VIM v The State of Western Australia

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT  :   THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)

CITATION:   "VIM" -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2005] WASCA 233

CORAM:   WHEELER JA

ROBERTS-SMITH JA
MILLER AJA

HEARD:   2 AUGUST 2005

DELIVERED          :   2 DECEMBER 2005

FILE NO/S:   CACR 10 of 2005

BETWEEN:   "VIM"

Appellant

AND

THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent

FILE NO/S              :CACR 38 of 2005

BETWEEN              :THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Appellant

AND

"VIM"
Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction              :  DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram  :FRENCH DCJ

File No  :IND 1288 of 2001

Catchwords:

Appeal - Criminal law and procedure - Joinder of charges of sexual offences against two female complainants - Offences against children by stepfather - Severance - Application for separate trials - Whether similar fact or propensity evidence - Whether evidence in relation to offences against one complainant admissible in relation to offences against other

Appeal - Criminal law and procedure - Application for separate trials - Whether prejudicial effect of similar fact or propensity evidence likely to outweigh its probative value - Principles applying to determination of admissibility of propensity evidence and joint trial of multiple charges of offences against two complainants

Appeal - Criminal law and procedure - Convictions of sexual offences - Whether verdicts inconsistent with verdicts of acquittal

Appeal - Criminal law and procedure - Jury - After third day of trial juror advised she was acquainted with son of accused in acrimonious circumstances - Juror discharged - Whether reasonable perception of bias of other jurors - Whether miscarriage of justice

Criminal law and procedure - State appeal against sentence - Aggregate sentence of 6 years' imprisonment for 31 separate sexual offences against two stepdaughters over eight years - Need for general deterrence - Whether undue weight on factors personal to offender - Whether sentences manifestly inadequate - Whether overall sentence reflected overall criminality

Legislation:

Criminal Code (WA), s 585

Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA), s 133

Evidence Act 1906 (WA), s 31A

Result:

Appeal against conviction dismissed
Appeal against sentence allowed

Category:    A

Representation:

CACR 10 of 2005

Counsel:

Appellant:     Mr T F Percy QC & Ms K J Everett

Respondent:     Mr S E Stone & Ms L Petrusa

Solicitors:

Appellant:     W L & K J Everett

Respondent:     State Director of Public Prosecutions

CACR 38 of 2005

Counsel:

Appellant:     Mr S E Stone & Ms L Petrusa

Respondent:     Mr T F Percy QC & Ms K J Everett

Solicitors:

Appellant:     State Director of Public Prosecutions

Respondent:     W L & K J Everett

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

B v The Queen [2002] WASCA 236

Bell v The Queen [2001] WASCA 40

Bishop v The Queen [2002] WASCA 79

Bosworth v The Queen [2004] WASCA 43

Boudville v The Queen [2001] WASCA 133

Broome v The Queen [1999] WASCA 202

Chinnery v The Queen [2000] WASCA 295

Clegg v The Queen [2000] WASCA 326

Cook v The Queen (2000) 22 WAR 67

D v The Queen [2003] WASCA…

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Details
Case
[2005] WASCA 233
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of VIM v The State of Western Australia involved an appeal against the conviction and sentence of the appellant, VIM, who was charged with multiple counts of sexual offences against two female complainants. The primary issues before the court were the admissibility of similar fact evidence in a joint trial, the prejudicial effect of such evidence, and the consistency of the jury's verdicts. The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in ordering a joint trial of all charges, asserting that there were no similar facts justifying such a trial and that the prejudicial effect of the evidence would outweigh its probative value. Additionally, the appellant contested the consistency of the jury's verdicts, claiming they were unsafe and unsatisfactory as they were inconsistent.

The court considered whether the trial judge erred in ordering a joint trial based on similar fact evidence and whether the prejudicial effect of such evidence outweighed its probative value. The court also examined the consistency of the jury's verdicts, noting that the credibility of the complainants was the central issue. The court examined the statutory provisions governing the admissibility of propensity evidence and joinder of charges, considering the legislative changes between the application for separate trials and the trial itself. It was noted that the law applicable to the decision on joinder was that which prevailed at the time of the ruling, even if a retrial were ordered.

In its reasoning, the court found that the trial judge did not err in ordering a joint trial, as there were indeed similar facts that justified a joint trial, despite the Crown's concession during the separate trials application. The court held that the probative value of the similar fact evidence outweighed the prejudicial effect, and the judge's consideration of practical advantages of a joint trial was secondary to the main issue of prejudice versus probative value. The court also concluded that the jury's verdicts, while seemingly inconsistent, were not unsafe or unsatisfactory as they did not prevent a conviction where the jury was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the complainants' testimonies. The verdicts of not guilty on certain counts did not affect the validity of the guilty verdicts on other counts, as the jury could have reasonably believed one complainant but not the other. The court rejected the appeal against conviction and sentence, affirming the trial judge's decisions.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

There were six grounds of appeal against conviction. Grounds 3 (failure to consider whether reasonable possibility of concoction) and 5 (inadequate direction on evidence of appellant's good character) were subsequently abandoned. The remaining grounds are:"GROUND ONE: SEPARATE TRIALS: WERE THERE ANY SIMILAR FACTS?1.The learned trial judge erred in ordering a joint trial of all the counts in the indictment on the basis of similar fact evidence, there being no evidence which at law was capable of being similar fact evidence.PARTICULARSa)To be admissible as evidence of similar fact rather than mere propensity the evidence on any given count needed to have such a striking similarity to another count that it was unlikely that the two offences could have been committed by other than the same person.b)The Crown conceded at the joint trials application that there was no strikingly similar feature that would justify a joint trial.c)The evidence of the Accused's relationship with both girls was effectively sought to be led as propensity evidence only.d)There were no two counts identified which would have justified a joint trial on the basis of similar fact evidence.e)The indictment should have been split to allow a separate trial for the counts relation to each of the two complainants.GROUND TWO: SEPARATE TRIALS - PREJUDICIAL EFFECT AND PROBATIVE VALUE2.The learned judge who heard the separate trials application erred in ordering a joint trial of all the counts in the indictment, the prejudicial effect of similar fact evidence at such a trial being likely to outweigh its probative value.PARTICULARSa)The 31 counts relating to the complainant LB should have been the subject of a separate trial to those 12 counts relating to the complainant JM.b)The Prosecution conceded that there would be significant prejudice to the Accused by the evidence to be led at a joint trial but contended that this was outweighed by the probative value of the similar fact evidence.c)His Honour erred by failing to:(i)have sufficient regard to, the degree of prejudice that would result from the joinder of the counts compared to the probative value of the similar fact evidence; and(ii)failed to make any finding to this effect.d)His Honour erred in giving significant weight to various 'practical' advantages of having a joint trial, which matters were secondary to a consideration of the prejudice that would result to the accused from the evidence led at such a trial compared to its probative value.…GROUND FOUR: SEPARATE TRIALS - DISSIMILAR COUNTS4.The learned judge erred in ordering a single joint trial where counts containing similar facts were to be tried together with counts which were not similar.PARTICULARSa)The indictment contained 44 counts relating to two complainants.b)Some of the counts involving the complainant LB had broad similarities to those involving JM.c)There were numerous counts where there were no unifying features between any counts relating to LB and any other count relating to JM.d)Any joint trial should only have been ordered in respect of the counts where there were similar fact counts; in accordance with the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal in Stickland v R.e)The other counts should have been tried at two further trials, as relating to the dissimilar LB counts and the others relating to the dissimilar JM counts.…GROUND SIX: INCONSISTENT VERDICTS6.The verdicts of the Jury, were unsafe and unsatisfactory, the not guilty verdicts returned in respect of each complainant being inconsistent with the guilty verdicts returned in respect of the same complainant.PARTICULARSa)The credibility of each complainant was the central issue at the trial.b)There was no independent evidence corroborating the testimony of either complainant.c)Unless the jury was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the truth of each complainant's evidence, there could be no conviction on any count in the indictment relating to that complainant.d)The verdicts of not guilty on counts 2, 5, 11, 14, 27, 28, 30, 31, indicate that the jury were not satisfied of the truth of testimony of the complainant LB on those counts.e)The verdicts of not guilty on counts 32, 33, indicate that the jury were not satisfied of the truth of the testimony of the complainant JM on those counts.f)There being no additional factor which would have permitted the jury to reach different verdicts on the counts which resulted in convictions, the verdicts of guilty were accordingly unsafe and should be set aside."

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

For completeness, it is necessary to mention s 31A of the Evidence Act 1906 (WA) which came into operation on 1 January 2005:"(1) In this section ‑'propensity evidence' means - (a)similar fact evidence or other evidence of the conduct of the accused person; or(b)evidence of the character or reputation of the accused person or of a tendency that the accused person has or had;'relationship evidence' means evidence of the attitude or conduct of the accused person towards another person, or a class of persons, over a period of time.(2)Propensity evidence or relationship evidence is admissible in proceedings for an offence if the court considers - (a)that the evidence would, either by itself or having regard to other evidence adduced or to be adduced, have significant probative value; and(b)that the probative value of the evidence compared to the degree of risk of an unfair trial, is such that fair-minded people would think that the public interest in adducing all relevant evidence of guilt must have priority over the ['acceptable'?] risk of an unfair trial.(3)In considering the probative value of evidence for the purposes of subsection (2) it is not open to the court to have regard to the possibility that the evidence may be the result of collusion, concoction or suggestion." It can thus be seen that the statutory law relating to joinder which applied at the time H H Jackson DCJ made his ruling was s 585 of the Code in what we will describe as its original form; the law which applied at the time of trial was s 585 in its amended form; the law which applies now is that contained in s 133 of the CPA and s 31A of the Evidence Act. It was common ground before us that were the appeal against conviction to succeed and a retrial be ordered, any application for severance would fall to be decided according to the law as it currently stands. We accept that to be so. The legislative changes relating to the admissibility of propensity evidence, joinder of charges and severance, all go to matters of procedure, and:"A person who commits a crime does not have a right to be tried in any particular way; merely a right to be tried according to the practice and procedure prevailing at the time of trial. The principle is sometimes succinctly … expressed by saying … that no‑one has a vested right in any form of procedure". (Rodway v The Queen (1990) 169 CLR 515, 521) However, if that issue arises at all in this appeal, it will do so only in the context of the application of the proviso (s 30(4) Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA)). It is first necessary to consider whether or not the grounds of appeal have been made out and that is to be determined having regard to the law as it applied at the time the ruling was made. In his ruling on 16 January 2004, H H Jackson DCJ began by outlining the submissions advanced by the parties. For the appellant it was argued that as neither sister could give evidence directly corroborative of the appellant's offending against the other, to permit the matters to go ahead in one trial would be to raise unacceptable prejudice against him which could not be cured by judicial direction to the jury. It was also submitted there was no sufficient basis for the admission of the other complainant's evidence on the ground that it was admissible as evidence of propensity or similar fact.

Decision

Reasons for decision

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT: This is another case which is importantly affected by changes to the relevant law between its inception and its resolution following trial. The appellant was indicted on 44 counts of sexual abuse against two complainants, "L" (counts 1 ‑ 31 inclusive) and "J" (counts 32 ‑ 44 inclusive). On 5 December 2003 an application for an order for separate trials was argued in the District Court before his Honour Judge H H Jackson DCJ. On 16 January 2004 his Honour dismissed the application and gave reasons. Following trial before her Honour Judge French and a jury between 18 January and 2 February 2005, the appellant was convicted in relation to the complainant L, of 10 counts of rape, contrary to s 325 of the Criminal Code 1913 (WA) ("the Code") (counts 1, 7, 8, 10, 13, 20, 23, 25, 26 and 29) and 10 counts of indecent assault contrary to s 328 of the Code (counts 6, 9, 12, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22 and 24). He was convicted in relation to the complainant J of one count of rape (count 34), three counts of indecent assault, contrary to s 324B of the Code (counts 35, 38 and 40) and seven counts of sexual penetration without consent contrary to s 324D of the Code (counts 36, 37, 39, 41, 42, 43 and 44). The jury returned verdicts of acquittal in relation to the complainant L on five counts of rape (counts 2, 5, 11, 14 and 27), three counts of indecent assault (counts 15, 28 and 30), one count of sexual penetration without consent and two counts of indecent dealing of a child under 14 years (counts 3 and 4). In relation to the complainant J, the jury returned verdicts of acquittal on two counts of indecent dealing with a child under 14 years (counts 32 and 33). The verdicts of acquittal in respect of counts 3, 4 and 15 were returned by direction of her Honour. On 16 March 2005 the appellant was sentenced to a total of 6 years' imprisonment with eligibility for parole backdated to 2 February 2005. The appellant's application for leave to appeal against conviction was filed on 22 February 2005; the State's notice of appeal against sentence was filed on 30 March 2005. There were six grounds of appeal against conviction. Grounds 3 (failure to consider whether reasonable possibility of concoction) and 5 (inadequate direction on evidence of appellant's good character) were subsequently abandoned. The remaining grounds are:"GROUND ONE: SEPARATE TRIALS: WERE THERE ANY SIMILAR FACTS?1.The learned trial judge erred in ordering a joint trial of all the counts in the indictment on the basis of similar fact evidence, there being no evidence which at law was capable of being similar fact evidence.PARTICULARSa)To be admissible as evidence of similar fact rather than mere propensity the evidence on any given count needed to have such a striking similarity to another count that it was unlikely that the two offences could have been committed by other than the same person.b)The Crown conceded at the joint trials application that there was no strikingly similar feature that would justify a joint trial.c)The evidence of the Accused's relationship with both girls was effectively sought to be led as propensity evidence only.d)There were no two counts identified which would have justified a joint trial on the basis of similar fact evidence.e)The indictment should have been split to allow a separate trial for the counts relation to each of the two complainants.GROUND TWO: SEPARATE TRIALS - PREJUDICIAL EFFECT AND PROBATIVE VALUE2.The learned judge who heard the separate trials application erred in ordering a joint trial of all the counts in the indictment, the prejudicial effect of similar fact evidence at such a trial being likely to outweigh its probative value.PARTICULARSa)The 31 counts relating to the complainant LB should have been the subject of a separate trial to those 12 counts relating to the complainant JM.b)The Prosecution conceded that there would be significant prejudice to the Accused by the evidence to be led at a joint trial but contended that this was outweighed by the probative value of the similar fact evidence.c)His Honour erred by failing to:(i)have sufficient regard to, the degree of prejudice that would result from the joinder of the counts compared to the probative value of the similar fact evidence; and(ii)failed to make any finding to this effect.d)His Honour erred in giving significant weight to various 'practical' advantages of having a joint trial, which matters were secondary to a consideration of the prejudice that would result to the accused from the evidence led at such a trial compared to its probative value.…GROUND FOUR: SEPARATE TRIALS - DISSIMILAR COUNTS4.The learned judge erred in ordering a single joint trial where counts containing similar facts were to be tried together with counts which were not similar.PARTICULARSa)The indictment contained 44 counts relating to two complainants.b)Some of the counts involving the complainant LB had broad similarities to those involving JM.c)There were numerous counts where there were no unifying features between any counts relating to LB and any other count relating to JM.d)Any joint trial should only have been ordered in respect of the counts where there were similar fact counts; in accordance with the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal in Stickland v R.e)The other counts should have been tried at two further trials, as relating to the dissimilar LB counts and the others relating to the dissimilar JM counts.…GROUND SIX: INCONSISTENT VERDICTS6.The verdicts of the Jury, were unsafe and unsatisfactory, the not guilty verdicts returned in respect of each complainant being inconsistent with the guilty verdicts returned in respect of the same complainant.PARTICULARSa)The credibility of each complainant was the central issue at the trial.b)There was no independent evidence corroborating the testimony of either complainant.c)Unless the jury was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the truth of each complainant's evidence, there could be no conviction on any count in the indictment relating to that complainant.d)The verdicts of not guilty on counts 2, 5, 11, 14, 27, 28, 30, 31, indicate that the jury were not satisfied of the truth of testimony of the complainant LB on those counts.e)The verdicts of not guilty on counts 32, 33, indicate that the jury were not satisfied of the truth of the testimony of the complainant JM on those counts.f)There being no additional factor which would have permitted the jury to reach different verdicts on the counts which resulted in convictions, the verdicts of guilty were accordingly unsafe and should be set aside."

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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