Dair v The State of Western Australia

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT  :   THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)

CITATION:   DAIR -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2008] WASCA 72

CORAM:   STEYTLER P

MILLER JA
EM HEENAN AJA

HEARD:   5 FEBRUARY 2008

DELIVERED          :   27 MARCH 2008

FILE NO/S:   CACR 33 of 2007

CACR 32 of 2007

BETWEEN:   DEVRON DAIR

Appellant

AND

THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction              :  DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram  :HEALY DCJ

File No  :IND 576 of 2004

Catchwords:

Criminal law - Appeal against conviction - Unlawfully doing grievous bodily harm with intent to maim, disfigure, disable or do grievous bodily harm - Admissibility of evidence relating to identification - Circumstantial evidence and not positive identification - Admissibility of evidence of past convictions - Section 31A Evidence Act1906 (WA) - Evidence of recognition

Evidence - Admissibility of evidence falling short of identification - Circumstantial evidence - Appropriate directions - Admissibility of past convictions - Section 31A Evidence Act1906 (WA) - Meaning of 'significant probative value' - Whether probative value outweighed risk of an unfair trial - Evidence of recognition - Extent to which witness could give evidence of special features relating to appellant

Criminal law - Sentencing - Unlawfully doing grievous bodily harm with intent to maim, disfigure, disable or do grievous bodily harm - Sentence of 8 years' imprisonment without parole - Whether manifestly excessive - Whether sentencing judge erred in failing to take into account time previously spent in custody - Appellant in custody 3 years 4 months prior to arrest and taken into custody for present offence

Legislation:

Criminal Code (WA)
Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA), s 98(2)(a)
Evidence Act 1906 (WA), s 31A
Sentencing Act (WA)
Sentencing Legislation Amendment and Repeal Act 2003 (WA)

Result:

Appeal against conviction allowed

Category:    A

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant:     Mr M R Gunning

Respondent:     Mr S E Stone

Solicitors:

Appellant:     Gunning Young

Respondent:     Director of Public Prosecutions (WA)

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Australian National Industries Ltd v Spedley Securities Ltd (in liq) (1992) 26 NSWLR 411

Azarian v The State of Western Australia [2007] WASCA 249

BRS v The Queen [1997] HCA 47; (1997) 191 CLR 275

Davies v The King (1937) 57 CLR 170

Di Lena v The State of Western Australia [2006] WASCA 162; (2006) 165 A Crim R 482

Director of Public Prosecutions v P [1991] 2 AC 447

Domican v The Queen (1992) 173 CLR 555

Donaldson v The State of Western Australia [2005] WASCA 196; (2005) 31 WAR 122

DPP v Boardman [1975] AC 421

Festa v The Queen [2001] HCA 72; (2001) 208 CLR 593

Fordham (1997) 98 A Crim R 359

Gipp v The Queen [1998] HCA 21; (1998) 194 CLR 106

Goldsmith v Sandilands [2002] HCA 31; (2002) 76 ALJR 1024

Harriman v The Queen (1989) 169 CLR 590

Hoch v The Queen (1988) 165 CLR 292

Jacara Pty Ltd v Perpetual Trustees WA Ltd [2000]…

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Details
Case
[2008] WASCA 72
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Dair v The State of Western Australia, the appellant was convicted of unlawfully doing grievous bodily harm with intent to maim, disfigure, disable or do grievous bodily harm. The case was heard in the Court of Appeal, which was required to determine the admissibility of certain evidence presented in the trial and the fairness of the sentencing. The issues at hand were whether the evidence presented had significant probative value and whether the sentence was manifestly excessive. The court also had to consider the admissibility of evidence of past convictions under Section 31A of the Evidence Act 1906 (WA).

The court determined that the evidence presented had significant probative value, as it could rationally affect the assessment of the probability of the relevant fact in issue to a significant extent. The court also found that the probative value of the evidence outweighed the risk of an unfair trial, and that the evidence of recognition was admissible. The court held that the sentencing judge did not err in failing to take into account the time previously spent in custody, and that the sentence of 8 years' imprisonment without parole was not manifestly excessive.

The appeal against conviction was allowed, and the appellant's conviction was quashed. The case was remitted to the Supreme Court for a new trial. The court did not make any orders in relation to the sentence, as the appeal against conviction was allowed.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeal against conviction allowed

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Section 31A was introduced in the Evidence Act 1906 by s 13 of the Criminal Law Amendment (Sexual Assault and Other Matters) Act 2004 (WA). As Miller JA has said, the introduction of that provision was designed to give the courts greater capacity to admit propensity and relationship evidence: Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 30 June 2004, 4608 (Mr JA McGinty, Attorney General). The section reads as follows:31A.Propensity and relationship evidence(1)In this section ‑ 'propensity evidence' means ‑ (a)similar fact evidence or other evidence of the conduct of the accused person; or(b)evidence of the character or reputation of the accused person or of a tendency that the accused person has or had;'relationship evidence' means evidence of the attitude or conduct of the accused person towards another person, or a class of persons, over a period of time.(2)Propensity evidence or relationship evidence is admissible in proceedings for an offence if the court considers ‑ (a)that the evidence would, either by itself or having regard to other evidence adduced or to be adduced, have significant probative value; and(b)that the probative value of the evidence compared to the degree of risk of an unfair trial, is such that fair minded people would think that the public interest in adducing all relevant evidence of guilt must have priority over the risk of an unfair trial.(3)In considering the probative value of evidence for the purposes of subsection (2) it is not open to the court to have regard to the possibility that the evidence may be the result of collusion, concoction or suggestion. Miller JA has pointed out that the wording of s 31A(2)(b) has been taken from the dissenting judgment of McHugh J in Pfennig (529). A different statutory approach has been taken in other States. So, for example, in Victoria s 398A(2) of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) provides that propensity evidence relevant to facts in issue in a proceeding for an offence 'is admissible if the court considers that in all the circumstances it is just to admit it despite any prejudicial effect it may have on the person charged with the offence'. That section adopts the approach taken by the English common law in cases such as DPP v P, rather than that adopted under Australian common law: R v Best [1998] 4 VR 603, 609; R v Tektonopoulos [1999] VSCA 93; [1999] 2 VR 412 [18]. The Victorian Court of Appeal has held that subs 398A(2) enacted a broad exclusionary rule extending to any evidence of discreditable conduct 'which may cause the jury to infer that a person who has been responsible for or involved in these acts is likely by reason of that fact to have committed the crime charged': Best, 608 (Callaway JA); Tektonopoulos [21]; R v Mateiasevici [1999] VSCA 120; [1999] 3 VR 185. The subsection applies whether or not the evidence is tendered for propensity purposes, although the purpose for which it is admitted remains relevant when considering whether it is 'just' to admit it: Tektonopoulos [24] ‑ [25] (Winneke P); R v Alexander [2002] VSCA 183; (2002) 6 VR 53 [43] (Winneke P).

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Before evidence can have significant probative value it must be such as 'could rationally affect the assessment of the probability of the relevant fact in issue to a significant extent: ie, more is required than mere … relevance': Zaknic Pty Ltd v Svelte Corporation Pty Ltd (1995) 61 FCR 171, 175 ‑ 176. Heydon [21245] suggests that significant probative value is something more than mere relevance but something less than a 'substantial' degree of relevance and that it is a probative value which is 'important' or 'of consequence'. He makes the point that the significance of the probative value of tendency evidence must depend on the nature of the facts in issue to which it is relevant and the significance or importance which that evidence may have in establishing the fact: Lockyer (1996) 89 A Crim R 457, 459; Lock (1997) 91 A Crim R 356, 360 ‑ 361; Fordham (1997) 98 A Crim R 359, 370; Jacara Pty Ltd v Perpetual Trustees WA Ltd [2000] FCA 1886; (2000) 106 FCR 51 [77] ‑ [82]; The State of Western Australia v Osborne [2007] WASCA 183 [13]. Once the evidence is found to have significant probative value, either by itself or taken with other evidence, the court must engage in the process contemplated by s 31A(2)(b). Because there will already have been an assessment of the probative value of the evidence (taking into account the purpose for which it is adduced and its likely effect when considered together with the other evidence), it is necessary, next, to assess the degree of risk of unfairness in the trial that will be brought about by the admission of the evidence. Geoffrey Flatman QC and Dr Mirko Bagaric, 'Non‑similar Fact Propensity Evidence: Admissibility, Dangers and Jury Directions' (2001) 75 Australian Law Journal 190, 199, identify a threefold prejudice (only part of which is present in this case) involved in the introduction of similar fact evidence, as follows:1.'The over strong tendency to believe that the defendant is guilty of the charge merely because he is a likely person to do such acts' (Wigmore, Evidence (1940), p 650; see also Waight and Williams, [Evidence: Commentary and Materials (5th ed, LBC, 1998)], p 426 (citing R v Bailey [1924] 2 KB 300 at 305: 'it is easy to derive from a series of unsatisfactory allegations … an accusation which at least appears satisfactory … to collect from a mass of ingredients, not one of which is sufficient, a totality which will appear to contain what is missing')). This comes down to the belief that the jury will over‑estimate the cogency of the similar fact evidence; the jury may act illogically by giving too much weight to the evidence. In BRS v The Queen ((1997) 191 CLR 275) Kirby J stated:'research confirms the common tendency to infer from particular conduct character traits which are then used to justify predictions and estimates about other conduct. However, objectively, such predictions are frequently shown to be unwarranted (Ibid at 322).'2.'The tendency to condemn, not because he is believed guilty of the present charge, but because he has escaped punishment from other offences' (Wigmore … p 650). Thus, 'there might be a tendency for the jury to punish the accused for past misconduct by finding the accused guilty of the offence charged' (R v Rarru (1996) 107 CCC (3d) 82). This second danger refers not to a possible defect in logic that may be triggered by similar fact evidence, but the fear that the jury will convict solely due to a bias against the accused: 'sentiments of revulsion and condemnation … might well deflect [the jury] from the rational dispassionate analysis upon which the criminal process should rest' (Ibid). In short, it is thought that the reception of similar fact evidence may result in a bias being formed against the accused which will taint the jury's decision.3.'The jury might become confused [or distracted] as it concentrates on resolving whether the accused actually committed the similar acts' (Ibid; see also … Pfenning v The Queen (1995) 182 CLR 461 at 512). (See also Heydon [21135] ‑ [21150].)