Reported Decision:
153 A Crim R 434
New South Wales
Court of Criminal Appeal
CITATION: HEARING DATE(S): 26 April 2005, 28 April 2005
JUDGMENT DATE:
1 June 2005JUDGMENT OF: Grove J at 1; Barr J at 6; Howie J at 56
DECISION: Appeal allowed - quash the conviction and the resulting sentences - order a new trial.
PARTIES: Regina, Thomas Douglas Watkins
FILE NUMBER(S): CCA 2004/2614
COUNSEL: G Rowling
P Boulten SCSOLICITORS: S Kavanagh
Bilbie Dan
LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: District Court
LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S): 03/21/1147
LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER: Woods QC DCJ
2004/2614
1 JUNE 2005GROVE J
BARR J
HOWIE J
1 GROVE J: I have had the advantage of reading the judgment of Barr J in draft form. I agree with his conclusions regarding grounds 1 and 2 and his remarks concerning other grounds.
2 His Honour has observed that, absent the evidence which caused the trial to miscarry, the Crown case was strong to the point of being almost overwhelming. It was perceptibly strong beyond that description. When imposing sentence the trial judge described that part of the appellant’s evidence which asserted that a large company, with audit procedures in place, permitted the chief accountant to put cheques into his private account in the fashion suggested as “manifest nonsense and treated by the jury as such”.
3 It is difficult to appreciate why the Crown, given the strength of its case, chose to embark upon the tender of evidence not directly touching upon the crimes charged which it must have known was at least, arguably inadmissible and, for the reasons given by Barr J, was in fact inadmissible.
4 The strength of the Crown case, absent the purported tendency or coincidence evidence, is so powerful as to have given me significant pause before declining to apply the proviso to s 6(1) of the Criminal Appeal Act and dismissing the appeal. However, in the light of the concession by Crown counsel in the appeal (who did not prosecute in the District Court) and the centrality of the credibility of the appellant to the issues of trial I share the conclusion that it cannot appropriately be applied in this case.
5 I agree with the orders proposed by Barr J.
6 BARR J: This is an appeal by Thomas Douglas Watkins against his conviction following a trial by jury in the District Court on thirty counts, each of which charged that he, being an officer of a body corporate, deposited its cheque to the credit of his own bank account with intent to cheat and defraud the body corporate. The appellant also seeks leave to appeal against the resulting sentences. The Crown appeals against the sentences.
7 The appellant was born on 2 November 1938. He trained and qualified as an accountant. During the early 1990s he was engaged as a consultant to a wholesale timber merchant called Tasman KB Pty…
Continue reading R v Watkins
Sign in free to access the full text
- AGLC
- R v Watkins [2005] NSWCCA 164
- Case
- [2005] NSWCCA 164
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court of Criminal Appeal found that the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of Watkins' past convictions for larceny as a clerk in 1984, as well as a letter and interview records from those proceedings. The court held that this evidence was not admissible under the tendency and coincidence rules of the Evidence Act because it lacked significant probative value and carried a high risk of unfair prejudice. The Court concluded that the prejudicial effect of this evidence substantially outweighed its probative value, and therefore, it should not have been admitted.
Given the erroneous admission of this evidence, the Court of Criminal Appeal allowed Watkins' appeal, quashed his conviction, and ordered a new trial. The Court emphasised the strength of the Crown's case against Watkins, absent the inadmissible evidence, but noted that the admission of this evidence was likely to have influenced the jury's assessment of Watkins' credibility, which was critical to the case. The Court also highlighted the regrettability of setting aside Watkins' convictions due to the Crown's reliance on inadmissible evidence.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Full text does not contain this section.