The State of Western Australia v Te

Link copied
Case Copied 28 min read

JURISDICTION     :   DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CRIMINAL

LOCATION:   PERTH

CITATION:   THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA -v- TE [2023] WADC 86

CORAM:   TROY DCJ

HEARD:   2 & 13 JUNE 2023

DELIVERED          :   23 JUNE 2023

PUBLISHED           :   18 MARCH 2024

FILE NO/S:   IND BRO 5 of 2022

IND BRO 4 of 2023

BETWEEN:   THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

AND

TE


Catchwords:

Cross-admissibility where issue is consent - Tendency - Significant probative value - Application to join counts granted

Legislation:

Evidence Act 1906 (WA), s 31A

Result:

Cross-admissibility established
Application for joint indictment granted

Representation:

Counsel:

The State of Western Australia : Ms D E Aldous
Accused : Mr D Robinson

Solicitors:

The State of Western Australia : State Director of Public Prosecutions
Accused : Albert Wolff Chambers

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

Dair v The State of Western Australia [2008] WASCA 72

DKA v The State of Western Australia [2017] WASCA 44

Donaldson v The State of Western Australia [2005] WASCA 196

Glen Jacobs (a pseudonym) v The Queen [2017] VSCA 309

Hughes v The Queen (2017) 263 CLR 338

LFG v The State of Western Australia [2015] WASCA 88; (2015) 250 A Crim R 252

Phillips v The Queen (2006) 225 CLR 303

PRS v The State of Western Australia [2023] WASCA 106

RMD v The State of Western Australia [2017] WASCA 70

Stubley v The State of Western Australia (2011) 242 CLR 374

The State of Western Australia v ATM [2022] WADC 78

The State of Western Australia v JHN [2021] WASCA 225

The State of Western Australia v Osborne [2007] WASCA 183

TROY DCJ:

Introduction

  1. These are the reasons for the decision I announced on 23 June 2023.  The accused, TE presently faces an indictment which contains one count.  The State have applied to amend the indictment by adding a second count.  At the time of the hearing before me on 13 June 2023 the matter had not yet been listed for trial or trials but that occurred on 27 June 2023.  Each of the proposed counts allege a sexual offence.  Each of the counts involve a separate complainant.  The defence on each count is consent.

  2. In applying, on 23 March 2023, to amend the indictment by adding a second count, the State filed a formal application seeking orders that the evidence relating to each proposed count on the indictment is cross‑admissible, applying s 31A of the Evidence Act1906 (WA) (Evidence Act).

  3. The defence opposed the application.

  4. I was assisted by the respective written submissions, augmented by oral argument on 13 June 2023 together with further written submissions on what might be termed the 'Phillips issue'.

Section 31A of the Evidence Act

  1. Section 31A of the Evidence Act provides:

    31APropensity and relationship evidence

    (1)In this section -

    propensity evidence means -

    (a)similar fact evidence or other evidence of the conduct of the accused person; or

    (b)evidence of the character or reputation of the accused person or of a tendency that…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read The State of Western Australia v Te and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2023] WADC 86
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The State of Western Australia brought proceedings against Te, involving two charges of sexual assault against two different complainants, SM and RE. SM alleged that she had been assaulted while sleeping on a couch at the accused's house, while RE alleged that she had been assaulted after a night of drinking with the accused at his house. The trial was before the District Court of Western Australia. The court was required to determine whether the evidence of one complainant could be used against the accused in relation to the charges involving the other complainant. The central legal issue was whether the evidence of one complainant was admissible under section 31A of the Evidence Act to prove the guilt of the accused in relation to the charges involving the other complainant.

The court considered the principles of cross-admissibility of evidence where the issue is consent. The court held that the evidence of one complainant could be used against the accused in relation to the charges involving the other complainant if the evidence had significant probative value and the probative value of the evidence compared to the degree of risk of an unfair trial was such that fair-minded people would think that the public interest in adducing all relevant evidence of guilt must have priority over the risk of an unfair trial. The court held that the evidence of both complainants had significant probative value and that the probative value of the evidence compared to the degree of risk of an unfair trial was such that fair-minded people would think that the public interest in adducing all relevant evidence of guilt must have priority over the risk of an unfair trial. The court therefore granted the application to join the counts.

The final orders of the court were that the application to join the counts was granted, and that the evidence of both complainants was admissible in relation to both counts.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Section 31A of the Evidence Act provides:31APropensity and relationship evidence(1)In this section -propensity evidence means -(a)similar fact evidence or other evidence of the conduct of the accused person; or(b)evidence of the character or reputation of the accused person or of a tendency that the accused person has or had;relationship evidence means evidence of the attitude or conduct of the accused person towards another person, or a class of persons, over a period of time.(2)Propensity evidence or relationship evidence is admissible in proceedings for an offence if the court considers -(a)that the evidence would, either by itself or having regard to other evidence adduced or to be adduced, have significant probative value; and(b)that the probative value of the evidence compared to the degree of risk of an unfair trial, is such that fair‑minded people would think that the public interest in adducing all relevant evidence of guilt must have priority over the risk of an unfair trial.(3)In considering the probative value of evidence for the purposes of subsection (2) it is not open to the court to have regard to the possibility that the evidence may be the result of collusion, concoction or suggestion. In a decision I published last year, The State of Western Australia v ATM [2022] WADC 78, I dealt with the issue of cross‑admissibility where the issue was consent. I endeavoured to identify the applicable principles at [6] - [10] and [86] - [94] and I apply them again without repetition. On proposed count 1, the complainant SM states that she had been a boarder at the accused's house for eight months prior to the alleged incident. He is a family friend that she had known her whole life. She was 28 at the time. He was 66. She described that on 8 September 2021 she drank a considerable amount of alcohol with friends, not including the accused. She was really drunk. She went back to the house where the accused was still awake. She laid down on a couch in the living room and fell asleep: pars 12 and 14 of her witness statement. She states at pars 15 - 19 that:15Next thing I knew I could feel something touching my vagina. It felt like fingers touching my vagina. 16I could feel that there was at least one finger up inside my vagina and it was moving in and out. 17I open my eyes and looked up. 18[The accused] was sitting on the couch next to my legs and I could see his hand going up my shorts. 19I screamed out 'Fuck off' and I hit him in the head with my right hand. Given that the defence is consent, these assertions are bound to be disputed. SM immediately called 000. Police arrived under priority two conditions at 4.30 am. On proposed count 2, (which is said to have occurred one year and eight days later) RE, in contrast to SM, was a visitor for the first time to the accused's house, as opposed to a lodger. She arrived on a Thursday morning to attend a funeral. The accused picked her up from a bus stop, she had a shower, dropped her things at his house and immediately went out drinking through to the Friday morning. The accused picked her up and took her home and nothing untoward happened at that stage.