DKA v The State of Western Australia

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT :   THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)

CITATION:   DKA -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2017] WASCA 44

CORAM:   BUSS P

MAZZA JA
BEECH J

HEARD:   21 FEBRUARY 2017

DELIVERED          :   13 MARCH 2017

FILE NO/S:   CACR 70 of 2016

CACR 71 of 2016

BETWEEN:   DKA

Appellant

AND

THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction              :  DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram  :O'NEAL DCJ

File No  :IND 959 of 2015

Catchwords:

Criminal law - Serious sexual offences - Evidence - Propensity evidence - Evidence of other witnesses of low level inappropriate conduct of a sexual nature - Whether proposed propensity evidence had significant probative value

Legislation:

Evidence Act 1906 (WA), s 31A

Result:

Appeal against conviction allowed
Convictions on counts 1 to 17 quashed
Retrial ordered in relation to counts 1 to 17
Appeal against sentence dismissed

Category:    A

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant:     Mr T F Percy QC & Mr G C R Yin

Respondent:     Mr R G Wilson

Solicitors:

Appellant:     D G Price & Co, Barristers & Solicitors

Respondent:     Director of Public Prosecutions (WA)

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

AJE v The State of Western Australia [2012] WASCA 185; (2012) 225 A Crim R 242

BP v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 303

Dair v The State of Western Australia [2008] WASCA 72; (2008) 36 WAR 413

Daniels v The State of Western Australia [2012] WASCA 213; (2012) 226 A Crim R 61

DAO v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 63; (2011) 81 NSWLR 568

Donaldson v The State of Western Australia [2005] WASCA 196; (2005) 31 WAR 122

El‑Haddad v The Queen [2015] NSWCCA 10; (2015) 88 NSWLR 93

House v The King [1936] HCA 40; (1936) 55 CLR 499

Hughes v The Queen [2015] NSWCCA 330

Ibrahim v Pham [2007] NSWCCA 215

IMM v The Queen [2016] HCA 14; (2016) 90 ALJR 529

Johnson v Johnson [2000] HCA 48; (2000) 201 CLR 488

KJM v The Queen (No 2) [2011] VSCA 268; (2011) 33 VR 11

LFG v The State of Western Australia [2015] WASCA 88; (2015) 48 WAR 178

McCartney v The Queen [2012] VSCA 268; (2012) 226 A Crim R 274

Preston v The State of Western Australia [2012] WASCA 64; (2012) 220 A Crim R 347

R v Ford [2009] NSWCCA 306; (2009) 201 A Crim R 451

Saoud v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 136; (2014) 87 NSWLR 481

Stubley v The State of Western Australia [2011] HCA 7; (2011) 242 CLR 374

Velkoski v The Queen [2014] VSCA 121; (2014) 45 VR 680

Vojneski v The Queen [2016] ACTCA 57

REASONS OF THE COURT:   

Introduction

  1. On 3 March 2016, the appellant was convicted, after a trial before O'Neal DCJ and a jury, of 17 counts of serious sexual offending against his step‑granddaughter (RA) and of one count of threatening to kill his step‑grandson…

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Details
Case
[2017] WASCA 44
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

DKA v The State of Western Australia is a case that concerns the admissibility of propensity evidence in criminal proceedings. The dispute arose from the appellant's conviction for serious sexual offences, where the State sought to introduce evidence of the appellant's inappropriate conduct of a sexual nature towards other witnesses. The issue before the court was whether the proposed propensity evidence had significant probative value and whether its admission would cause an unfair trial. The court was required to decide whether the evidence met the criteria set out in section 31A of the Evidence Act, specifically whether it had significant probative value and whether the probative value outweighed the risk of an unfair trial.

The court carefully considered the nature and relevance of the evidence in question, applying the statutory framework provided by section 31A. The court held that propensity evidence must be capable of rationally affecting, to a significant extent, the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue. It also noted that the term "significant" in "significant probative value" connotes "important" or "of consequence." The court found that the evidence in question did not have significant probative value as it was not sufficiently relevant to the facts in issue. Furthermore, the court held that even if the evidence had significant probative value, the risk of an unfair trial would outweigh the probative value, as the evidence could unduly prejudice the jury against the appellant.

In light of the court's findings, the appeal was allowed, and the convictions were quashed. The court emphasised the importance of striking a balance between the probative value of evidence and the risk of an unfair trial, and it held that in this case, the risk of an unfair trial was too great to justify the admission of the propensity evidence. The court's decision highlights the stringent requirements that must be met for propensity evidence to be admitted in criminal proceedings.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Section 31A of the Evidence Act provides as follows:31A.Propensity and relationship evidence (1)In this section - propensity evidence means - (a)similar fact evidence or other evidence of the conduct of the accused person; or (b)evidence of the character or reputation of the accused person or of a tendency that the accused person has or had; relationship evidence means evidence of the attitude or conduct of the accused person towards another person, or a class of persons, over a period of time. (2)Propensity evidence or relationship evidence is admissible in proceedings for an offence if the court considers - (a)that the evidence would, either by itself or having regard to other evidence adduced or to be adduced, have significant probative value; and (b)that the probative value of the evidence compared to the degree of risk of an unfair trial, is such that fair-minded people would think that the public interest in adducing all relevant evidence of guilt must have priority over the risk of an unfair trial. The appellant accepts that, given the broad definition of propensity evidence, the evidence in question was propensity evidence. The issue is whether the two requirements in pars (a) and (b) of s 31A(2) were satisfied. As to whether evidence has significant probative value, the following is well‑established:(a)Evidence has 'probative value' if the evidence could rationally affect, directly or indirectly, the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue.(b)The test in s 31A(2)(a) will be satisfied if the court 'considers' (that is, thinks) that the propensity evidence 'would' (as distinct from could), either by itself or having regard to other evidence adduced or to be adduced, rationally affect, to a significant extent, the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue.(c)The adjective 'significant', in the phrase 'significant probative value' in s 31A(2)(a), connotes 'important' or 'of consequence'.(d)If propensity evidence has 'probative value' then whether the probative value is 'significant' will depend upon the nature of the fact in issue to which it is relevant, and the significance or importance which the propensity evidence, either by itself or having regard to other evidence adduced or to be adduced, has in proving that fact.[9][9] Dair v The State of Western Australia [2008] WASCA 72; (2008) 36 WAR 413 [60] ‑ [61]; Daniels v The State of Western Australia [2012] WASCA 213; (2012) 226 A Crim R 61 [47] ‑ [49]; LFG v The State of Western Australia [2015] WASCA 88; (2015) 48 WAR 178 [290]; see also, in a similar but not identical statutory setting, IMM v The Queen [2016] HCA 14; (2016) 90 ALJR 529 [46], [103]. The authorities establish the following points as to the comparison required by s 31A(2)(b). First, s 31A(2)(b) requires the court to assess the degree of risk of unfairness at trial that will be occasioned by the admission of the evidence in question, the court having already found under s 31A(2)(a) that the evidence has significant probative value. Secondly, when assessing the risk of an unfair trial for this purpose, the court must take into account any directions that might be given to the jury in an attempt to overcome the prejudice, and their likely effect on the jury. Thirdly, after identifying the probative value of the evidence in question and the degree of risk of an unfair trial, the court must consider the conclusion that fair-minded people would draw from a comparison of these issues. Although fair-minded people are reasonable members of the general community who are not lawyers, it must be assumed that such people have informed themselves of 'at least the most basic considerations relevant to arriving at a conclusion founded on a fair understanding of all the relevant circumstances'.[10] [10] Dair [62] ‑ [67]; Daniels [50]; LFG [291]; quoting Johnson v Johnson [2000] HCA 48; (2000) 201 CLR 488 [53] (Kirby J).

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established