Mansell v The State of Western Australia

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT :   THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)

CITATION:   MANSELL -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2009] WASCA 140

CORAM:   MARTIN CJ

BUSS JA
MILLER JA

HEARD:   21 JULY 2009

DELIVERED          :   21 JULY 2009

PUBLISHED           :  6 AUGUST 2009

FILE NO/S:   CACR 36 of 2009

BETWEEN:   CAMERON JAMES MANSELL

Appellant

AND

THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction              :  DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram  :DEANE DCJ

File No  :IND 665 of 2008

Catchwords:

Criminal law and procedure - Joinder of drug charges - Application for separate trials - Appeal under s 26 Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA) - Section 133 Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA) - Whether charges properly joined - Whether prejudice occasioned from joinder - Whether risk of unfair trial - Propensity evidence - Section 31A Evidence Act 1906 (WA) - Whether evidence in respect of different charges cross­admissible

Legislation:

Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA), s 26, s 85
Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA), s 133
Evidence Act 1906 (WA), s 31A
Misuse of Drugs Act 1981 (WA), s 6(1)(a), s 6(1)(c)

Result:

Leave to appeal refused and appeal dismissed on ground 1(a)
Leave to appeal granted but appeal dismissed on grounds 1(b), (c) and (d)

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant:     Mr T F Percy QC

Respondent:     Mr D Dempster

Solicitors:

Appellant:     D G Price & Co

Respondent:     Director of Public Prosecutions (WA)

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

BRS v The Queen [1997] HCA 47; (1997) 191 CLR 275

Dair v The State of Western Australia [2008] WASCA 72; (2008) 36 WAR 413

De Jesus v The Queen [1986] HCA 65; (1986) 61 ALJR 1

Di Lena v The State of Western Australia [2006] WASCA 162; (2006) 165 A Crim R 482

Donaldson v The State of Western Australia [2005] WASCA 196; (2005) 31 WAR 122

Harriman v The Queen [1989] HCA 50; (1989) 167 CLR 590

Lancaster v The Queen [1989] WAR 83

Noto v The State of Western Australia [2006] WASCA 278; (2006) 168 A Crim R 457

PIM v The State of Western Australia [2009] WASCA 131

R v Kray [1970] 1 QB 125

The State of Western Australia v Osborne [2007] WASCA 183

Upton v The State of Western Australia [2008] WASCA 54

Zammit v The State of Western Australia [2007] WASCA 66; (2007) 34 WAR 302

  1. MARTIN CJ:  On 21 July 2009 I joined in the orders made by the court dismissing this appeal for the reasons now given by Miller JA.

  2. BUSS JA:  I joined in the orders made by the court on 21 July 2009 for the reasons to be published by Miller JA.

  3. MILLER JA:  At the hearing of this appeal, the court was unanimously of the view that the appeal should be dismissed.  The appellant is already on remand for trial in the District Court at Perth and no other orders were required. 

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Details
Case
[2009] WASCA 140
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Mansell v The State of Western Australia, the appellant, Mansell, challenged the admissibility of evidence relating to drug charges that were joined in a single proceeding. The dispute arose in the Supreme Court of Western Australia, where the appellant sought to exclude evidence pertaining to different charges under the Evidence Act 1906 (WA). The legal issues the court needed to address included whether the charges were properly joined, whether prejudice would result from the joinder, and whether the risk of an unfair trial was significant. Additionally, the court had to determine whether the evidence was cross-admissible under section 31A of the Evidence Act.

The Supreme Court considered whether the evidence regarding different drug charges was admissible as propensity evidence under section 31A. The court found that while the evidence was not "similar fact evidence," it constituted evidence of the accused's conduct, which qualified as propensity evidence. The key issue was whether this evidence had significant probative value regarding the allegations in the other charges and whether its admission would lead to an unacceptably high risk of an unfair trial. The court concluded that the evidence was significantly probative and that the risk of an unfair trial, while present, did not outweigh the public interest in adducing all relevant evidence. Therefore, the evidence was deemed cross-admissible, allowing the jury to consider the likelihood of the accused being involved in drug dealing on separate occasions.

The court ruled that the evidence in relation to the different drug charges was admissible under section 31A of the Evidence Act. The evidence was considered significantly probative of the other charges and, despite the risk of prejudice, the probative value justified its admission. The court held that the evidence of the accused's conduct in dealing with prohibited drugs was admissible to assist the jury in assessing the probability of the accused being involved in the alleged drug dealing on separate occasions.

The final orders of the court allowed the evidence pertaining to the different drug charges to be admitted, confirming the admissibility under section 31A of the Evidence Act. The court's decision upheld the joinder of the charges and rejected the appellant's argument for separate trials, thereby affirming the trial process as conducted.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The provisions of s 31A of the Evidence Act are in the following terms:31A. Propensity and relationship evidence(1)In this section -propensity evidence means -(a)similar fact evidence or other evidence of the conduct of the accused person; or(b)evidence of the character or reputation of the accused person or of a tendency that the accused person has or had;relationship evidence means evidence of the attitude or conduct of the accused person towards another person, or a class of persons, over a period of time.(2)Propensity evidence or relationship evidence is admissible in proceedings for an offence if the court considers -(a)that the evidence would, either by itself or having regard to other evidence adduced or to be adduced, have significant probative value; and(b)that the probative value of the evidence compared to the degree of risk of an unfair trial, is such that fair‑minded people would think that the public interest in adducing all relevant evidence of guilt must have priority over the risk of an unfair trial.(3)In considering the probative value of evidence for the purposes of subsection (2) it is not open to the court to have regard to the possibility that the evidence may be the result of collusion, concoction or suggestion. The purpose for which s 31A was introduced into the Evidence Act is referred to in Dair v The State of Western Australia [2008] WASCA 72; (2008) 36 WAR 413 by Steytler P, at [54] and Miller JA, at [179]. The history of the section is also dealt with in some detail by Buss JA in PIM v The State of Western Australia [2009] WASCA 131 at [289] ‑ [293]. The appellant contends that evidence in respect of count 1 and counts 2 and 3 is neither 'similar fact evidence' nor 'evidence of the conduct of the accused person' within the meaning of s 31A(1)(a) of the Evidence Act. It is contended that the evidence is therefore not propensity evidence as defined within s 31A(1)(a). I agree that the evidence is not similar fact evidence, but, in my opinion, it is clearly evidence of the conduct of the accused person. It is evidence of dealing in prohibited drugs, in the first instance by allegedly possessing a substantial quantity of prohibited drug with intent to sell or supply and in the second and third instances by allegedly supplying prohibited drugs in substantial quantities. Dealing in prohibited drugs, whether by selling or supplying, is, in my opinion, a course of conduct which comes within the definition of propensity evidence in s 31A(1)(a) of the Evidence Act. The real questions for determination are (a) whether the evidence on count 1 is significantly probative of the allegations in counts 2 and 3, and vice versa, and (b) whether, if significantly probative, there is nevertheless a significant and unacceptably high risk of an unfair trial if the evidence were to be admitted, which risk a fair‑minded person would think must have priority over the public interest in adducing all relevant evidence. If the evidence in relation to count 1 is admissible in relation to counts 2 and 3, and vice versa, the evidence is cross‑admissible in relation to count 1 and counts 2 and 3 respectively. The jury would be entitled to receive evidence in relation to count 1 to assist them in consideration of counts 2 and 3, and vice versa. They would then be able to assess the objective probability or improbability of the same person allegedly dealing in drugs in November 2007 and again allegedly dealing in drugs in April 2008.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established