JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
TITLE OF COURT : THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)
CITATION: DAIR -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2008] WASCA 72
CORAM: STEYTLER P
MILLER JA
EM HEENAN AJA
HEARD: 5 FEBRUARY 2008
DELIVERED : 27 MARCH 2008
FILE NO/S: CACR 33 of 2007
CACR 32 of 2007
BETWEEN: DEVRON DAIR
Appellant
AND
THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent
ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction : DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram :HEALY DCJ
File No :IND 576 of 2004
Catchwords:
Criminal law - Appeal against conviction - Unlawfully doing grievous bodily harm with intent to maim, disfigure, disable or do grievous bodily harm - Admissibility of evidence relating to identification - Circumstantial evidence and not positive identification - Admissibility of evidence of past convictions - Section 31A Evidence Act1906 (WA) - Evidence of recognition
Evidence - Admissibility of evidence falling short of identification - Circumstantial evidence - Appropriate directions - Admissibility of past convictions - Section 31A Evidence Act1906 (WA) - Meaning of 'significant probative value' - Whether probative value outweighed risk of an unfair trial - Evidence of recognition - Extent to which witness could give evidence of special features relating to appellant
Criminal law - Sentencing - Unlawfully doing grievous bodily harm with intent to maim, disfigure, disable or do grievous bodily harm - Sentence of 8 years' imprisonment without parole - Whether manifestly excessive - Whether sentencing judge erred in failing to take into account time previously spent in custody - Appellant in custody 3 years 4 months prior to arrest and taken into custody for present offence
Legislation:
Criminal Code (WA)
Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA), s 98(2)(a)
Evidence Act 1906 (WA), s 31A
Sentencing Act (WA)
Sentencing Legislation Amendment and Repeal Act 2003 (WA)
Result:
Appeal against conviction allowed
Category: A
Representation:
Counsel:
Appellant: Mr M R Gunning
Respondent: Mr S E Stone
Solicitors:
Appellant: Gunning Young
Respondent: Director of Public Prosecutions (WA)
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
Australian National Industries Ltd v Spedley Securities Ltd (in liq) (1992) 26 NSWLR 411
Azarian v The State of Western Australia [2007] WASCA 249
BRS v The Queen [1997] HCA 47; (1997) 191 CLR 275
Davies v The King (1937) 57 CLR 170
Di Lena v The State of Western Australia [2006] WASCA 162; (2006) 165 A Crim R 482
Director of Public Prosecutions v P [1991] 2 AC 447
Domican v The Queen (1992) 173 CLR 555
Donaldson v The State of Western Australia [2005] WASCA 196; (2005) 31 WAR 122
Festa v The Queen [2001] HCA 72; (2001) 208 CLR 593
Fordham (1997) 98 A Crim R 359
Gipp v The Queen [1998] HCA 21; (1998) 194 CLR 106
Goldsmith v Sandilands [2002] HCA 31; (2002) 76 ALJR 1024
Harriman v The Queen (1989) 169 CLR 590
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- Case
- [2008] WASCA 72
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court determined that the evidence presented had significant probative value, as it could rationally affect the assessment of the probability of the relevant fact in issue to a significant extent. The court also found that the probative value of the evidence outweighed the risk of an unfair trial, and that the evidence of recognition was admissible. The court held that the sentencing judge did not err in failing to take into account the time previously spent in custody, and that the sentence of 8 years' imprisonment without parole was not manifestly excessive.
The appeal against conviction was allowed, and the appellant's conviction was quashed. The case was remitted to the Supreme Court for a new trial. The court did not make any orders in relation to the sentence, as the appeal against conviction was allowed.
Orders
Orders of the court
Appeal against conviction allowed
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Before evidence can have significant probative value it must be such as 'could rationally affect the assessment of the probability of the relevant fact in issue to a significant extent: ie, more is required than mere … relevance': Zaknic Pty Ltd v Svelte Corporation Pty Ltd (1995) 61 FCR 171, 175 ‑ 176. Heydon [21245] suggests that significant probative value is something more than mere relevance but something less than a 'substantial' degree of relevance and that it is a probative value which is 'important' or 'of consequence'. He makes the point that the significance of the probative value of tendency evidence must depend on the nature of the facts in issue to which it is relevant and the significance or importance which that evidence may have in establishing the fact: Lockyer (1996) 89 A Crim R 457, 459; Lock (1997) 91 A Crim R 356, 360 ‑ 361; Fordham (1997) 98 A Crim R 359, 370; Jacara Pty Ltd v Perpetual Trustees WA Ltd [2000] FCA 1886; (2000) 106 FCR 51 [77] ‑ [82]; The State of Western Australia v Osborne [2007] WASCA 183 [13]. Once the evidence is found to have significant probative value, either by itself or taken with other evidence, the court must engage in the process contemplated by s 31A(2)(b). Because there will already have been an assessment of the probative value of the evidence (taking into account the purpose for which it is adduced and its likely effect when considered together with the other evidence), it is necessary, next, to assess the degree of risk of unfairness in the trial that will be brought about by the admission of the evidence. Geoffrey Flatman QC and Dr Mirko Bagaric, 'Non‑similar Fact Propensity Evidence: Admissibility, Dangers and Jury Directions' (2001) 75 Australian Law Journal 190, 199, identify a threefold prejudice (only part of which is present in this case) involved in the introduction of similar fact evidence, as follows:1.'The over strong tendency to believe that the defendant is guilty of the charge merely because he is a likely person to do such acts' (Wigmore, Evidence (1940), p 650; see also Waight and Williams, [Evidence: Commentary and Materials (5th ed, LBC, 1998)], p 426 (citing R v Bailey [1924] 2 KB 300 at 305: 'it is easy to derive from a series of unsatisfactory allegations … an accusation which at least appears satisfactory … to collect from a mass of ingredients, not one of which is sufficient, a totality which will appear to contain what is missing')). This comes down to the belief that the jury will over‑estimate the cogency of the similar fact evidence; the jury may act illogically by giving too much weight to the evidence. In BRS v The Queen ((1997) 191 CLR 275) Kirby J stated:'research confirms the common tendency to infer from particular conduct character traits which are then used to justify predictions and estimates about other conduct. However, objectively, such predictions are frequently shown to be unwarranted (Ibid at 322).'2.'The tendency to condemn, not because he is believed guilty of the present charge, but because he has escaped punishment from other offences' (Wigmore … p 650). Thus, 'there might be a tendency for the jury to punish the accused for past misconduct by finding the accused guilty of the offence charged' (R v Rarru (1996) 107 CCC (3d) 82). This second danger refers not to a possible defect in logic that may be triggered by similar fact evidence, but the fear that the jury will convict solely due to a bias against the accused: 'sentiments of revulsion and condemnation … might well deflect [the jury] from the rational dispassionate analysis upon which the criminal process should rest' (Ibid). In short, it is thought that the reception of similar fact evidence may result in a bias being formed against the accused which will taint the jury's decision.3.'The jury might become confused [or distracted] as it concentrates on resolving whether the accused actually committed the similar acts' (Ibid; see also … Pfenning v The Queen (1995) 182 CLR 461 at 512). (See also Heydon [21135] ‑ [21150].)