R v Delgado-Guerra

Case [2001] QCA 266


SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION: R v Delgado-Guerra; ex parte A-G  [2001] QCA 266
PARTIES: R
v
DELGADO-GUERRA, Carlos
(appellant)

FILE NO/S:

PARTIES: 

CA No 324 of 2000
DC No 1143 of 2000

R
v
DELGADO-GUERRA, Carlos
(respondent)
EX PARTE ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF QUEENSLAND
(appellant)

FILE NO/S:

DIVISION:

CA No 338 of 2000
DC No 1143 of 2000

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING: Appeal against conviction; sentence appeal by A-G (Qld)
ORIGINATING COURT:

District Court at Brisbane

DELIVERED ON: 17 July 2001
DELIVERED AT: Brisbane
HEARING DATE: 29 May 2001
JUDGES: McMurdo P, Thomas JA and Helman J
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, each concurring as to the orders made
ORDER:

1.   Appeal against conviction dismissed. 

2.   The Attorney-General’s appeal is allowed.  The sentences at first instance are varied by replacing the sentences on counts 2 and 5 with sentences of 15 years imprisonment.  The declaration of serious violent offence should be set aside and replaced by declaration that the conviction on count 6 is a conviction of a serious violent offence.

CATCHWORDS:

CRIMINAL LAW – PARTICULAR OFFENCES – BURGLARY AND LIKE OFFENCES - OFFENCES AGAINST THE PERSON – SEXUAL OFFENCES – RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT – where appellant convicted of breaking and entering a dwelling house with intent, rape and sexual assault

CRIMINAL LAW – EVIDENCE – SIMILAR FACT – ADMISSIBILITY GENERALLY – whether propensity evidence properly admitted – purposes served by the reception of propensity evidence – purposes included identifying offender and rebutting innocent explanation for his fingerprints near point of entry – whether probative value outweighed the prejudicial effect – adequacy of evidence to pass the test in Pfennig – no need for striking similarity in all respects

CRIMINAL LAW – EVIDENCE – SIMILAR FACTS – RELEVANCE – PROOF OF IDENTITY OF THE ACCUSED – GENERALLY – whether a direction must be given such that the jury must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the propensity evidence before it can be used to support an inference of guilt – where the identify of the perpetrator is in question – ‘signature test’ rejected – whether need for separate proof beyond reasonable doubt of each similar fact when the purpose of the evidence is to support the identification of the accused as the perpetrator –McGranaghan test rejected – whether propensity evidence should be regarded as an indispensable intermediate step in the reasoning process towards an inference of guilt – where such direction need not be given and the propensity evidence is to be regarded as a strand in assisting to identify the offender and not a separate link which itself proves the identity of the offender

EVIDENCE – ADMISSIBILITY AND RELEVENCY – HEARSAY STATEMENTS – whether admissions of appellant made by his counsel on earlier plea of guilty were admissible to prove earlier incident – whether counsel an agent with ostensible authority to make statements on the appellants behalf – prima facie admissible although the truth of such admissions might be rebutted

CRIMINAL LAW…

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Details
AGLC
R v Delgado-Guerra [2001] QCA 266
Case
[2001] QCA 266
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case before the court, the appellant was convicted of multiple offences including breaking and entering a dwelling house with intent, rape, and sexual assault. The prosecution presented evidence of similar incidents that occurred previously, which the defence objected to on the grounds of its prejudicial effect. The court was required to decide whether the similar fact evidence was properly admitted, its purpose, and whether its probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect. The court also needed to determine if the propensity evidence could assist in identifying the offender and if a separate proof beyond reasonable doubt was necessary for each similar fact. Additionally, the admissibility of hearsay statements made by the appellant's counsel during an earlier plea was considered.

The court found that the similar fact evidence was properly admitted as it served purposes such as identifying the offender and rebutting any innocent explanations for the appellant's fingerprints near the point of entry. The court held that the probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect, and there was no need for a striking similarity in all respects. The court rejected the ‘signature test’ and the McGranaghan test, stating that propensity evidence should not be regarded as a separate link that proves the identity of the offender. Instead, it is to be regarded as a strand in assisting to identify the offender. The court also found that the admissions made by the appellant's counsel during an earlier plea were prima facie admissible, although the truth of such admissions might be rebutted.

The appeal against the conviction was dismissed, but the Attorney-General's appeal was allowed. The sentences on counts 2 and 5 were varied to 15 years imprisonment, and the declaration of serious violent offence was set aside and replaced by a declaration that the conviction on count 6 is a conviction of a serious violent offence. The court determined that the appropriate sentence for the break and enter followed by rape of the occupant in her own home was 15 years. The ambiguity in the orders endorsed on the indictment was clarified, and the judgment was amended accordingly.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal against conviction dismissed.

2. The Attorney-General’s appeal is allowed. The sentences at first instance are varied by replacing the sentences on counts 2 and 5 with sentences of 15 years imprisonment. The declaration of serious violent offence should be set aside and replaced by declaration that the conviction on count 6 is a conviction of a serious violent offence.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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