Walters v The State of Western Australia

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT :   THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)

CITATION:   WALTERS -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2018] WASCA 3

CORAM:   MAZZA JA

BEECH JA
CHANEY J

HEARD:   14 DECEMBER 2017

DELIVERED          :   9 JANUARY 2018

FILE NO/S:   CACR 66 of 2017

BETWEEN:   ROBERT WALTERS

Appellant

AND

THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction              :  DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram  :PETRUSA DCJ

File No  :IND DER 29 of 2016

Catchwords:

Criminal law - Appeal - Sentencing - First and second limbs of the totality principle - Relevance of advanced age and age-related illness - Sexual offences against a child over 13 and under 16 years - Pregnancy and birth of a child resulted

Legislation:

Nil

Result:

Leave to appeal on ground 1 refused
Appeal dismissed

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant:     Ms N R Sinton

Respondent:     Mr J A Scholz

Solicitors:

Appellant:     Legal Aid (WA)

Respondent:     Director of Public Prosecutions (WA)

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

FGC v The State of Western Australia [2008] WASCA 47; (2008) 183 A Crim R 313

Greenland v The State of Western Australia [2017] WASCA 83

Gulyas v The State of Western Australia [2007] WASCA 263; (2007) 178 A Crim R 539

JAF v The State of Western Australia [2008] WASCA 231; (2008) 190 A Crim R 124

Tapper v The State of Western Australia [2016] WASCA 140

The State of Western Australia v FJG [2012] WASCA 206

The State of Western Australia v PJW [2015] WASCA 113

  1. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT:    This is an appeal against sentence.

  2. The appellant was charged on indictment in the District Court with two offences contrary to s 321(2) of the Criminal Code (WA). As amended, the appellant was charged that:[1]

    (1)On a date unknown between 11 June 1998 and about 7 January 2000 at Derby [the appellant] sexually penetrated [the victim] a child of or over the age of 13 years and under the age of 16 years by penetrating her vagina.

    (2)On a date unknown between 11 June 1998 and about 7 January 2000 at Derby [the appellant] sexually penetrated [the victim] a child of or over the age of 13 years and under the age of 16 years by penetrating her vagina with his penis.

    [1] Appeal book, 26, 31.

  3. On 13 February 2017, the appellant, who by then was aged 86 years of age, pleaded guilty to these offences and was duly convicted of them.  The pleas were entered at the first reasonable opportunity.  Petrusa DCJ sentenced the appellant on count 1 to 1 year 6 months' immediate imprisonment (reduced from 2 years for totality) and, on count 2, to 3 years' immediate imprisonment.  She ordered that the sentences be served cumulatively.  Thus, the total effective sentence she imposed was 4 years 6 months' immediate imprisonment.  The appellant was made eligible for parole and the sentence was backdated to commence on 22 January 2017.[2]

    [2] ts 14.

  4. The…

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Details
Case
[2018] WASCA 3
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In this case, the appellant was convicted and sentenced for two counts of sexual penetration of a child over 13 years and under 16 years of age, and appeals against the length of the total effective sentence. The Court of Appeal was required to determine whether the sentence imposed infringed the first or second limb of the totality principle. The appellant, aged 86, argued that the sentence infringed the first limb of the totality principle, as it was excessive in light of his advanced age and age-related illness. The Court was also required to determine whether the sentence infringed the second limb of the totality principle, which concerns whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.

The Court of Appeal found that neither ground of appeal had been made out. The Court considered the appellant's age and health but noted that these factors were already taken into account by the District Court Judge in reducing the sentences on each count from 2 years to 1 year 6 months and 3 years respectively. The Court held that the total effective sentence of 4 years and 6 months' imprisonment was not manifestly excessive, and thus did not infringe the second limb of the totality principle. The Court also noted that the appellant's age and health did not mitigate the seriousness of the offences, which involved the sexual exploitation of a vulnerable child. The Court found that the District Court Judge had appropriately exercised her discretion in imposing the sentence.

The appeal was dismissed, and the original sentence was upheld. The Court of Appeal did not make any orders altering the sentence imposed by the District Court.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT: This is an appeal against sentence. The appellant was charged on indictment in the District Court with two offences contrary to s 321(2) of the Criminal Code (WA). As amended, the appellant was charged that:[1](1)On a date unknown between 11 June 1998 and about 7 January 2000 at Derby [the appellant] sexually penetrated [the victim] a child of or over the age of 13 years and under the age of 16 years by penetrating her vagina.(2)On a date unknown between 11 June 1998 and about 7 January 2000 at Derby [the appellant] sexually penetrated [the victim] a child of or over the age of 13 years and under the age of 16 years by penetrating her vagina with his penis.[1] Appeal book, 26, 31. On 13 February 2017, the appellant, who by then was aged 86 years of age, pleaded guilty to these offences and was duly convicted of them. The pleas were entered at the first reasonable opportunity. Petrusa DCJ sentenced the appellant on count 1 to 1 year 6 months' immediate imprisonment (reduced from 2 years for totality) and, on count 2, to 3 years' immediate imprisonment. She ordered that the sentences be served cumulatively. Thus, the total effective sentence she imposed was 4 years 6 months' immediate imprisonment. The appellant was made eligible for parole and the sentence was backdated to commence on 22 January 2017.[2][2] ts 14. The appellant does not challenge the individual sentences. The two grounds of appeal focus upon the length of the total effective sentence. In substance, ground 1 alleges that the sentence infringes the first limb of the totality principle, while ground 2 alleges that the sentence infringes the second limb of that principle.[3] Leave to appeal has been granted on ground 2, while the question of leave to appeal on ground 1 was referred to the hearing of the appeal.[4][3] Appeal book, 7.[4] Order of Mazza JA, 19 May 2017; appeal book, 4. For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that neither ground has been made out and that the appeal should be dismissed. The facts of the appellant's offending are, in summary, as follows.[5][5] This summary is taken mostly from ts 4 ‑ 5. The victim is an indigenous female who, at all relevant times, was between the ages of 13 and 14 years of age. She was vulnerable to the predations of the appellant by reason of her young age and her social circumstances. The appellant was almost 70 years old. On a number of occasions between 11 June 1998 and about 7 January 2000, the victim attended at the appellant's home in Derby, where she engaged in sexual behaviour with the appellant in exchange for money. It is accepted by the appellant that the offences were committed against the background that he had, on other occasions, paid the victim for sexual favours. In other words, the offences were not isolated. In respect of count 1, the State initially alleged that the appellant strapped on a rubber dildo and inserted it into the victim's vagina. The appellant disputed that he penetrated the victim with a dildo, but accepted that he penetrated her with his penis. In the end, the appellant was sentenced on the basis that count 1 was constituted by a penile penetration of the victim's vagina. When the appellant had finished penetrating the victim, he provided her with money, and she left his house.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established