Stubley v The State of Western Australia

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GUMMOW, HEYDON, CRENNAN, KIEFEL AND BELL JJ

ALAN JOHN STUBLEY  APPELLANT

AND

THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA  RESPONDENT

Stubley v Western Australia [2011] HCA 7
Date of Order:  20 October 2010
Date of Publication of Reasons:  30 March 2011
P29/2010

ORDER

1.        Appeal allowed.

2.Set aside the order of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Western Australia made on 3 March 2010 dismissing the appellant's appeal against conviction and, in place thereof, order that:

(a)the appeal to the Court of Appeal be allowed;

(b)the convictions of the appellant be set aside; and

(c)there be a new trial.

On appeal from the Supreme Court of Western Australia

Representation

D Grace QC with S Vandongen for the appellant (instructed by Michael Tudori & Associates)

J McGrath with D A Lima for the respondent (instructed by Director of Public Prosecutions (WA))

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

  1. GUMMOW, CRENNAN, KIEFEL AND BELL JJ.   After a trial in the Supreme Court of Western Australia, before Johnson J and a jury, the appellant was convicted of six offences of rape, an offence of attempting to commit rape and three offences of unlawful and indecent assault.  The appellant was sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment and made eligible for parole.  The appellant appealed against his conviction and sentence to the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.

  2. A majority of the Court of Appeal (Owen and Buss JJA, Pullin JA dissenting) upheld an appeal against sentence, reducing the term to six years' imprisonment.  The majority dismissed the appeal against the convictions[1].  On 30 July 2010, Hayne and Bell JJ granted the appellant special leave to appeal from that order.  On 20 October 2010, at the conclusion of the hearing of the appeal in the Full Court, orders were made allowing the appeal, setting aside the order of the Court of Appeal and the appellant's convictions and directing a new trial.  Our reasons for making those orders are as follows. 

  3. At issue in the appeal was the admissibility of the evidence of three witnesses, LB, MM and AW, of uncharged acts of sexual misconduct against them by the appellant. 

    Background facts

  4. The appellant was a medical practitioner with a specialist qualification in psychiatry.  Between 1965 and 2000, he had engaged in private practice as a psychiatrist and from about 1966 until about 1976 he also consulted as a psychiatrist at Royal Perth Hospital.

  5. Between 1975 and 1978, the appellant was alleged to have engaged in sexual activity with two women, JG and CL, without their consent.  Each was his patient at the time and the offences were alleged to have occurred in his consulting rooms during appointments scheduled for psychotherapy. 

  6. JG was the appellant's patient from 1974 to 1996.  The sexual encounters commenced between December 1975 and January 1976 and…

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Details
Case
[2011] HCA 7
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia heard an appeal from the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Western Australia concerning the admissibility of evidence in a criminal trial. The appellant, a former psychiatrist, was charged with sexual misconduct against two former patients, JG and CL. The prosecution sought to adduce evidence from three other former patients, LB, MM, and AW, regarding alleged uncharged acts of sexual misconduct by the appellant. The central dispute revolved around whether this evidence of uncharged acts possessed sufficient probative value to be admissible under section 31A of the *Evidence Act 1906* (WA).

The legal issues before the High Court were twofold. Firstly, it was necessary to determine whether the trial judge erred in ruling that the evidence of the three uncharged acts had "significant probative value" as required by section 31A(2)(a) of the *Evidence Act 1906* (WA). Secondly, the Court considered whether the appellant's concession of having consensual sexual activity with the complainants constituted an admission for the purposes of section 32 of the *Evidence Act 1906* (WA), and if so, whether this concession rendered consent the sole live issue at trial.

The High Court allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge had erred in admitting the evidence of the uncharged acts. The Court reasoned that for propensity or relationship evidence to have "significant probative value" under section 31A(2)(a), it must be capable of rationally affecting the assessment of the probability of a relevant fact in issue to a significant extent, requiring more than mere relevance. The Court concluded that the evidence of the uncharged acts, when considered in light of the specific allegations and the appellant's defence, did not meet this threshold of significant probative value. Consequently, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal allowed.

2. Set aside the order of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Western Australia made on 3 March 2010 dismissing the appellant's appeal against conviction and, in place thereof, order that:

(a) the appeal to the Court of Appeal be allowed;

(b) the convictions of the appellant be set aside; and

(c) there be a new trial.

Background

Background to the litigation

At issue in the appeal was the admissibility of the evidence of three witnesses, LB, MM and AW, of uncharged acts of sexual misconduct against them by the appellant. Background facts The appellant was a medical practitioner with a specialist qualification in psychiatry. Between 1965 and 2000, he had engaged in private practice as a psychiatrist and from about 1966 until about 1976 he also consulted as a psychiatrist at Royal Perth Hospital. Between 1975 and 1978, the appellant was alleged to have engaged in sexual activity with two women, JG and CL, without their consent. Each was his patient at the time and the offences were alleged to have occurred in his consulting rooms during appointments scheduled for psychotherapy. JG was the appellant's patient from 1974 to 1996. The sexual encounters commenced between December 1975 and January 1976 and ended some time before December 1980. In 1983, JG was questioned by a person from the Medical Board regarding an unspecified complaint. She did not speak about sexual intercourse on that occasion as she said she feared the appellant and that she would "end up in an institution". She made complaints, through her lawyers, to the Medical Board of Western Australia in 1996, and to the police in 2006. CL was a patient of the appellant between 1976 and 1981 and the sexual encounters extended over four years, commencing in 1977. CL made complaints to the Medical Board of Western Australia in 1981. The appellant was charged under the Criminal Code (WA) ("the Code") with 14 offences relating to sexual activity with JG and CL: seven counts of rape; one count of attempting to commit rape; and six counts of unlawful and indecent assault. The offences against JG were alleged to have been committed on unknown dates between 8 December 1975 and 31 August 1978. The offences against CL were alleged to have been committed on unknown dates between 1 January 1977 and 30 June 1978[2]. [2]Unless otherwise stated, references to the Criminal Code in these reasons are to the Criminal Code (WA), reprint as at 13 December 1983. Prior to the trial the prosecution notified the appellant that it intended to call LB, MM and AW to give evidence of indecent touching by him or sexual intercourse with him in his consulting rooms when they were his patients. No offences involving these three women were charged in the indictment. The admissibility of the evidence was determined under s 31A of the Evidence Act 1906 (WA). Section 31A Section 31A provides:"(1) In this section — propensity evidence means — (a)similar fact evidence or other evidence of the conduct of the accused person; or(b)evidence of the character or reputation of the accused person or of a tendency that the accused person has or had; relationship evidence means evidence of the attitude or conduct of the accused person towards another person, or a class of persons, over a period of time. (2)Propensity evidence or relationship evidence is admissible in proceedings for an offence if the court considers — (a)that the evidence would, either by itself or having regard to other evidence adduced or to be adduced, have significant probative value; and(b)that the probative value of the evidence compared to the degree of risk of an unfair trial, is such that fair-minded people would think that the public interest in adducing all relevant evidence of guilt must have priority over the risk of an unfair trial."

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Section 31A provides:"(1) In this section — propensity evidence means — (a)similar fact evidence or other evidence of the conduct of the accused person; or(b)evidence of the character or reputation of the accused person or of a tendency that the accused person has or had; relationship evidence means evidence of the attitude or conduct of the accused person towards another person, or a class of persons, over a period of time. (2)Propensity evidence or relationship evidence is admissible in proceedings for an offence if the court considers — (a)that the evidence would, either by itself or having regard to other evidence adduced or to be adduced, have significant probative value; and(b)that the probative value of the evidence compared to the degree of risk of an unfair trial, is such that fair-minded people would think that the public interest in adducing all relevant evidence of guilt must have priority over the risk of an unfair trial." Section 31A was introduced into the Evidence Act in 2004[3]. The provision abrogates the common law rule that similar fact evidence is inadmissible unless, when considered with the other evidence in the prosecution's case, there is no reasonable view of the similar fact evidence that is consistent with the innocence of the accused[4]. The admissibility of "propensity evidence" and "relationship evidence" is governed by the requirements of sub-ss (2)(a) and (2)(b). Sub-section (2)(a) requires an assessment that the evidence, by itself or with other evidence to be adduced in the trial, has "significant probative value". The meaning of that expression was discussed by Steytler P in Dair v Western Australia[5]:"Before evidence can have significant probative value it must be such as 'could rationally affect the assessment of the probability of the relevant fact in issue to a significant extent: ie more is required than mere … relevance': Zaknic Pty Ltd v Svelte Corporation Pty Ltd[6]. Heydon[7] suggests that significant probative value is something more than mere relevance but something less than a 'substantial' degree of relevance and that it is a probative value which is 'important' or 'of consequence'. He makes the point that the significance of the probative value of tendency evidence must depend on the nature of the facts in issue to which it is relevant and the significance or importance which that evidence may have in establishing the fact". (citations omitted) [3]Criminal Law Amendment (Sexual Assault and Other Matters) Act 2004 (WA), s 13. [4]Pfennig v The Queen (1995) 182 CLR 461 at 482-483 per Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ; [1995] HCA 7; Phillips v The Queen (2006) 225 CLR 303 at 308 [9] per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne and Heydon JJ; [2006] HCA 4; HML v The Queen (2008) 235 CLR 334 at 431 fn 309 per Heydon J; [2008] HCA 16. [5](2008) 36 WAR 413 at 429 [61]. Section 31A of the Evidence Act has also been considered by the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Western Australia on a number of other occasions. See eg Donaldson v Western Australia (2005) 31 WAR 122 at 142-149 [98]-[131]; Di Lena v Western Australia (2006) 165 A Crim R 482 at 492-497 [48]-[73]; Noto v Western Australia (2006) 168 A Crim R 457; Horsman v Western Australia (2008) 187 A Crim R 565; Buiks v Western Australia (2008) 188 A Crim R 362; Western Australia v Atherton (2009) 197 A Crim R 119. [6](1995) 61 FCR 171 at 175-176.[7]Cross on Evidence, 7th Aust ed (2004) at [21245].

Decision

Reasons for decision

GUMMOW, CRENNAN, KIEFEL AND BELL JJ (dissent) HEYDON J

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: HEYDON J