Buiks v The State of Western Australia

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT  :   THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)

CITATION:   BUIKS -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2008] WASCA 194

CORAM:   BUSS JA

MILLER JA
MURRAY AJA

HEARD:   12 AUGUST 2008

DELIVERED          :   22 SEPTEMBER 2008

FILE NO/S:   CACR 30 of 2008

BETWEEN:   STEVEN PETER BUIKS

Appellant

AND

THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction              :  DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram  :WISBEY DCJ

Citation  :THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA -v- BUIKS

File No  :IND 271 of 2006

Catchwords:

Criminal law and procedure - Appellant convicted as a principal offender of cultivation and possession of cannabis with intent to sell or supply - Appellant previously convicted as an aider and abetter of cultivation of cannabis with intent to sell or supply - Hydroponic cultivation on both occasions - Admissibility of evidence of prior offending - Whether prior conviction had significant probative value - Other evidence at trial largely circumstantial

Criminal law and procedure - Cultivation of cannabis with intent to sell or supply - Misuse of Drugs Act 1981 (WA) - Meaning of 'to cultivate' and 'to harvest' - Whether evidence capable of proving appellant involved in cultivation or harvesting of cannabis

Legislation:

Evidence Act 1906 (WA) s 31A
Misuse of Drugs Act 1981 (WA) s 3, s 6(1), s 7(1), s 11

Result:

Appeal allowed
Convictions quashed
Retrial ordered

Category:    A

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant:     Mr S B Watters

Respondent:     Ms L Petrusa

Solicitors:

Appellant:     Thames Legal

Respondent:     Director of Public Prosecutions (WA)

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Buttsworth v The Queen [2004] WASCA 69; (2004) 29 WAR 1

Dair v The State of Western Australia [2008] WASCA 72

Di Lena v The State of Western Australia [2006] WASCA 162; (2006) 165 A Crim R 482

Donaldson v The State of Western Australia [2005] WASCA 196; (2005) 31 WAR 122

Gassy v The Queen [2008] HCA 18; (2008) 82 ALJR 838

Hoch v The Queen (1988) 165 CLR 292

KRM v The Queen [2001] HCA 11; (2001) 206 CLR 221

Mouroufas v The Queen [2007] NSWCCA 58

Noto v The State of Western Australia [2006] WASCA 278; (2006) 168 A Crim R 457

Pfennig v The Queen (1995) 182 CLR 461

R v Giorgi (1982) 31 SASR 299

R v Palaga [2001] SASC 174; (2001) 80 SASR 19

R v Ruiz‑Avila [2003] NSWCCA 264; (2003) 142 A Crim R 459

R v Stratford and McDonald [1985] 1 Qd R 361

Smith v The Queen (1992) 7 WAR 527

State of Western Australia v Osborne [2007] WASCA 183

VIM v Western Australia [2005] WASCA 233; (2005) 31 WAR 1

Weiss v The Queen [2005] HCA 81; (2005) 224 CLR 300

  1. BUSS JA:  I have read the proposed reasons of Murray AJA.  I respectfully disagree with his Honour's conclusion that the appeal should be dismissed.  I would allow the appeal, quash the convictions and order a retrial.

  2. My…

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Details
Case
[2008] WASCA 194
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal was against the appellant's convictions for cultivating and possessing cannabis with intent to sell or supply, offences under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1981 (WA). The evidence against him was largely circumstantial, relying on his previous conviction as an aider and abetter of cultivating cannabis with intent to sell or supply, which also involved hydroponic cultivation. The primary legal issues before the court were the admissibility of the evidence of prior offending under the Evidence Act and whether that evidence had significant probative value. Additionally, the court had to determine if the evidence was capable of proving the appellant's involvement in the cultivation or harvesting of cannabis.

The court examined the statutory provisions and found that the evidence of prior offending was admissible under section 31A of the Evidence Act, provided it met the criteria of having significant probative value and that its probative value outweighed the risk of an unfair trial. The court held that the evidence of the prior conviction did have significant probative value because it could rationally affect the assessment of the probability of the appellant's involvement in the current offences to a significant extent. This was particularly pertinent given the circumstantial nature of the other evidence. The court also determined that the evidence was sufficient to prove the appellant's involvement in the cultivation or harvesting of cannabis in the current offences.

The appeal was allowed, and the convictions were quashed. A retrial was ordered to allow the appellant the opportunity to defend himself with the full context of the evidence, including the prior conviction, being considered appropriately within the legal framework.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeal allowed

Convictions quashed

Retrial ordered

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Section 31A of the Evidence Act provides: (1)In this section -'propensity evidence' means - (a)similar fact evidence or other evidence of the conduct of the accused person; or(b)evidence of the character or reputation of the accused person or of a tendency that the accused person has or had;'relationship evidence' means evidence of the attitude or conduct of the accused person towards another person, or a class of persons, over a period of time. (2)Propensity evidence or relationship evidence is admissible in proceedings for an offence if the court considers -(a)that the evidence would, either by itself or having regard to other evidence adduced or to be adduced, have significant probative value; and(b)that the probative value of the evidence compared to the degree of risk of an unfair trial, is such that fair-minded people would think that the public interest in adducing all relevant evidence of guilt must have priority over the risk of an unfair trial. (3)In considering the probative value of evidence for the purposes of subsection (2) it is not open to the court to have regard to the possibility that the evidence may be the result of collusion, concoction or suggestion. Section 31A was introduced into the Evidence Act by s 13 of the Criminal Law Amendment (Sexual Assault and Other Matters) Act 2004 (WA). The Parliament's purpose in enacting s 31A was to confer on the courts greater power to admit propensity and relationship evidence. See the second reading speech of the Attorney General: Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 30 June 2004, 4068. Section 31A substantially amended the common law. It abolished the test that propensity evidence is inadmissible if there is a rational view of it, when considered with other relevant evidence, that is inconsistent with the accused's guilt. See Donaldson v The State of Western Australia [2005] WASCA 196; (2005) 31 WAR 122 [102] ‑ [130]; Di Lena v The State of Western Australia [2006] WASCA 162; (2006) 165 A Crim R 482 [44] ‑ [73]; Noto v The State of Western Australia [2006] WASCA 278; (2006) 168 A Crim R 457 [26]. By s 31A, propensity evidence, as defined in s 31A(1), is admissible if the court considers that the requirements of each of paras (a) and (b) of s 31A(2) have been satisfied. Recently, in Dair v The State of Western Australia [2008] WASCA 72, Steytler P analysed s 31A. His Honour said, in relation to the concept of 'significant probative value', within s 31A(2)(a):The evidence in question must obviously be relevant before it can be admitted into evidence. That is to say, it must be such as could rationally affect, directly or indirectly, the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue in the proceeding: Goldsmith v Sandilands [2002] HCA 31; (2002) 76 ALJR 1024 [2] (Gleeson CJ); Phillips v The Queen [2006] HCA 4; (2006) 225 CLR 303 [50]. It could otherwise have no probative value, let alone 'significant' probative value. Before evidence can have significant probative value it must be such as 'could rationally affect the assessment of the probability of the relevant fact in issue to a significant extent: ie, more is required than mere … relevance': Zaknic Pty Ltd v Svelte Corporation Pty Ltd (1995) 61 FCR 171, 175 - 176. Heydon [21245] suggests that significant probative value is something more than mere relevance but something less than a 'substantial' degree of relevance and that it is a probative value which is 'important' or 'of consequence'. He makes the point that the significance of the probative value of tendency evidence must depend on the nature of the facts in issue to which it is relevant and the significance or importance which that evidence may have in establishing the fact: Lockyer (1996) 89 A Crim R 457, 459; Lock (1997) 91 A Crim R 356, 360 - 361; Fordham (1997) 98 A Crim R 359, 370; Jacara Pty Ltd v Perpetual Trustees WA Ltd [2000] FCA 1886; (2000) 106 FCR 51 [77] - [82]; The State of Western Australia v Osborne [2007] WASCA 183 [13], [60] ‑ [61]. I respectfully agree with the President's analysis.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established