The State of Western Australia v White

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CRIMINAL

CITATION:   THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA -v- WHITE [2012] WASC 453

CORAM:   SIMMONDS J

HEARD:   15 NOVEMBER 2012

DELIVERED          :   15 NOVEMBER 2012

FILE NO/S:   INS 142 of 2012

BETWEEN:   THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Prosecution

AND

MICHAEL COLIN WHITE
Accused

Catchwords:

Criminal law and procedure - Application for directions concerning propensity evidence - Tendency to commit offences to service drug habit at about time of offending - Relevance of undisputed other evidence tending to connect accused to offending - Relevance of directions at trial

Legislation:

Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA), s 98
Evidence Act 1906 (WA), s 31A

Result:

Application granted
Directions made

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Prosecution                   :     Ms K Robinson

Accused:     Mr D J McKenzie

Solicitors:

Prosecution                   :     Director of Public Prosecutions (WA)

Accused:     David McKenzie Legal Pty Ltd

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Dair v The State of Western Australia [2008] WASCA 72; (2008) 36 WAR 413

Daniels v The State of Western Australia [2012] WASCA 213

  1. SIMMONDS J:  It is my intention today both to rule on the application and to provide the reasons for the ruling.  I can begin this statement, however, by indicating that I would grant the application of the prosecution and, having reflected on the matter, the determination as to admission is one that is not in provisional form, in view of what I was told by the defence as to the character of the case to be mounted at trial.

  2. I should begin these reasons by stating it is an application under Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA), s 98 for certain directions. The directions applied for are as follows.

    In any trial on indictment 142 of 2012 the State is permitted to lead evidence of the conduct of the accused person relating to offences contained in charge numbers 11906/12 and 11911/12 in respect of which the accused indicated a plea of guilty on 18 July 2012 in the Stirling Gardens Magistrates Court, and count 2 on INS 142 [of 2012] to which the accused pleaded guilty in the Supreme Court on 18 October 2012.

  3. Indictment 142 of 2012 contains two counts.  Count 1 alleges that on 28 December 2011 the accused stole money, medications and three cheques from the Marmion Pharmacy and threatened staff with a knife.  On 18 October 2012 the accused pleaded not guilty to that count and the trial was listed to commence on 15 January 2013.  I have no reason to believe that that trial will be otherwise than before a jury; and it would follow, of course, that these reasons would be suppressed until the completion of the trial process or further order.

  4. Count 2 on the indictment alleges that on 4 February 2012 the accused stole a variety of lottery tickets from the Warwick Grove News and Lottery (the Warwick Grove Newsagency), by pretending to be armed with a syringe.  On 18 October 2012 the accused pleaded guilty to count 2.  I will…

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Details
Case
[2012] WASC 453
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of The State of Western Australia v White, the defendant was charged with multiple offences, and the trial court was asked to consider the admissibility of propensity evidence concerning the defendant's drug habit and its relevance to the charges. The decision was made by the Western Australian Court of Appeal. The primary legal issue was whether the propensity evidence about the defendant's drug habit should be admitted under section 31A of the Evidence Act. This section governs the admissibility of propensity evidence and requires the court to consider both the probative value of the evidence and the risk of an unfair trial.

The court referenced previous case law, including Daniels v The State of Western Australia, to establish the principles for determining the admissibility of propensity evidence. The court had to decide whether the evidence of the defendant's drug habit would have significant probative value and whether the risk of an unfair trial was outweighed by the probative value. The court noted that propensity evidence is admissible if it is relevant and could rationally affect the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue to a significant extent. The court also considered the relevance of the defendant's drug habit in relation to the charges and the other evidence that would be presented at the trial.

Ultimately, the court determined that the evidence of the defendant's drug habit had significant probative value in relation to the charges and that the risk of an unfair trial was outweighed by the probative value. The court concluded that the evidence should be admitted generally at the trial, as it was relevant to the defendant's propensity to commit the offences and could assist the jury in determining the likelihood of the defendant's guilt. The court did not find it necessary to give a propensity warning, as the evidence's purpose was to prove the defendant's likelihood to have committed the offences charged.

The court's decision was that the evidence of the defendant's drug habit should be admitted under section 31A of the Evidence Act. The court's reasoning was based on the principles established in previous case law, and the court found that the evidence had significant probative value and that the risk of an unfair trial was outweighed by the probative value. The court's decision allows the prosecution to present the evidence of the defendant's drug habit at the trial, which may assist in proving the defendant's guilt.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

So far then as the Evidence Act s 31A is relevant, I would reproduce it as follows:31A.Propensity and relationship evidence(1)In this section -propensity evidence means -(a)... ; or(b)evidence of the character or reputation of the accused person or of a tendency that the accused person has or had;...(2)Propensity evidence ... is admissible in proceedings for an offence if the court considers -(a)that the evidence would, either by itself or having regard to other evidence adduced or to be adduced, have significant probative value; and(b)that the probative value of the evidence compared to the degree of risk of an unfair trial, is such that fair‑minded people would think that the public interest in adducing all relevant evidence of guilt must have priority over the risk of an unfair trial. That takes me then to the applicable principles to resolve the present application. I note the recent review, statement and application of the principles applicable in this case in Daniels v The State of Western Australia [2012] WASCA 213. I particularly note the review and statement of the principles in Daniels [43] ‑ [51], as well as [93] ‑ [94], in the judgment of his Honour Buss JA (Martin CJ & Mazza JA agreeing), as follows:The tests for admissibility in s 31A(2)(a) and (b) apply to both 'propensity evidence' and 'relationship evidence', as defined. Neither 'propensity evidence' nor 'relationship evidence' will be admissible under s 31A unless the court considers that:(a)the evidence would, either by itself or having regard to other evidence adduced or to be adduced, have significant probative value; and (b)the probative value of the evidence compared to the degree of risk of an unfair trial, is such that fair-minded people would think that the public interest in adducing all relevant evidence of guilt must have priority over the risk of an unfair trial.The court may decide, in a particular case, that the tests in s 31A(2)(a) and (b) are satisfied in relation to the proposed evidence generally; that is, the evidence should be admitted generally at the trial, and not merely for a particular or limited purpose. Alternatively, the court may decide, in a particular case, that the test in s 31A(2)(a) is satisfied, but the test in s 31A(2)(b) is not satisfied unless the evidence in question is admitted:(a)solely for a particular or limited purpose; or(b)subject to the trial judge giving the jury a specific direction or directions in relation to the evidence.These examples are not an exhaustive statement of the issues which may arise in considering the application of s 31A to the facts and circumstances of a particular case or how those issues should be resolved.Where 'propensity evidence' or 'relationship evidence' is disputed by the accused, it is, nevertheless, admissible as part of the State's case if the conditions in s 31A(2)(a) and (b) are satisfied.In Dair v The State of Western Australia [2008] WASCA 72; (2008) 36 WAR 413 [60] ‑ [61], Steytler P said in relation to the concept of 'significant probative value' within s 31A(2)(a):'The evidence in question must obviously be relevant before it can be admitted into evidence. That is to say, it must be such as could rationally affect, directly or indirectly, the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue in the proceeding: Goldsmith v Sandilands [2002] HCA 31; (2002) 76 ALJR 1024 [2] (Gleeson CJ); Phillips v The Queen [2006] HCA 4; (2006) 225 CLR 303 [50]. It could otherwise have no probative value, let alone "significant" probative value.Before evidence can have significant probative value it must be such as "could rationally affect the assessment of the probability of the relevant fact in issue to a significant extent: ie, more is required than mere … relevance": Zaknic Pty Ltd v Svelte Corporation Pty Ltd (1995) 61 FCR 171, 175 - 176. Heydon [21245] suggests that significant probative value is something more than mere relevance but something less than a "substantial" degree of relevance and that it is a probative value which is "important" or "of consequence". He makes the point that the significance of the probative value of tendency evidence must depend on the nature of the facts in issue to which it is relevant and the significance or importance which that evidence may have in establishing the fact: Lockyer (1996) 89 A Crim R 457, 459; Lock (1997) 91 A Crim R 356, 360 - 361; Fordham (1997) 98 A Crim R 359, 370; Jacara Pty Ltd v Perpetual Trustees WA Ltd [2000] FCA 1886; (2000) 106 FCR 51 [77] - [82]; The State of Western Australia v Osborne [2007] WASCA 183 [13].'This analysis was approved in Horsman v The State of Western Australia [2008] WASCA 190; (2008) 187 A Crim R 565 [22] (Buss JA, Martin CJ & Miller JA agreeing) and Buiks v The State of Western Australia [2008] WASCA 194; (2008) 188 A Crim R 362 [45] (Buss JA, Miller JA agreeing).So:(a)Evidence has 'probative value' if the evidence could rationally affect, directly or indirectly, the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue.(b)The test in s 31A(2)(a) will be satisfied if the court 'considers' (that is, thinks) that the propensity evidence 'would' (as distinct from could), either by itself or having regard to other evidence adduced or to be adduced, rationally affect, to a significant extent, the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue.(c)The adjective 'significant', in the phrase 'significant probative value' in s 31A(2)(a), connotes 'important' or 'of consequence'.(d)If propensity evidence has 'probative value' then whether the probative value is 'significant' will depend upon the nature of the fact in issue to which it is relevant, and the significance or importance which the propensity evidence, either by itself or having regard to other evidence adduced or to be adduced, has in proving that fact.In Dair, Steytler P made these points about the comparison which s 31A(2)(b) requires. First, s 31A(2)(b) requires the court to assess the degree of risk of unfairness at trial that will be occasioned by the admission of the evidence in question, the court having already found under s 31A(2)(a) that the evidence has significant probative value. Secondly, when assessing the risk of an unfair trial for this purpose, the court must take into account any directions that might be given to the jury in an attempt to overcome the prejudice, and their likely effect on the jury. Thirdly, after identifying the probative value of the evidence in question and the degree of risk of an unfair trial, the court must consider the conclusion that fair-minded people would draw from a comparison of these issues. Although fair-minded people are reasonable members of the general community who are not lawyers, it must be assumed that such people have informed themselves of 'at least the most basic considerations relevant to arriving at a conclusion founded on a fair understanding of all the relevant circumstances': Johnson v Johnson [2000] HCA 48; (2000) 201 CLR 488 [53] (Kirby J).These observations were approved in Horsman [23] and Buiks [46]....Section 31A is concerned with admissibility. It does not deal with the terms of any directions which a trial judge may or must give to a jury in relation to 'propensity evidence' or 'relationship evidence', as defined.This court has held that if evidence is admitted generally as propensity evidence under s 31A then a 'propensity warning' (that is, a warning of the kind described by McHugh J in KRM v The Queen [2001] HCA 11; (2001) 206 CLR 221 [2] - [3]) is not required because the very purpose of the evidence is to prove that the accused is the type of person who is likely to have committed the offence or offences charged. See Noto v The State of Western Australia [2006] WASCA 278; (2006) 168 A Crim R 457 [26] - [28] (McLure JA, Steytler P & Wheeler JA agreeing); Upton v The State of Western Australia [2008] WASCA 54 [65] (Steytler P, McLure & Pullin JJA agreeing); Dair [64] (Steytler P).

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established