Bolitho v The State of Western Australia

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT :   THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)

CITATION:   BOLITHO -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2007] WASCA 102

CORAM:   ROBERTS-SMITH JA

McLURE JA
BUSS JA

HEARD:   8 DECEMBER 2006

DELIVERED          :   15 MAY 2007

FILE NO/S:   CACR 36 of 2006

BETWEEN:   CLAIRE LOUISE BOLITHO

Appellant

AND

THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction              :  DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram  :O'SULLIVAN DCJ

File No  :IND 312 of 2005

Catchwords:

Appeal - Criminal law and procedure - Appeal against conviction - Fraud - Inducing person to do an act she was lawfully entitled to abstain from doing - Deceiving complainant into subjecting herself to injections by accused falsely pretending to be a surgeon - Section 409(1)(e) and (g) Criminal Code (WA) - Meaning of "intent to defraud" - Whether s 409 applies only in relation to prejudice to economic or property rights or interests or deceit of persons responsible for a public duty

Legislation:

Criminal Code (WA), s 409(1)

Result:

Appeal allowed
Convictions set aside
Verdicts of acquittal entered

Category:    A

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant:     Ms H E Prince

Respondent:     Mr P D Yovich

Solicitors:

Appellant:     Legal Aid WA

Respondent:     State Director of Public Prosecutions

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Balcombe v De Simoni [1972] HCA 9; (1972) 126 CLR 576

Board of Trade v Owen [1957] AC 602

CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd [1997] HCA 2; (1997) 187 CLR 384

Director of Public Prosecutions v Raines (1995) 79 A Crim R 448

Director of Public Prosecutions v Withers [1975] AC 842

DM Cannane v J Cannane Pty Ltd (in liq) [1998] HCA 26; (1998) 192 CLR 557

Graham‑Helwig v Western Australia [2005] WASCA 127; (2005) 30 WAR 221

In re London and Globe Finance Corporation Ltd [1903] 1 Ch 728

Johnston v The Queen, unreported; CCA SCt of WA; Library No 960714; 13 December 1996

Lewis v The Queen (1998) 20 WAR 1

Macleod v The Queen [2003] HCA 24; (2003) 214 CLR 230

Mansfield v Director of Public Prosecutions [2007] WASCA 39

Markarian v The Queen [2001] WASCA 393

McPharlin v The Queen, unreported; CCA SCt of WA; Library No 970665; 10 October 1997

Moylan v The State of Western Australia [2007] WASCA 52

Newcastle City Council v GIO General Ltd (1997) 191 CLR 85

Peters v The Queen [1998] HCA 7; (1998) 192 CLR 493

R v Harris (1834) 168 ER 1316; (1833) 1 Mood CC 393

R v Horsington [1983] 2 NSWLR 72

R v Kastratovic (1985) 42 SASR 59

R v Moah (1858) 169 ER 1116; (1858) 7 Cox CC 503

R v Pedersen [1995] 2 NZLR 386

R v Scott [1975] AC 819

R v Sharman (1854) 169 ER 729; (1854) 1 Dears CC 285

R v Terry [1984] AC 374

R v Toshack (1849) 169 ER 341; (1849) 4 Cox CC 38

R v Turner (No 4)

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Details
Case
[2007] WASCA 102
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, Bolitho, was convicted of fraud by the Supreme Court of Western Australia. Bolitho appealed against his conviction, arguing that the court had erred in its interpretation of the meaning of "intent to defraud" under section 409 of the Criminal Code (WA). The Court of Appeal considered whether section 409 applies only in relation to prejudice to economic or property rights or interests or deceit of persons responsible for a public duty. The appeal raised questions about the scope of the term "intent to defraud" and whether it encompasses any deceit leading to a person's injury or detriment.

In examining the issue, the Court of Appeal referred to the judgment of Lord Radcliffe in London and Globe Finance Corporation Ltd. The Court found that the distinction between deceiving and defrauding is significant, with deceiving being the inducement of a state of mind and defrauding being the inducement of a course of action by deceit. The Court held that the term "intent to defraud" should not be limited to economic or property rights or interests, but should encompass any deceit leading to a person's injury or detriment. The Court also noted that the term "intent to defraud" should not be given such a wide interpretation as to include all deceptions to another's prejudice, as this would render the term "intent to deceive" redundant.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction and ordered a retrial. The Court held that the trial judge had erred in his interpretation of the term "intent to defraud" and that the conviction could not stand. The Court also held that the issue of whether the appellant's conduct amounted to fraud should be reconsidered in light of the correct interpretation of the term "intent to defraud." The Court did not make any orders as to the costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Lord Radcliffe then referred (at 125 ‑ 126) to the following passage from the judgement of Buckley J in In re London and Globe Finance Corporation Ltd (supra) at 732:"To deceive is, I apprehend, to induce a man to believe that a thing is true which is false, and which the person practising the deceit knows or believes to be false. To defraud is to deprive by deceit: it is by deceit to induce a man to act to his injury. More tersely it may be put, that to deceive is by falsehood to induce a state of mind; to defraud is by deceit to induce a course of action." Noting that passage was obiter, Lord Radcliffe observed (at 126) it was no less valuable because it did not contain an exhaustive account of the legal significance of deceit and fraud. Importantly, (at 127), he added that:"Again, it is said and, I think, justly, that to defraud must involve something more than the mere inducing of a course of action by deceit. But these words, which are found in the last sentence of the whole passage, must be understood in the light of what had gone before. They do not qualify the description of 'defraud' as 'by deceit to induce a man to act to his injury'; what they do is to point the contrast between deceiving, the essence of which is to bring about a state of mind, and defrauding, the essence of which is to bring about a course of action, whether doing something or refraining from something.It is this last point which constitutes the most important element in the whole passage. It is obvious that it was at once appreciated that it expressed briefly and with felicity the significant distinction between the two kinds of intent when they were referred to together or apart in statutes dealing with criminal offences." (My emphasis). Again, importantly for present purposes, Lord Radcliffe went on to say at 128:"It was objected that, if defrauding was treated as meaning something so wide as any deceiving of another to his injury, his detriment or his prejudice, it provided a dangerously wide definition of a crime. It was said, for example, that by such a definition the writing of a faked letter to another giving him a fictitious appointment would constitute the crime of forgery. I do not know that I should regard this as so startling a result as to lead me to reconsider what seems to be the long-accepted definition of defrauding: after all, the crime in question only exists if there is the making of a false document in order that it may be used as genuine, which is itself dishonest and a cheat. Words, not being capable of infinite division for purposes of precise measurement, can only convey ideas that are to some extent general, and I think it may be that the imposition suggested does technically constitute the crime of forgery, unless the rule that lex non curat de minimis puts it out of court, or a jury concludes that there was no real intent to prejudice or injure. I suppose that, in any event, these theoretical arguments have to be tried by a certain standard of common sense, and I cannot say that in practice I should expect to see a crop of criminal prosecutions based on tricks or deceptions of this kind.There is, I think, more weight in the criticism that if, in interpreting the Act of 1913, 'intent to defraud' is given as wide an ambit as to include all deceptions to another's prejudice, there is virtually no ambit left to be covered by the other statutory intent, 'intent to deceive,' since it is difficult to imagine an instance of a man forging a document in order that it should be used as genuine without having at the same time an intention of affecting another's conduct to his prejudice. It is difficult, but it is not impossible. There can be cases, I think, in which there is an intent to deceive and no more."