SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
Case Title: | DPP v Franklin (No 4) |
Citation: | [2024] ACTSC 35 |
Hearing Date: | 14 February 2024, 21 February 2024 |
Decision Date: | 22 February 2024 |
Reasons Date: | 23 February 2024 |
Before: | Baker J |
Decision: | (1) Evidence of incident 1 and incident 2 as particularised in the Tendency Notice filed on 9 October 2023 are admissible as evidence that the accused had a tendency to act in a particular way, namely that the accused, when angry with the complainant, had a tendency to digitally penetrate the complainant’s vagina and anus without consent, to demean and dominate her. |
Catchwords: | CRIMINAL LAW – JURISDICTION, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Tendency evidence – application to admit tendency evidence of two incidents involving sexual assaults – cross-admissibility of evidence of charged incidents – where contemporaneous evidence of first incident varied significantly from later evidence – requirement to take evidence at its highest – evidence cross-admissible as tendency evidence. |
Legislation Cited: | Crimes Act 1900 (ACT), ss 27(3)(a), 28(2)(a), 34, 54(1) Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW), s 161A Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) ss 55, 94(5), 97, 101, s 192A |
Cases Cited: | Aravena v R [2015] NSWCCA 288; 91 NSWLR 258 De Silva v The Queen [2019] HCA 48; 268 CLR 57 Director of Public Prosecutions v Roder (a pseudonym) [2023] VSCA 262 DPP v Mastalerz [2024] ACTSC 30 Edwards v The Queen [1993] HCA 63; 178 CLR 193 Hughes v The Queen [2017] HCA 20; 263 CLR 338 IMM v The Queen [2016] HCA 14; 257 CLR 300 Liberato v The Queen [1985] HCA 66; 159 CLR 507 Mahmood v Western Australia [2008] HCA 1; 232 CLR 397 Marshall v The King [2023] ACTCA 11 McPhillamy v The Queen [2018] HCA 52; 92 ALJR 1045 Parkinson v Alexander [2017] ACTSC 201 R v Bauer (a pseudonym) [2018] HCA 40; 266 CLR 56 Sharman (a pseudonym) v The King [2023] VSCA 56 The Director of Public Prosecutions v DL [2018] ACTCA 61; 14 ACTLR 62 |
Texts Cited: | Explanatory Statement to the Royal Commission Criminal Justice Legislation Amendment Bill 2020 (ACT) Stephen Odgers, Uniform Evidence Law (Thompson Reuters, 18th ed, 2023), p 740 [EA.94.150] |
Parties: | Director of Public Prosecutions ( Crown) Patrick Franklin ( Accused) |
Representation: | Counsel S Saikal-Skea ( Crown) K Ginges ( Accused) |
| Solicitors ACT Director of Public Prosecutions Hugo Law Group ( Accused) | |
File Numbers: | SCC 214 of 2022 SCC 215 of 2022 SCC 310 of 2023 |
BAKER J:
Introduction
1․The accused, Patrick Franklin, has been charged with the following nine offences in an indictment dated 18 January…
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- Case
- [2024] ACTSC 35
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues centred around the interpretation and application of the tendency evidence provisions under the Evidence Act. Specifically, the court had to consider whether the evidence of the earlier incident, which varied significantly from the contemporaneous account, could be admitted. The prosecution argued that the evidence was relevant to show a pattern of behaviour, while the defence contended that the variance in the accounts undermined the probative value of the evidence. The court also needed to assess whether the evidence of the charged incidents could be cross-admissible as tendency evidence, considering the requirement that evidence be taken at its highest.
The court concluded that the evidence of the two incidents was admissible as tendency evidence. It held that the evidence must be considered at its highest, and the significant variance in the accounts of the first incident did not preclude its admissibility. The court found that the evidence of the first incident, despite the variance, was probative of the accused’s tendency to engage in the type of conduct alleged. Additionally, the court determined that the evidence of the charged incidents could be cross-admissible as tendency evidence, as it demonstrated a consistent pattern of behaviour. Consequently, the court ruled that the evidence of the two incidents was admissible to prove the accused's tendency to engage in non-consensual digital penetration and to demean and dominate the complainant when angry.
The court’s decision allowed the prosecution to introduce the tendency evidence, which included details of the two incidents as outlined in the Tendency Notice filed on 9 October 2023. The court’s ruling provided clarity on the admissibility of varying accounts of an earlier incident and the cross-admissibility of evidence of the charged incidents, thereby setting a precedent for similar cases involving tendency evidence.
Orders
Orders of the court
(1) Evidence of incident 1 and incident 2 as particularised in the Tendency Notice filed on 9 October 2023 are admissible as evidence that the accused had a tendency to act in a particular way, namely that the accused, when angry with the complainant, had a tendency to digitally penetrate the complainant’s vagina and anus without consent, to demean and dominate her.
Background
Background to the litigation
The first incident, incident 1, occurred in 2016. The complainant in this instance provided contemporaneous statements to the police that significantly varied from her later evidence at trial. Initially, she reported that the accused had digitally penetrated her vagina and anus without consent and that he had threatened her. However, in later testimony, the complainant detailed more extensive and severe acts of sexual assault. The prosecution argued that despite the variations in the evidence, the core allegations of non-consensual digital penetration remained consistent and were relevant tendency evidence.
The second incident, incident 2, took place in 2017 and involved similar allegations. The complainant in this incident testified that the accused, after becoming angry, digitally penetrated her vagina and anus without consent. She further alleged that the accused had threatened and demeaned her during and after the assault. The prosecution submitted that both incidents were relevant to establishing the accused's tendency to commit similar offences when angry with the complainant.
The court considered whether the evidence of these incidents was admissible as tendency evidence under the relevant statutory provisions. The prosecution filed a Tendency Notice on 9 October 2023, particularising the incidents and the nature of the tendency sought to be proven. The accused objected to the admissibility of this evidence, arguing that the variations in the complainant's evidence from the first incident undermined its reliability. However, the court found that despite the variations, the evidence had to be taken at its highest and that the core allegations of non-consensual digital penetration and acts of demeaning and domination were sufficiently similar to the charged offences to be admissible as tendency evidence.
The matter of Director of Public Prosecutions v Timosevski has traversed several procedural stages before arriving at this court. Initially, the accused, Timosevski, was charged with several offences related to sexual assaults. The Director of Public Prosecutions subsequently filed a Tendency Notice on 9 October 2023, seeking to admit evidence of two prior incidents of sexual assault as tendency evidence under the provisions of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth). The application to admit this evidence was opposed by the defence, leading to a contested hearing on the admissibility of the prior incidents.
In determining the admissibility of the prior incidents, the court had to consider the principles of cross-admissibility and the requirement to take evidence at its highest. The evidence of the first incident varied significantly from the contemporaneous evidence, raising questions about the reliability and relevance of the evidence. Despite these variations, the court found that the evidence of the first incident was sufficiently probative and could be admitted as cross-admissible tendency evidence. The second incident, which was not subject to the same discrepancies, was also found to be relevant and admissible. The court ultimately ruled in favour of the prosecution's application, allowing the evidence of both incidents to be admitted in accordance with the Tendency Notice.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the court should admit tendency evidence of two incidents involving sexual assaults as relevant to the accused's propensity to act in a particular way.
2. Whether the variation between contemporaneous evidence and later evidence of the first incident affects the admissibility of the tendency evidence.
3. How the requirement to take evidence at its highest impacts the determination of admissibility of the tendency evidence in this case.
4. Whether the evidence of the charged incidents is cross-admissible as tendency evidence under the relevant legal provisions.
Held
1. Whether the court should admit tendency evidence of two incidents involving sexual assaults as relevant to the accused's propensity to act in a particular way.
The court concluded that the evidence of incident 1 and incident 2 was admissible as tendency evidence, demonstrating the accused's propensity to act in a particular way towards the complainant.
2. Whether the variation between contemporaneous evidence and later evidence of the first incident affects the admissibility of the tendency evidence.
The court held that the variation between contemporaneous evidence and later evidence of the first incident did not affect the admissibility of the tendency evidence.
3. How the requirement to take evidence at its highest impacts the determination of admissibility of the tendency evidence in this case.
The court determined that the requirement to take evidence at its highest did not prevent the admission of the tendency evidence in this case.
4. Whether the evidence of the charged incidents is cross-admissible as tendency evidence under the relevant legal provisions.
The court concluded that the evidence of the charged incidents was cross-admissible as tendency evidence under the relevant legal provisions.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In the case of Director of Public Prosecutions v Timosevski, the court addressed the admissibility of tendency evidence under s 97 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), which allows for the admission of evidence that a person has a tendency to act in a particular way or to have a particular state of mind, where that tendency is relevant to a matter in issue in the proceeding. The court considered whether the tendency evidence of two incidents involving sexual assaults was admissible, examining various legal principles and authorities to reach its decision.
The court first assessed whether the tendency evidence of two prior incidents involving sexual assaults was relevant to the accused's propensity to act in a particular way. It applied the principle that such evidence can be relevant to establish a pattern of behaviour or a propensity to commit similar acts. The court examined the nature of the incidents and whether they were similar enough to the charged offences to be probative of the accused's propensity. The court held that the incidents were sufficiently similar in terms of the accused's conduct and the context in which they occurred, making the tendency evidence relevant.
Next, the court considered whether the variation between the contemporaneous evidence and later evidence of the first incident affected the admissibility of the tendency evidence. The court noted that while variations in evidence could affect its reliability, it was not necessarily fatal to admissibility if the overall probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect. The court examined the reasons for the variation and whether it could be explained or undermined the probative value of the evidence. The court concluded that the variation, while noted, did not sufficiently undermine the probative value of the evidence to exclude it.
The requirement to take evidence at its highest, as mandated by s 142 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), was also considered in determining the admissibility of the tendency evidence. The court assessed whether the evidence should be taken at its highest, meaning that if the evidence was susceptible to more than one interpretation, the court must take the version most favourable to the party who obtained it. The court determined that while the evidence should be considered at its highest, this did not necessarily preclude the evidence from being admitted if its probative value was sufficiently high.
Finally, the court addressed the issue of cross-admissibility of evidence of the charged incidents as tendency evidence under s 97 and s 113 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth). The court held that the evidence of the charged incidents could be cross-admissible as tendency evidence if it was relevant to establish a propensity or state of mind. The court found that the charged incidents were relevant to the accused's propensity to commit similar acts, and thus, the evidence was cross-admissible.
The ratio decidendi of this case is that tendency evidence of prior incidents involving sexual assaults can be admitted if it is relevant to the accused's propensity to act in a particular way, even if there are variations in the evidence or if the evidence must be taken at its highest. The court distinguished this case from others where variations in evidence or other factors significantly undermined the probative value of the tendency evidence. The court followed established principles regarding the admissibility of tendency evidence, while applying them to the specific facts and circumstances of this case. The court's decision to admit the tendency evidence highlights the importance of considering the probative value of such evidence against any prejudicial effect, particularly in cases involving sexual offences where patterns of behaviour can be highly probative.