Walsh v The State of Western Australia

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT  :   THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)

CITATION:   WALSH -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2024] WASCA 78

CORAM:   MAZZA JA

HALL JA

VANDONGEN JA

HEARD:   2 APRIL 2024

DELIVERED          :   3 JULY 2024

FILE NO/S:   CACR 58 of 2023

BETWEEN:   JAY RIORDON WALSH

Appellant

AND

THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Respondent

FILE NO/S:   CACR 59 of 2023

BETWEEN:   JAY RIORDON WALSH

Appellant

AND

THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction              :   DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram:   MASSEY DCJ

File Number            :   IND 1032 of 2021


Catchwords:

Criminal law - Appeal against conviction - Whether trial judge erred in refusing to discharge the jury as a consequence of statements made in prosecutor's closing address - Whether directions regarding propensity reasoning and cross-admissibility sufficient - Appeal against sentence - Whether sentence infringed totality principle

Legislation:

Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA), s 27(3), s 30(3), s 30(4)
Criminal Code (WA), s 189(1)(iii) (repealed), s 190 (repealed), s 321(4), s 321(8)(b), s 322(2), s 322(4)
Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA), s 116
Evidence Act 1906 (WA), s 31A
Sentencing Act 1995 (WA), s 7

Result:

CACR 58 of 2023
Leave to appeal on grounds 1 and 2 refused
Appeal dismissed

CACR 59 of 2023
Leave to appeal refused
Appeal dismissed

Category:    B

Representation:

CACR 58 of 2023

Counsel:

Appellant : S A Auburn & J A Davies
Respondent : G N Beggs

Solicitors:

Appellant : Scerri Legal
Respondent : Director of Public Prosecutions (WA)

CACR 59 of 2023

Counsel:

Appellant : S Auburn & J A Davies
Respondent : G N Beggs

Solicitors:

Appellant : Scerri Legal
Respondent : Director of Public Prosecutions (WA)

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

Crofts v The Queen [1996] HCA 22; (1996) 186 CLR 427

Dayananda v The State of Western Australia [2021] WASCA 11

Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Benjamin Roder (a pseudonym) [2024] HCA 15; (2024) 98 ALJR 644

DKA v The State of Western Australia [2017] WASCA 44

Dupas v The Queen [2010] HCA 20; (2010) 241 CLR 237

Eric v The State of Western Australia [2019] WASCA 101

EXF v The State of Western Australia [2015] WASCA 118

GHK v The State of Western Australia [2014] WASCA 19; (2014) 238 A Crim R 178

Gilbert v The Queen [2000] HCA 15; (2000) 201 CLR 414

Goedecke v The State of Western Australia [2013] WASCA 25

Gray v The State of Western Australia [2015] WASCA 108; (2015) 71 MVR 31

Guagliardo v The State of Western Australia [2023] WASCA 71

Gulyas v The State of Western Australia [2007] WASCA 263; (2007) 178 A Crim R 539

Headley v The State of Western Australia [2018] WASCA 37

Hofer v The Queen [2021] HCA 36; (2021) 274 CLR 351

House v The King [1936] HCA 40; (1936) 55 CLR 499

Ilievski v The King; Nolan v The King (No 2) [2023] NSWCCA 248;

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Details
Case
[2024] WASCA 78
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter before the court was an appeal against both the conviction and sentence of the appellant, Mr Walsh, by the State of Western Australia. The crux of the appeal was twofold: firstly, whether the trial judge erred in not discharging the jury following comments made in the prosecutor's closing address; and secondly, whether the sentence imposed contravened the totality principle. The appellant argued that the trial judge's instructions to the jury were insufficient to counteract the prejudicial impact of the prosecutor's remarks, and that the sentence was excessively harsh given the totality of the circumstances.

The court examined whether the trial judge's directions to the jury, which emphasised the need to disregard any suggestion that the appellant tailored his evidence in response to the prosecution's case, were adequate to mitigate the potential prejudice caused by the prosecutor's comments. The court also scrutinised whether the trial judge's instructions on the principles of propensity reasoning and cross-admissibility were sufficient. Furthermore, the court assessed whether the sentence imposed by the trial judge adhered to the principle of totality, which requires that the overall punishment not exceed what is proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the circumstances of the offender.

The court determined that the trial judge's directions to the jury were robust and sufficient to ensure that any prejudice arising from the prosecutor's comments was adequately mitigated. The court found that the trial judge's instructions properly reinforced the principle that the appellant, as a witness, was to be treated no differently from any other witness, thereby neutralising the potential prejudicial effect of the prosecutor's remarks. In addition, the court held that the sentence imposed was proportionate to the nature and circumstances of the offence and did not infringe the principle of totality. The appeal against both the conviction and the sentence was therefore dismissed.

The final orders of the court were that the appeal against the conviction and the appeal against the sentence be dismissed, and that the original judgment and sentence of the trial court be affirmed.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Later, at the end of the trial, the trial judge gave the jury the following instructions, which he also said were binding on them:[13][13] ts 1316 - 1317.There's one other aspect that I need to direct you on before I come to the longer of the warnings I've still got to give and that's this. You'll recall that [the prosecutor] asked the accused about him having access to the brief of evidence in this case including statements of witnesses.And [the prosecutor] quite properly prefaced those questions by saying she was not suggesting there was anything improper about that. During the course of her closing address she went on to remind you of that evidence, but went on to say you could be satisfied the accused knew the case he was going to have to meet and had tailored his evidence accordingly.I gave you some directions about that when it occurred and I said I would repeat them again which is what I'm about to do. As I said to you at the time, the accused is entitled by law, it's his statutory entitlement to have served on him all evidence in the possession of the prosecution authorities including not only the [Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions], but also the police which is relevant to the charges he faces.The accused is entitled to know the case he has to meet which you might think would be a matter of common sense and as part of that process must be served with any material which might assist in his defence. There's nothing unusual or sinister about that. The prosecution are required to serve it on him.It's also a fundamental requirement of our system of justice that the prosecution present its evidence against the accused before he's called upon to make an election as to whether give, call or adduce evidence and the accused is required to be in court while the prosecution witnesses given [sic] their evidence.That is simply the way our system works. So it's therefore inappropriate to reason that the accused has tailored his evidence accordingly. And I'm sure [the prosecutor] didn't mean it in this way, but I need to deal with it. Such a submission undermines the accused's right as a witness to be treated as any other witness which should be perfectly obvious to you.When the accused elected to give evidence, he became a witness like any other witness in this case. He is entitled to have his evidence considered in precisely the same way as any other witness in this case. As I said, every accused person receives the prosecution brief, the statements of witnesses and sits through the trial before they are required to give evidence.You should under no circumstances discount the accused's evidence because of the fact that he is the accused person and he's received that prosecution brief. As I've said, he is entitled to the same considerations in relation to [h]is evidence as any other witness is entitled to.And so you should disregard any suggestion that the accused has tailored his evidence to meet the prosecution case. You should simply disregard it. It is irrelevant to your determinations and as I said undermines the fundamental requirement that you treat the accused as a witness in this case as you would any other witness. (emphasis added)

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established