SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
LOUKAS-KARLSSON J:
Introduction
1․The prosecution seeks to adduce tendency evidence that the accused has a tendency to commit acts of family violence upon his former domestic partner (the complainant).
2․The accused, Mr Smith, is charged on indictment with the following:
(a)one count of sexual intercourse without consent, contrary to s 54(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT); and
(b)one count of an act of indecency without consent, contrary to s 60(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT).
3․There is a transfer charge of common assault. The transfer…
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- Case
- [2024] ACTSC 95
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the provisions of section 97 of the Evidence Act, which permits the admission of evidence of past conduct to prove a tendency to commit acts of a particular kind, including acts of family violence. The court considered the criteria set out in section 98, which requires a finding that the evidence is relevant and that its probative value is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. In weighing these factors, the court scrutinised the similarity and recency of the past incidents, the degree of similarity between the past incidents and the current charges, and the importance of the evidence in resolving a question of fact in issue in the proceeding.
After careful consideration of the evidence and submissions from both parties, the court found that the proposed evidence did not meet the threshold for admissibility. The court concluded that the evidence of past incidents of family violence, while relevant to a propensity argument, did not sufficiently establish a pattern of behaviour or a clear tendency to commit such acts against the domestic partner in the present case. The court also found that the prejudicial effect of admitting the evidence outweighed its probative value, given the potential for the jury to be misled or influenced by the evidence of unrelated incidents. Consequently, the court dismissed the application by the prosecution to adduce the proposed evidence of past acts of family violence.
Orders
Orders of the court
The prosecution is not permitted to adduce evidence of incidents 1 to 6 as outlined in the Notice of Intention to Adduce Tendency Evidence dated 3 July 2023.
Background
Background to the litigation
The prosecution argued that the evidence of these incidents was relevant to establishing a tendency to commit acts of family violence against the complainant. Smith opposed the application, arguing that the incidents were too remote, too dissimilar, or otherwise not probative of the current charges against him. The court considered the nature and circumstances of each incident, the time elapsed since the incidents, and the relevance of the incidents to the current charges. After careful consideration, the court found that the evidence of the six incidents was not sufficiently probative of the current charges and dismissed the prosecution's application to adduce the tendency evidence.
The matter of Director of Public Prosecutions v Smith (No 2) originated as a criminal prosecution against the accused, Smith, who faced charges related to specific incidents of violence. The prosecution sought to introduce tendency evidence pursuant to section 97 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) to demonstrate a pattern of behaviour towards his domestic partner. This application was brought before the court as a pre-trial procedural matter. Prior to this application, Smith had already been charged and initial proceedings had been set in motion. The prosecution filed a Notice of Intention to Adduce Tendency Evidence on 3 July 2023, outlining six specific incidents they wished to present as tendency evidence. Smith contested the admissibility of this evidence, arguing it was prejudicial and irrelevant to the specific charges he faced. The court conducted a hearing to determine the admissibility of this evidence, considering legal precedents and statutory provisions. Ultimately, the court ruled that the evidence of incidents 1 to 6 was not admissible, dismissing the prosecution's application to introduce this tendency evidence in the trial.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Does the prosecution's proposed tendency evidence fall within the scope of section 97 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth)?
2. Is the tendency evidence relevant to a matter that is a fact in issue in the proceeding?
3. Does the probative value of the tendency evidence outweigh its potential to cause unfair prejudice to the accused?
4. Is the evidence of family violence sufficiently similar and recent to be admissible under section 98 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth)?
5. Can the evidence of family violence be properly characterised as a tendency to commit acts of family violence upon his domestic partner?
6. Does the evidence of family violence relate to a tendency to commit family violence in circumstances that are sufficiently similar to the current charges?
7. Does the exclusion of the evidence of family violence potentially deprive the prosecution of a significant part of its case?
Held
1. The court concluded that the prosecution's proposed tendency evidence does not fall within the scope of section 97 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), and therefore dismissed the application to adduce this evidence.
2. The court found that the tendency evidence was not relevant to a fact in issue in the proceeding.
3. The court did not reach this issue as the evidence did not fall within the scope of section 97.
4. The court did not reach this issue as the evidence did not fall within the scope of section 97.
5. The court did not reach this issue as the evidence did not fall within the scope of section 97.
6. The court did not reach this issue as the evidence did not fall within the scope of section 97.
7. The court concluded that the exclusion of the evidence of family violence does not potentially deprive the prosecution of a significant part of its case.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In Director of Public Prosecutions v Smith (No 2), the court meticulously evaluated the prosecution's application to introduce tendency evidence concerning the accused's past acts of family violence towards his domestic partner. The central issue was whether the proposed evidence fell within the purview of section 97 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), which governs the admissibility of tendency evidence. The court first examined whether the evidence could be classified as tendency evidence under section 97, which permits the introduction of evidence to prove that a person has a tendency to act in a particular way or have a particular state of mind. The prosecution argued that the evidence of past incidents of violence demonstrated a propensity to commit family violence, which was relevant to the current charges. However, the court considered whether these incidents were sufficiently similar and recent to the charged offences to be admissible under section 98 of the Act.
The court held that for the evidence to be admissible, it must be relevant to a fact in issue in the proceeding and its probative value must not be substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The prosecution needed to demonstrate that the past acts were not only similar but also recent enough to indicate a likelihood of recurrence. The court scrutinised each of the six incidents proposed by the prosecution, finding that while some incidents were similar in nature to the current charges, they were not recent enough to meet the threshold set by section 98. This assessment was crucial in determining whether the probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect.
Further, the court delved into whether the evidence of family violence related to a tendency to commit family violence in circumstances sufficiently similar to the current charges. The court found that the incidents proposed by the prosecution were not adequately similar to the charged offences to establish a clear tendency. Additionally, the court had to determine if the evidence could be properly characterised as a tendency to commit acts of family violence upon his domestic partner. The court found that while the incidents were indeed acts of family violence, they did not sufficiently demonstrate a pattern or propensity that would be probative of the accused's conduct in the current charges.
The court also weighed the potential unfair prejudice to the accused against the probative value of the evidence. It considered whether the evidence of family violence, if admitted, would unfairly prejudice the accused by allowing the jury to make an impermissible inference about his character. Given that the incidents were not recent and did not sufficiently demonstrate a clear tendency, the court concluded that the prejudicial effect outweighed the probative value. Lastly, the court examined whether excluding the evidence of family violence would potentially deprive the prosecution of a significant part of its case. The court found that the prosecution could still present a robust case without the contested evidence, thereby concluding that the exclusion did not significantly undermine the prosecution’s ability to prove the charges.
In summary, the court dismissed the prosecution's application to adduce the evidence of past incidents of family violence, holding that the evidence did not meet the criteria set out in sections 97 and 98 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth). The ratio decidendi of this case is that for tendency evidence concerning past acts of family violence to be admissible, it must be both recent and sufficiently similar to the charged offences, and its probative value must not be substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice to the accused. The court's decision underscores the importance of closely aligning the admissibility criteria with the specifics of the current charges to ensure a fair trial.