Director of Public Prosecutions v Timosevski

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SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY

Case Title:

DPP v Timosevski

Citation: 

[2024] ACTSC 85

Hearing Date: 

19 March 2024

Decision Date: 

19 March 2024

Reasons Date:

28 March 2024

Before:

Loukas-Karlsson J

Decision: 

That the prosecution be permitted to adduce tendency evidence as notified in the Notice of Intention to Adduce Tendency Evidence dated 6 February 2024.

Catchwords: 

CRIMINAL LAW – EVIDENCE – Pre-trial application – application to adduce tendency evidence - charged and uncharged incidents - significant probative value – whether probative value of evidence outweighs danger of unfair prejudice – single complainant – presumption s97A Evidence Act

Legislation Cited: 

Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) ss 55, 97, 97A, 101

Royal Commission Criminal Justice Legislation Amendment Act 2020 (ACT)

Cases Cited: 

DPP v Mastalerz [2024] ACTSC 30

DPP v Murphy [2023] ACTSC 4

Elomar vThe Queen [2014] NSWCCA 303; 316 ALR 206

HML v The Queen [2008] HCA 16; 235 CLR 334

Hughes v The Queen [2017] HCA 20; 263 CLR 338

Papakosmas v The Queen [1999] HCA 37; 196 CLR 297

R v Bauer (a pseudonym) [2018] HCA 40; 266 CLR 56

R v PWD [2010] NSWCCA 209; 205 A Crim R 75

R v QX (No 5) [2021] ACTSC 247; 292 A Crim R 193

Restricted judgment [2024] ACTSC 35

Sokolowskyj v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 55; 239 A Crim R 528

TL v The King [2022] HCA 35; 275 CLR 83

TL v The Queen [2020] NSWCCA 265

Vojneski v The Queen [2016] ACTCA 57; 262 A Crim R 370

Parties: 

ACT Director of Public Prosecutions ( Applicant)

Jaryn Timosevski ( Respondent)

Representation: 

Counsel

M Howe ( Applicant)

J Maher ( Respondent)

Solicitors

ACT Director of Public Prosecutions

Tu’ulakitau Mcguire Lawyers ( Respondent)

File Numbers:

SCC 238 and 239 of 2023

LOUKAS-KARLSSON J:     

Introduction

  1. The prosecution has sought to adduce tendency evidence, pursuant to ss 97, 97A and 101 of the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) (Evidence Act), that the accused had a sexual interest in the child complainant, and a tendency to act on that interest.

  2. The accused, Mr Timosevski, is charged on indictment with the following:

    (a)Count 1: act of indecency with a person under 16.

    (b)Count 2: act of indecency with a person under 16.

    (c)Count 3: sexual intercourse with a person under 16.

    (d)Count 4: act of indecency with a person under 16.

    (e)Count 5: act of indecency with a person under 16.

    (f)Count 6: sexual intercourse with a person under 16.

    (g)Count 7: sexual intercourse with a person under 16.

    (h)Count 8: supply cannabis to a child.

    (i)Count 9: supply cannabis to a child.

    (j)Count 10: supply cannabis to a child.

  3. The charges all relate to the same complainant.

  4. The accused and the complainant met on Friday 2 December 2023 on a dating application known as ‘Tinder’. The prosecution alleged that the complainant was 13 years old at the time of the alleged offences, and the accused was…

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Details
Case
[2024] ACTSC 85
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Director of Public Prosecutions v Timosevski, the primary concern was whether the prosecution could introduce tendency evidence in a criminal trial where the defendant was accused of child sexual offences. The application was heard in the relevant court, where the judge had to determine the admissibility of such evidence under the provisions of the Evidence Act. The legal issues at hand centred on the balancing of the probative value of the evidence against the potential for unfair prejudice to the accused, particularly given the sensitive nature of the allegations and the presumed application of the presumption in s97A(2) of the Act.

The court's reasoning involved a detailed analysis of the specific provisions of the Evidence Act, particularly sections 97, 97A, and 101. The court acknowledged that the presumption in s97A(2) applied due to the nature of the charges. This presumption means that the probative value of the evidence is presumed to be significant, unless exceptional circumstances are present. The court further examined whether the probative value of the proposed tendency evidence substantially outweighed the prejudicial effect it might have on the accused. The court referenced previous cases to outline the types of prejudicial effects that might arise, such as the risk of the jury giving the evidence more weight than it logically deserves or responding emotionally to its content.

Ultimately, the court found that the probative value of the tendency evidence did substantially outweigh the prejudicial effect, particularly given the single complainant and the nature of the offences. The court was satisfied that appropriate jury directions could mitigate any prejudicial effects, and therefore, the evidence could be admitted. The final orders permitted the prosecution to adduce the notified tendency evidence in the trial.

Orders

Orders of the court

That the prosecution be permitted to adduce tendency evidence as notified in the Notice of Intention to Adduce Tendency Evidence dated 6 February 2024.

Background

Background to the litigation

In the case of Director of Public Prosecutions v Timosevski, the defendant, Mr Timosevski, was charged with various child sexual offences involving a single complainant. The prosecution sought to adduce tendency evidence to support its case. This evidence included both charged and uncharged incidents, which the prosecution argued had significant probative value in proving the alleged offences. The application to adduce this evidence was contested, focusing on whether its probative value substantially outweighed the risk of unfair prejudice to the accused.

The court examined whether the presumption under section 97A(2) of the Evidence Act applied to this case, given that the proceeding involved allegations of child sexual offences. It was determined that the presumption did apply, presuming significant probative value in the tendency evidence. The court further considered whether there were exceptional circumstances that would negate this presumption, but found none. The focus then shifted to whether the probative value of the tendency evidence substantially outweighed any prejudicial effect it might have on the accused.

The court assessed the prejudicial effects of the evidence, recognising that such evidence often raises concerns about disreputable conduct and the risk of unfair prejudice, including the potential for the jury to misuse the evidence by giving it undue weight or responding emotionally to its content. The court also noted the additional risks associated with the jury's emotional response to the evidence and the requirement for the accused to address a range of uncharged conduct. Despite these risks, the court concluded that the probative value of the tendered evidence outweighed the potential prejudicial effects, allowing the prosecution to adduce the tendency evidence as notified.

The matter of Director of Public Prosecutions v Timosevski involves a pre-trial application to adduce tendency evidence in a criminal case. This application was brought before the court pursuant to the provisions of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), specifically addressing the admissibility of certain evidence concerning the accused's tendency to commit acts of a particular kind, which in this case are alleged child sexual offences. The application followed a Notice of Intention to Adduce Tendency Evidence dated 6 February 2024, which outlined the specific incidents the prosecution intended to rely on. The court's consideration of the application was informed by prior decisions and legal principles, including the presumption under section 97A of the Evidence Act, which applies when proceedings involve a child sexual offence. This presumption implies significant probative value unless there are exceptional circumstances. The court also weighed the potential prejudicial effects of the evidence against its probative value, a balancing exercise mandated by section 101(2) of the Evidence Act. The decision was influenced by judicial considerations such as the risk of unfair prejudice, the need for appropriate jury directions, and the High Court's observations in Hughes v The Queen regarding the potential for prejudice when tendency evidence is presented in criminal proceedings.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In relation to whether the presumption in s97A(2) applies, in QX (No 5) I stated at [79]-[85]Does the evidence, either by itself or having regard to other evidence, have significant probative value? Section 97(1)(b)[79]Prior to undertaking the analysis required by s 97(1)(b), the Court is required to determine whether the presumption in s 97A(2) applies to this matter.Does the presumption in s 97A(2) apply?[80] In order for the presumption in s 97A(2) to apply to this matter, the proceeding must be concerned with whether the commission by the accused of an act that constitutes, or may constitute, a child sexual offence is a fact in issue: s 97A(1) Evidence Act.… This is a matter where the s97A presumption applies and significant probative value is therefore presumed. There are no exceptional circumstances in this case. As I stated in QX (No 5), s 101(2) requires the Court to make a judgment as to whether the jury, if the tendency evidence is adduced, will use the evidence improperly or unfairly in some way. In Vojneski v The Queen [2016] ACTCA 57; 262 A Crim R 370, Murrell CJ and Refshauge J stated at [61]-[63]: 61. Section 101(2) requires the identification of the probative value and the prejudicial effect of the tendency evidence. Then a balancing exercise must be conducted on the facts of each case: R v Ellis [2003] NSWCCA 319; 58 NSWLR 700 at [95], Hughes at [190].62.At the s 101 stage of the inquiry, it is necessary to identify the type or types of prejudicial effect in question: Ford per Campbell JA at [64].63. The reference to prejudicial effect is a reference to unfair prejudice; the risk that the fact-finder will misuse the evidence in an unfair way by giving it more weight than it logically deserves or by responding emotionally to the inflammatory content of the evidence, where the risk cannot be cured by direction: Festa v The Queen [2001] HCA 72; 208 CLR 593 per McHugh J at [51] (Festa), Lam at [31]–[32], R v Costa (No 1) [2015] ACTSC 63 at [44]. As noted above, tendency evidence usually raises disreputable conduct, i.e. contains inherent prejudice. But in many cases this prejudicial effect can be greatly reduced by appropriate jury directions. In particular cases, tendency evidence may have another prejudicial effect.(emphasis added) In Hughes v The Queen [2017] HCA 20; 263 CLR 338, the High Court observed the types of prejudice which may arise when tendency evidence is used. The plurality stated at [17]: In criminal proceedings in which the prosecution seeks to adduce tendency evidence about the accused, s 101(2) of the Evidence Act imposes a further restriction on admissibility: the evidence cannot be used against the accused unless its probative value substantially outweighs any prejudicial effect that it may have on the accused. The reception of tendency evidence in a criminal trial may occasion prejudice in a number of ways. The jury may fail to allow that a person who has a tendency to have a particular state of mind, or to act in a particular way, may not have had that state of mind, or may not have acted in that way, on the occasion in issue. Or the jury may underestimate the number of persons who share the tendency to have that state of mind or to act in that way. In either case the tendency evidence may be given disproportionate weight. In addition to the risks arising from tendency reasoning, there is the risk that the assessment of whether the prosecution has discharged its onus may be clouded by the jury’s emotional response to the tendency evidence. And prejudice may be occasioned by requiring an accused to answer a raft of uncharged conduct stretching back, perhaps, over many years.(emphasis added)

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Does the presumption in s 97A(2) of the Evidence Act apply to this case?
2. Does the evidence, either by itself or having regard to other evidence, have significant probative value?
3. If the evidence has significant probative value, does its probative value substantially outweigh any prejudicial effect it may have on the accused?
4. What types of prejudicial effect may arise when tendency evidence is used, and can they be mitigated by appropriate jury directions?
5. Does the evidence of uncharged incidents have a disproportional prejudicial effect that could cloud the jury's assessment of whether the prosecution has discharged its onus?

Held
1. Does the presumption in s 97A(2) of the Evidence Act apply to this case?
The court concluded that the presumption in s 97A(2) does apply to this case as the proceeding is concerned with whether the commission by the accused of an act that constitutes, or may constitute, a child sexual offence. Result: The presumption applies.

2. Does the evidence, either by itself or having regard to other evidence, have significant probative value?
The court concluded that the evidence, either by itself or having regard to other evidence, has significant probative value. Result: Significant probative value is presumed.

3. If the evidence has significant probative value, does its probative value substantially outweigh any prejudicial effect it may have on the accused?
The court did not explicitly address this issue in the extract provided but noted that the probative value of the evidence must substantially outweigh any prejudicial effect on the accused, which is a consideration under s 101(2) of the Evidence Act.

4. What types of prejudicial effect may arise when tendency evidence is used, and can they be mitigated by appropriate jury directions?
The court identified that prejudicial effects may include the jury misusing the evidence by giving it more weight than it logically deserves or responding emotionally to the evidence. The court also noted that some of these prejudicial effects can be mitigated by appropriate jury directions.

5. Does the evidence of uncharged incidents have a disproportional prejudicial effect that could cloud the jury's assessment of whether the prosecution has discharged its onus?
The court concluded that the evidence of uncharged incidents may have a disproportional prejudicial effect and could cloud the jury's assessment of whether the prosecution has discharged its onus. However, the court did not explicitly make a finding on this issue in the extract provided. Result: The court permitted the prosecution to adduce the tendency evidence.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In the case of Director of Public Prosecutions v Timosevski, the court was tasked with determining whether the presumption in s 97A(2) of the Evidence Act applied to the matter. The court held that since the proceeding was concerned with whether the accused had committed an act that constitutes or may constitute a child sexual offence, the presumption in s 97A(2) applied. Consequently, the significant probative value of the evidence was presumed. The court did not find any exceptional circumstances to deviate from this presumption, as required by s 101(2) of the Evidence Act.

Moving to the second issue, the court examined whether the evidence, either by itself or in conjunction with other evidence, had significant probative value. Under s 97(1)(b), the court was required to identify the probative value and prejudicial effect of the evidence, then conduct a balancing exercise. The court noted that while tendency evidence often contains inherent prejudice, this can often be mitigated through appropriate jury directions. The court further referred to Hughes v The Queen, where the High Court outlined various ways in which prejudice can arise when tendency evidence is used. These include the jury potentially giving disproportionate weight to the evidence, underestimating the number of individuals with a similar tendency, or being emotionally influenced by the evidence, which could cloud their assessment of the prosecution’s burden.

The third issue the court considered was whether the probative value of the evidence substantially outweighed any prejudicial effect it might have. The court held that for the evidence to be admissible, its probative value had to substantially outweigh the prejudicial effect. The court acknowledged that the risk of prejudice was inherent in the use of tendency evidence, but found that with proper jury directions, the prejudicial effect could be significantly reduced. The court also noted that the types of prejudice identified in Hughes v The Queen could be mitigated through careful jury directions, ensuring that the jury understood the limited purpose for which the evidence was adduced.

Regarding the fourth issue, the court discussed the types of prejudicial effects that may arise when tendency evidence is used. The court observed that such evidence may lead to the jury giving undue weight to the evidence, or failing to appreciate that the accused may not have had the particular state of mind or acted in a particular way on the occasion in issue. Additionally, the court noted the risk that the jury’s emotional response to the evidence could cloud their assessment of whether the prosecution had discharged its onus. The court also considered the prejudice that might arise from requiring the accused to answer questions about a range of uncharged conduct over many years. The court concluded that while these prejudicial effects were inherent in the use of tendency evidence, they could be mitigated by appropriate jury directions.

Finally, the court addressed whether the evidence of uncharged incidents had a disproportionate prejudicial effect that could cloud the jury’s assessment of whether the prosecution had discharged its onus. The court held that the prejudicial effect of the evidence could be mitigated by appropriate jury directions, ensuring that the jury understood the limited purpose for which the evidence was adduced. The court found that the probative value of the evidence substantially outweighed any prejudicial effect, and thus, the evidence could be admitted.

The ratio decidendi of the case is that when dealing with child sexual offence cases, the presumption in s 97A(2) of the Evidence Act applies, presuming significant probative value unless exceptional circumstances exist. The court must ensure that the probative value of the evidence substantially outweighs any prejudicial effect, and that appropriate jury directions can mitigate the inherent prejudice of tendency evidence.