant : S A Auburn
Respondent : K C Cook

Solicitors:

Appellant : Sharon Auburn Lawyers
Respondent : Director of Public Prosecutions (WA)

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

Chuguna v The State of Western Australia [2024] WASCA 134

Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Roder (a pseudonym) [2024] HCA 15; (2024) 98 ALJR 644

Gilbert v The Queen [2000] HCA 15; (2000) 201 CLR 414

GNW v The State of Western Australia [2024] WASCA 164

HTN v The State of Western Australia [No 2] [2022] WASCA 51; (2022) 298 A Crim R 337

Hughes v The Queen [2017] HCA 20; (2017) 263 CLR 338

KHA v The State of Western Australia [2022] WASCA 173; (2022) 305 A Crim R 265

Le-Ta v The State of Western Australia [2020] WASCA 14

LNN v The State of Western Australia [2021] WASCA 39

Rictor v The State of Western Australia [2025] WASCA 39

RMD v The State of Western Australia [2017] WASCA 70; (2017) 266 A Crim R 67

The State of Western Australia v Jackson [2019] WASCA 118; (2019) 55 WAR 285

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT:

Overview

  1. The appellant was convicted after trial of nine offences against her two daughters, who were both children at the time of the offending.  Although the offences were varied, each offence could be broadly characterised as an act of violence or cruelty.  The appellant was acquitted of further offences against her daughters and two other child complainants.

  2. During the trial, the prosecution was permitted to lead evidence of other acts of violence and cruelty by the appellant against the children that were not the subject of charges. The learned trial judge had ruled that this evidence was admissible as 'context evidence' under the…

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Details
Case
[2025] WASCA 89
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case between VEC and the State of Western Australia concerns the admissibility of context evidence under section 31A of the Evidence Act 1906 (WA), specifically whether evidence revealing the appellant's tendency to behave abusively towards a daughter is significantly probative of whether the appellant committed offences of violence and cruelty against that daughter. The appellant opposed the admissibility of this evidence, arguing it posed a significant risk of unfair reasoning by the jury. The trial judge allowed the evidence as both context and tendency evidence, dismissing the application to discharge the jury.

The legal issues before the court were whether the evidence was admissible under the common law as context evidence and, if so, whether it also qualified as tendency evidence under s 31A of the Evidence Act. The court had to weigh the probative value of the evidence against the risk of unfair prejudice and impermissible reasoning. The appellant contended that the evidence should not have been admitted as tendency evidence and that, had the court ruled on this before the trial, some of the evidence would have been excluded. The trial judge concluded that the evidence was admissible as both context and tendency evidence, a decision the appellant challenged on appeal.

The court's reasoning focused on the balance between the probative value of the evidence and the risk of unfair prejudice. The court found that the detailed nature of the evidence meant it effectively operated as tendency evidence, which was relevant to the charged offences. The trial judge provided thorough and clear directions to the jury to mitigate the risk of unfair reasoning. The court held that the probative value of the evidence outweighed the risk of prejudice, and thus, the evidence was admissible. The appeal was dismissed, upholding the trial judge's decision.

No specific final orders are mentioned in the text beyond the dismissal of the appeal and the upholding of the trial judge's decision.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Such evidence may be referred to as 'relationship evidence' or 'context evidence'. We will use the latter expression. The appellant opposed the application.[4] The trial judge ruled that the evidence was admissible as context evidence.[5] On 23 October 2023, after the conclusion of the prosecution's case, the trial judge said that the degree of detail in the other conduct evidence adduced from all four complainants meant that it was effectively operating as 'tendency evidence'.[6] As will be discussed later, tendency evidence is evidence of a tendency that an accused person has or had. It may show that the accused was more likely to have committed the alleged offence.[6] ts 858 ‑ 859. Having raised the issue, the trial judge asked the parties to consider their positions.[7] [7] ts 860 - 861. That evening, defence counsel applied to discharge the jury. The following day, the trial judge heard defence counsel's application. Defence counsel's submissions were not entirely clear, but she appeared to contend as follows. First, the other conduct evidence amounted to evidence that the appellant delighted in inflicting cruelty on children and there was a risk that the jury would reason from that tendency that the appellant was more likely to have committed the charged offences.[8] Indeed, she appeared to submit that the other conduct evidence was so highly probative of the alleged offences that it was inevitable that the appellant would be convicted.[9][8] ts 863 ‑ 864. [9] ts 863 - 864, 866, 871 - 880. Second, if the evidence was not admissible as tendency evidence, it should not have been adduced in evidence at all and the prejudice could only be cured by discharging the jury. Defence counsel did not assert that she would have conducted the trial any differently had she known that the evidence would be admitted as tendency evidence before the trial began. Rather, she asserted that, if the question of its admissibility had been determined before the trial, some of the evidence would have been ruled inadmissible. She appeared to contend that, if the evidence was not admissible as tendency evidence, it would follow that it would be inadmissible for all purposes (including as context evidence).[10][10] ts 870. Third, if the other conduct evidence was properly admitted as tendency evidence (which she disputed), the usual directions would be sufficient.[11][11] ts 870 ‑ 871. The trial judge concluded that, in addition to being admissible as context evidence under the common law, the other conduct evidence was admissible as tendency evidence under s 31A of the Evidence Act.[12] Her Honour accordingly dismissed the application to discharge the jury.[12] ts 885 - 889; see also ts 1297 ‑ 1300. In the appeal, the appellant submits that the question of the admissibility of the other conduct evidence as tendency evidence should have been dealt with before the trial. She submits that, had that occurred, she would have been able to present a better argument as to why it was not admissible as tendency evidence and that this would have led to some of the evidence being ruled inadmissible. However, the appellant again does not contend that, if the ruling that the other conduct evidence was admissible as tendency evidence had been made prior to the trial, she would have conducted the case differently in any way.[13]

Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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