The State of Western Australia v Merrin

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JURISDICTION     :   DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CRIMINAL

LOCATION:   PERTH

CITATION:   THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA -v- MERRIN [2013] WADC 39

CORAM:   GOETZE DCJ

HEARD:   8 MARCH 2013

DELIVERED          :   14 MARCH 2013

FILE NO/S:   IND 1242 of 2012

BETWEEN:   THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Applicant

AND

DAMIEN MARC MERRIN
Respondent

Catchwords:

Application to lead propensity evidence pursuant to s 31A of the Evidence Act ­ Alleged offence of intent to defraud, by deceit or fraudulent means and gaining a benefit - Turns on own facts

Legislation:

Evidence Act 1906

Result:

Application allowed

Representation:

Counsel:

Applicant:     Mr J G Nicholls

Respondent:     Mr K P Bates

Solicitors:

Applicant:     State Director of Public Prosecutions

Respondent:     Ken Bates

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

APC v The State of Western Australia [2012] WASCA 159

Bennett v The State of Western Australia [2012] WASCA 70

Bolitho v The State of Western Australia [2007] WASCA 102

Buiks v The State of Western Australia [2008] WASCA 194

Dair v The State of Western Australia [2008] WASCA 72

Donaldson v The State of Western Australia [2005] WASCA 196

Graham‑Helwig v Western Australia (2005) 30 WAR 221

Mansell v The State of Western Australia [2009] WASCA 140

GOETZE DCJ:

Introduction

  1. By an indictment dated 5 December 2012, Damien Marc Merrin is charged with one offence, namely that on 27 June 2011 at Perth, he, with intent to defraud, by deceit or fraudulent means, gained a benefit for himself, namely $73,003.70 in money.

  2. The trial is listed for hearing on 15 April 2013.

The application

  1. The State of Western Australia has applied for an order that propensity evidence be admitted at trial pursuant to s 31A of the Evidence Act 1906.

  2. The proposed propensity evidence concerns Mr Merrin's three prior convictions that on 23 June 2008, 28 August 2008 and 15 September 2008, he, with intent to defraud, by deceit or fraudulent means, gained benefits for himself, namely $15,000, $10,000 and $30,000 in money respectively.  On 14 October 2011, Mr Merrin pleaded guilty to each of those three previous offences.  He was sentenced to a total term of imprisonment for three years and made eligible for parole.

The State case

  1. The State case against Mr Merrin can be summarised as follows:

    1.Mr Merrin purchased a time share membership at a resort in Thailand owned by Absolute Resorts and Hotels.

    2.That membership entitled Mr Merrin to refer other people to the resort using what is termed a third party contracted agent agreement.  In essence, the resort owner was not so concerned about generating income from hotel room rentals, rather it was concerned with selling time share memberships.  Therefore, members could refer potential time share membership purchasers to the resort for a short stay, charge such potential purchasers a referral fee for such short stay, of which the resort owner would have no knowledge, and receive a commission on any subsequent sale.  The resort charged only a small administration fee for the short stay.  There were however, certain…

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Details
Case
[2013] WADC 39
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The State of Western Australia brought proceedings against Merrin, involving allegations of intent to defraud by deceit or fraudulent means, with the aim of gaining a benefit. The central issue before the court was whether the proposed propensity evidence had significant probative value and could be admitted under section 31A of the Evidence Act. The defence counsel conceded that the evidence was relevant and probative, but the crux of the matter was whether it had significant probative value. The court had to consider if the evidence could rationally affect the assessment of the probability of the facts in issue to a significant extent. The test for significant probative value required the evidence to be more than merely relevant but less than substantially relevant, with an importance or consequence that warranted its admission.

The court examined the nature of the facts in issue and the significance of the proposed propensity evidence in establishing those facts. The defence counsel argued that the evidence was highly probative and could not be ignored, but the prosecution contended that it did not meet the threshold of significant probative value. The court considered previous cases such as Donaldson v The State of Western Australia and Dair v The State of Western Australia, which established that relevance and probativeness were necessary but not sufficient conditions for admissibility. The court also referred to Mansell v The State of Western Australia, which provided guidance on what constitutes significant probative value. Ultimately, the court had to balance the probative value of the evidence against the risk of an unfair trial, as required by section 31A of the Evidence Act.

After careful consideration, the court found that the proposed propensity evidence did not have significant probative value. The evidence was deemed relevant and probative, but it did not meet the higher threshold required for admissibility under section 31A. The court concluded that the risk of an unfair trial outweighed the potential probative value of the evidence. Therefore, the application to lead propensity evidence was dismissed. The court's decision ensured that the trial remained fair and that the probative value of the evidence was balanced against the risk of prejudice to the accused.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Section 31A of the Evidence Act provides:(1)In this section ‑propensity evidence means ‑(a)similar fact evidence or other evidence of the conduct of the accused person; or(b)evidence of the character or reputation of the accused person or of a tendency that the accused person has or had;...(2)Propensity evidence or relationship evidence is admissible in proceedings for an offence if the court considers ‑(a)that the evidence would, either by itself or having regard to other evidence adduced or to be adduced, have significant probative value; and(b)that the probative value of the evidence compared to the degree of risk of an unfair trial, is such that fair‑minded people would think that the public interest in adducing all relevant evidence of guilt must have priority over the risk of an unfair trial.… It was conceded by Mr Bates, that, the proposed propensity evidence has relevance and that it is probative, as to which see Donaldson v The State of Western Australia [2005] WASCA 196 [118] and Dair v The State of Western Australia [2008] WASCA 72 [260]. What is in issue, he said, is whether the proposed propensity evidence is of such a character that it can be described as having 'significant probative value'. If it does, then Mr Bates further conceded that the fair‑minded public interest test would also be met and that any prejudice that would follow from the reception of such evidence could be met by an adequate direction from the trial judge. In Mansell v The State of Western Australia [2009] WASCA 140 [37], Miller JA said that:For evidence to have significant probative value, it must be such as could rationally affect, directly or indirectly, the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue in the proceeding. This was made clear by Steytler P in Dair, at [60] - [61], where his Honour said:'The evidence in question must obviously be relevant before it can be admitted into evidence. That is to say, it must be such as could rationally affect, directly or indirectly, the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue in the proceeding: Goldsmith v Sandilands (2002) 76 ALJR 1024 at [2] per Gleeson CJ; Phillips v The Queen (2006) 225 CLR 303 at [50]. It could otherwise have no probative value, let alone "significant" probative value.Before evidence can have significant probative value it must be such as "could rationally affect the assessment of the probability of the relevant fact in issue to a significant extent: ie, more is required than mere … relevance": Zaknic Pty Ltd v Svelte Corporation Pty Ltd (1995) 61 FCR 171 at 175 - 176. Heydon (at [21245]) suggests that significant probative value is something more than mere relevance but something less than a "substantial" degree of relevance and that it is a probative value which is "important" or "of consequence". He makes the point that the significance of the probative value of tendency evidence must depend on the nature of the facts in issue to which it is relevant and the significance or importance which that evidence may have in establishing the fact: R v Lockyer (1996) 89 A Crim R 457 at 459; R v Lock (1997) 91 A Crim R 356 at 360 - 361; R v Fordham (1997) 98 A Crim R 359 at 370; Jacara Pty Ltd v Perpetual Trustees WA Ltd (2000) 106 FCR 51 at [77] - [82]; Western Australia v Osborne [2007] WASCA 183 at [13].'

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established