SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
Case Title: | DPP v Robertson |
Citation: | [2024] ACTSC 78 |
Hearing Date: | 18 March 2024 |
Decision Date: | 18 March 2024 |
Reasons Date: | 27 March 2024 |
Before: | Loukas-Karlsson J |
Decision: | The prosecution be allowed to rely on tendency evidence of the incidents set out in the notice of intention to adduce tendency evidence which was filed on 12 February 2024. |
Catchwords: | CRIMINAL LAW – EVIDENCE – pre-trial application – tendency evidence - application to adduce tendency evidence – significant probative value – whether probative value of evidence outweighs danger of unfair prejudice - unfair prejudice may be dealt with by appropriate jury directions |
Legislation Cited: | Crimes Act 1900 (ACT), ss 24, 26, 30, Evidence Act 2011 (ACT), ss 55, 97, 101, 135, 137 Family Violence Act 2016 (ACT), s 8 Royal Commission Criminal Justice Legislation Amendment Act 2020 (ACT) |
Cases Cited: | Director of Public Prosecutions v Ivanisevic [2023] ACTSC 34 Director of Public Prosecutions v Murphy [2023] ACTSC 4 El-Haddad v The Queen [2015] NSWCCA 10; 88 NSWLR 93 Harris (a pseudonym) v The King [2024] VSCA 43 Hughes v The Queen [2017] HCA 20; 263 CLR 338 IMM v The Queen [2016] HCA 14; 257 CLR 300 Parkinson v Alexander [2017] ACTSC 201 R v PWD [2010] NSWCCA 209; 205 A Crim R 75 R v QX (No 5) [2021] ACTSC 247; 292 A Crim R 193 R v Sean (a pseudonym) (No 2) [2023] ACTSC 132 TB v The Queen [2019] NSWCCA 224 |
Parties: | ACT Director of Public Prosecutions (Applicant) Joseph Donald Robertson ( Respondent) |
Representation: | Counsel G Cuthel ( Applicant) J Sabharwal ( Respondent) |
| Solicitors ACT Director of Public Prosecutions J Sabharwal ( Respondent) | |
File Number: | SCC 231 and 232 of 2023 |
LOUKAS-KARLSSON J:
Introduction
The prosecution seeks to establish and rely upon as relevant to the facts in issue, pursuant to ss 97 and 101 of the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) (Evidence Act), that the accused had a tendency to act in a violent or aggressive manner towards his former partner (the complainant) during an argument or when the complainant tried to leave the relationship.
The accused, Mr Robertson, is charged on indictment with the following offences:
(a)Count 1: threat to kill, s 30 Crimes Act 1900 (ACT).
(b)Count 2: assault occasioning actual bodily harm, s 24 Crimes Act 1900 (ACT).
(c)Count 3: threat to kill, s 30 Crimes Act 1900 (ACT).
(d)Count 4: assault occasioning actual bodily harm, s 24 Crimes Act 1900 (ACT).
(e)Count 5: assault occasioning actual bodily harm, s 24 Crimes Act 1900 (ACT).
The accused is also charged with nine transfer charges of common assault pursuant to s 26 Crimes Act 1900 (ACT). I note that two of these transfer charges are alternative charges to counts 2 and 4.
(a)CC2022/4017: Common assault, s…
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- Case
- [2024] ACTSC 78
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court's reasoning focused on the two-step process outlined in Hughes v The Queen, which involves assessing the extent to which the evidence supports the tendency and the extent to which the tendency makes more likely the facts of the offence charged. The court determined that the evidence provided by the prosecution was relevant, had significant probative value, and that this value outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice. This conclusion was reached after considering the nature of the facts in issue and the influence of the evidence on the context of fact-finding. The court further noted that any risk of unfair prejudice could be managed through appropriate jury directions.
Following its assessment, the court allowed the prosecution to rely on the tendency evidence specified in the notice of intention filed on 12 February 2024. The court found that the evidence met the criteria under the Evidence Act and would be admissible at trial. This decision enables the prosecution to present the proposed tendency evidence to support their case against Robertson.
Orders
Orders of the court
The prosecution be allowed to rely on tendency evidence of the incidents set out in the notice of intention to adduce tendency evidence which was filed on 12 February 2024.
Background
Background to the litigation
The prosecution's application to introduce tendency evidence involves several steps, starting with establishing the relevance of the evidence under section 55 of the Evidence Act. Following this, the prosecution must meet the threshold set out in section 97, which requires the evidence to have significant probative value. The court must then determine whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs the risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant, as per section 101(2) of the Evidence Act. Finally, the court may exercise its discretion under sections 135 and 137 of the Act to refuse to admit the evidence if necessary.
In its decision, the court examined the evidence provided by the prosecution and determined that it met the criteria for significant probative value. The evidence, when considered in the context of the facts in issue, strongly supported the existence of a tendency and also strongly supported the facts that make up the charged offences. The court found that the probative value of the evidence outweighed any potential unfair prejudice to the defendant. Consequently, the court allowed the prosecution to rely on the tendency evidence as part of their case against Robertson.
The matter of Director of Public Prosecutions v Robertson came before the court as a pre-trial application concerning the admissibility of tendency evidence. The prosecution sought to introduce evidence of prior incidents to demonstrate a pattern of behaviour relevant to the charges against the accused. The application was grounded in section 101 of the Evidence Act, which imposes specific conditions on the prosecution's ability to present tendency evidence in criminal proceedings. The court's task was to determine whether the probative value of the proposed evidence outweighed the potential for unfair prejudice to the accused. This required a rigorous assessment of the evidence's relevance, its capacity to support a tendency, and its contribution to proving the facts of the offence charged. The court referenced previous decisions, including R v QX (No 5) and IMM v The Queen, to guide its analysis of the probative value of the evidence. Ultimately, the court found that the prosecution could rely on the proposed tendency evidence, balancing the need to establish the accused's pattern of conduct against the risk of unfair prejudice, which could be mitigated through appropriate jury directions.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Does the evidence provided by the prosecution have sufficient notice as required by section 97(1)(a) of the Evidence Act?
2. Does the evidence provided by the prosecution have significant probative value as required by section 97(1)(b) of the Evidence Act?
3. Does the probative value of the evidence outweigh the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant as required by section 101(2) of the Evidence Act?
4. Is the nature of the fact in issue to which a tendency is sought to prove influential in the context of fact-finding?
5. Does the evidence strongly support the proof of a tendency?
6. Does the tendency strongly support the proof of a fact that makes up the offence charged?
7. Are the dangers in focusing on single labels such as “underlying unity”, “pattern of conduct” or “modus operandi” adequately avoided in the assessment of the evidence?
Held
1. The court concluded that the evidence provided by the prosecution had sufficient notice as required by section 97(1)(a) of the Evidence Act. The pre-trial application to adduce tendency evidence was allowed.
2. The court found that the evidence provided by the prosecution had significant probative value as required by section 97(1)(b) of the Evidence Act. The application to adduce tendency evidence was allowed.
3. The court determined that the probative value of the evidence outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant as required by section 101(2) of the Evidence Act. The application to adduce tendency evidence was allowed.
4. The court found that the nature of the fact in issue to which a tendency is sought to prove was influential in the context of fact-finding. The application to adduce tendency evidence was allowed.
5. The court concluded that the evidence strongly supported the proof of a tendency. The application to adduce tendency evidence was allowed.
6. The court found that the tendency strongly supported the proof of a fact that makes up the offence charged. The application to adduce tendency evidence was allowed.
7. The court noted that the dangers in focusing on single labels such as “underlying unity”, “pattern of conduct” or “modus operandi” were adequately avoided in the assessment of the evidence. The application to adduce tendency evidence was allowed.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In Director of Public Prosecutions v Robertson, the court was tasked with determining whether the prosecution could rely on tendency evidence in a criminal proceeding. The decision hinged on the application of sections 97(1)(a), 97(1)(b), 101(2) of the Evidence Act, as well as related principles and authorities. The court's reasoning was structured around the statutory criteria for admissibility and the balancing of probative value against the risk of unfair prejudice.
The court first considered whether the prosecution had provided sufficient notice of the tendency evidence as required by section 97(1)(a) of the Evidence Act. In accordance with established legal principles, the prosecution needed to provide adequate details about the incidents it intended to use as evidence. The court examined the notice of intention to adduce tendency evidence filed by the prosecution and determined that it contained sufficient information to meet the statutory requirement. This aligns with the approach in IMM v The Queen, where the court emphasised that the notice must enable the defendant to respond adequately to the evidence.
Next, the court assessed whether the evidence provided by the prosecution had significant probative value as required by section 97(1)(b). The court adopted the two-step process outlined in Hughes v The Queen, focusing on the extent to which the evidence supports the tendency and the extent to which the tendency supports the proof of facts making up the charged offence. The court considered that significant probative value exists where the evidence strongly supports the proof of a tendency and where that tendency strongly supports the proof of the facts in issue. In this case, the court found that the evidence provided by the prosecution met these criteria, thereby establishing significant probative value.
The court then proceeded to determine whether the probative value of the evidence outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant, as required by section 101(2) of the Evidence Act. The court recognised that while there was a risk of unfair prejudice, this could be managed through appropriate jury directions. The court relied on precedent, such as R v QX (No 5), which held that the risk of unfair prejudice could be mitigated by ensuring the jury is properly directed on the limited purpose for which the evidence can be considered. The court concluded that the probative value of the evidence did indeed outweigh the danger of unfair prejudice, allowing the prosecution to rely on the tendency evidence.
Further, the court considered whether the nature of the fact in issue was influential in the context of fact-finding. In line with IMM v The Queen, the court acknowledged that the nature of the fact in issue would inform whether the evidence had significant probative value. Here, the court found that the tendency evidence was influential in determining the facts of the case, particularly in establishing a pattern of conduct that was relevant to the charged offence.
In addition, the court examined whether the evidence strongly supported the proof of a tendency and whether this tendency strongly supported the proof of the facts making up the offence charged. The analysis revealed that the evidence provided by the prosecution strongly supported the proof of a tendency and that this tendency strongly supported the proof of the facts in issue. This analysis was crucial in determining the probative value of the evidence.
Finally, the court addressed the dangers of focusing on single labels such as “underlying unity”, “pattern of conduct”, or “modus operandi” in assessing the evidence. The court highlighted the importance of considering the two interrelated but separate matters identified in Hughes v The Queen: the extent to which the evidence supports the tendency, and the extent to which the tendency supports the proof of the facts in issue. By avoiding a narrow focus on single labels, the court ensured a comprehensive assessment of the probative value of the evidence.
In conclusion, the ratio decidendi of this decision is that the prosecution can rely on tendency evidence if it satisfies the statutory criteria under sections 97(1)(a) and 97(1)(b) of the Evidence Act and if the probative value of the evidence outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice. The court's decision underscores the importance of a structured approach in assessing the admissibility of tendency evidence, balancing probative value against the risk of unfair prejudice, and avoiding an over-reliance on single labels in the assessment process.